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I Respectfully Dissent 
 
Linking Judicial Voting Behavior, Media Coverage, and Public Responses  
in the Study of U.S. Supreme Court Decisions 
 
Michael A. Zilis 
 
 This dissertation is a study of what happens after the Supreme Court rules.  It begins by 
identifying a critical feature absent from existing studies of judicial policy legitimation: the 
information conveyed by the press to the public.  The dissertation combines disparate research, 
theory, and the use of multiple methods to answer important questions about Supreme Court 
influence. 
I develop Dissensus Dynamics Theory to explain how characteristics of judicial decisions 
impact media coverage.  The model shows that voting outcomes on the Supreme Court play the 
most important role in shaping how the press portrays legal controversies.  The central place of 
voting outcomes comes from their value to journalists who must characterize judicial decisions 
while subject to considerable constraints.  In cases where dissent and division on the bench is 
high, news organizations portray rulings in negative terms, drawing on frames raised by 
dissenting justices and by critics of the Court. 
 To explore Dissensus Dynamics Theory more rigorously, I employ a diverse range of 
tests, with each providing unique insight.  A case study of property rights coverage demonstrates 
the direct and indirect impacts of dissenting votes on coverage.  I show that dissent encourages 
the press to seek out critics of a ruling, but also to highlight resonant legal arguments and 
evocative language from dissenting opinions.  As such, dissent leads to media portrayals of 
property rights law that emphasize multiple, competing perspectives in place of frames more 
deferential to the Court. 
I examine Dissensus Dynamics Theory further by coupling content analysis data with 
statistical tests.  I find evidence that judicial dissensus increases the prevalence of negative 
frames in newspaper and cable news accounts of decisions.  Dissensus also increases the 
 ix 
prevalence of aggressive rhetoric in cable news coverage.  And ideological diversity in majority 
coalitions affects coverage under certain conditions.  These results hold even when taking into 
account the most powerful alternative explanations to Dissensus Dynamics Theory. 
 In the final chapters, I demonstrate why media coverage matters.  Experimental evidence 
shows that negative frames limit support for Supreme Court rulings, even as subjects continue to 
view the institution favorably.  These findings bridge what have been, until now, disparate lines 
of inquiry involving law and politics, political communication, and public opinion.  They suggest 
new avenues for future research on judicial decision-making.  And ultimately, the dissertation 
provides strong evidence that voting outcomes play a central role in how the popular 










 Interest in the United States Supreme Court has perhaps never been higher than it was on 
June 28, 2012.  On the final day of its term, the Court was prepared to announce its decisions in a 
series of cases that would determine the fate of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(PPACA), more commonly known as Obamacare.  Healthcare reform had generated substantial 
controversy since at least 2009, when Congress began debate on a series of related bills.  
Disagreements lingered long after President Barack Obama signed the PPACA into law on 
March 23, 2010.  Challenges to the law worked through the judicial system quickly, before most 
of its provisions could take effect.  In November 2011, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
three cases involving it.  The Court allocated an unprecedented three days in March 2012 for oral 
arguments in these cases, at which point it became clear that five justices had serious 
reservations about the constitutionality of the PPACA.   
Two factors conspired to heighten interest in the decision.  The Court’s deliberation 
generated a substantial amount of drama, since the notoriously secretive institution had given 
few hints as to how it would rule.  Indeed, most observers expected the fate of the law to hinge 
on the vote of a single justice (most likely Anthony Kennedy, who often sided with the majority 
in high profile cases).  The decision would be announced on the final day of the Court’s term.  At 
the same time, the consequences of the Court’s decision were monumental: in all likelihood, the 
Court would choose to make a determination on the fate of the law.  For opponents of 
Obamacare, the ruling represented the final chance to kill a law they had denounced yet failed to 
defeat for years.  For supporters, the ruling would either consolidate their victories or thwart 
what had been decades of agitation in favor of a national healthcare law.  If the Court struck 
down the law, there was little chance the Congress could pass a constitutional piece of healthcare 
legislation in the near future, if ever. 
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On the morning of June 28, the Court filled with observers.  Outside, thousands of 
activists talked, chanted, and stewed.  Major media outlets had focused on the litigation for 
months, with coverage peaking in recent weeks.  Reporters waited inside the Courtroom and on 
the Courthouse steps.  Cable news offered live, uninterrupted coverage (and speculation) 
throughout the morning.  One of the leading websites for judicial news – scotusblog.com – 
reported 1000 page views per second, 866,000 readers on its live blog, and 5.3 million hits 
during the day.1  On June 29, national newspapers followed up with front page reporting and 
analysis.  Coverage of the ruling continued to saturate the news long after it was announced. 
In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court upheld most major provisions of the PPACA 
including its most controversial piece – the “individual mandate” that all Americans purchase 
healthcare.  Surprising observers, the Court found the mandate beyond the scope of Congress’s 
power to regulate interstate commerce, but a permissible exercise of its power to levy taxes 
(National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius).  Chief Justice John Roberts wrote the 
majority opinion, joined by a coalition of four justices with whom he rarely aligned.  The Court’s 
ruling paved the way for Obamacare to take effect, another step in the remaking of healthcare 
law in the United States. 
 
Responses to the Obamacare Ruling 
How did Americans respond to one of the most important Supreme Court decisions in 
modern history?  Any full examination of this question must weigh a number of factors that 
come to bear on attitudes, which I define as evaluations of social and political issues (see Eagly 
and Chaiken 1993, Eagly et al. 1999).  These might include traditional ingredients of opinion 
formation like predispositions (partisanship and ideology chief among them), group-based 
reasoning, and issue specifics (Zaller 1992, Converse 1964, Campbell et al. 1960).  Many of 
these ingredients point to a static response, since the Supreme Court’s decision changed little 
information people possessed about the law itself.  Indeed, Americans had been exposed to a 
wealth of information about Obamacare since its proposal, making it among the most high 
profile pieces of legislation ever adopted.  But Americans reserve a special place for the Supreme 
Court in their understanding of politics.  To the extent that they see the Court as legitimate, 
                                                
1 “Live Blog of the Healthcare Decision.” June 28, 2012. http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/live-blog-of-the-
health-care-decision-sponsored-by-bloomberg-law/. 
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credible, and nonpartisan, Americans defer to its judgment (Caldeira and Gibson 1992).  
Scholars suggest that the Court may legitimate policies – increasing support for them – with its 
rulings (Mondak 1994; Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2005; Woodson, Gibson, and Lodge 2011).  
This effect would be dynamic, causing opponents of Obamacare to newly accept and possibly 
support the legislation.  Little evidence exists that Americans changed their views about 
healthcare law so dramatically (Blumenthal 2012). 
But it is incomplete to suggest that attitudes towards the Obamacare ruling result from 
pre-decision attitudes and views about the Supreme Court alone.  In fact, to make sense of the 
decision and the law, Americans paid careful attention to another actor in this process – the news 
media.  The ruling received unprecedented coverage, which offered numerous and multi-faceted 
considerations.  Consider a few common themes that animated this coverage. 
First, the press highlighted the Court’s finding that the PPACA represented little more 
than Congress’s exercise of its power to tax (Levs 2012, Mears and Cohen 2012, Cuccinelli 
2012).2  According to Robert’s opinion, “It is reasonable to construe what Congress has done as 
increasing taxes on those who have a certain amount of income, but choose to go without health 
insurance.  Such legislation is within Congress’s power to tax.”  A Los Angeles Times headline 
read, “Supreme Court Upholds Healthcare Law as Tax Measure.” CNN simplified the ruling 
with the headline, “Supreme Court: Mandate Penalty is a Tax.”3  Many accounts explained in 
considerable detail Robert’s reasoning, which rejected the argument that the law compelled 
individuals to purchase a commodity – healthcare – against their will.  The media framed the 
decision as one that saw a more limited role for Congress: to levy a small tax on those who did 
not purchase healthcare, without making their actions criminal. 
Second, the press noted the vehement objections of the four dissenting justices on the 
Court to the ruling.  It made clear that, given the opportunity, these justices would have struck 
down the entirety of the PPACA.  The press highlighted the dissenters’ finding that Congress 
                                                
2 Levs, Josh. “What the Supreme Court Ruled on Healthcare ‘Tax.’” July 5, 2012. 
http://edition.cnn.com/2012/07/05/politics/scotus-health-care-tax/index.html. Mears, Bill and Tom Cohen. 
“Emotions High After Supreme Court Upholds Health Care Law.” June 29, 2012. 
http://edition.cnn.com/2012/06/28/politics/supreme-court-health-ruling/index.html. Cuccinelli, Kenneth T. “Victory 
in Defeat.” National Review. June 29, 2012. 
3 Sahadi, Jeanne. “Supreme Court: Mandate Penalty is Tax.” June 28, 2012. 
http://money.cnn.com/2012/06/28/pf/taxes/health_reform_new_taxes/index.htm. Savage, David G. “Supreme Court 
Upholds Healthcare Law as Tax Measure.” Los Angeles Times. June 29, 2012.  
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intended to regulate commerce in healthcare, which was beyond the scope of its constitutional 
power (and on this point, John Roberts agreed).  According to the dissenters, however, it was 
erroneous to construe the PPACA as a tax measure. 
Third, the press highlighted the surprise outcome, which saw the reliably conservative 
John Roberts break with the other conservatives on the Court to uphold the law. According to the 
New York Times, the case featured the first vote to unite Roberts, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen 
Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan against their four conservative colleagues.  Some 
reports even suggested Roberts changed his vote, deciding only in the days before the decision to 
uphold Obamacare.4 
Did such coverage make a difference in how Americans viewed the decision?  One may 
think about these press themes in terms of how they exert pressure on popular opinion about the 
ruling.  The first – the majority reasoning – has a legitimating effect, potentially increasing 
support for the ruling and the law.  It has the dual impact of making salient an argument in favor 
of the healthcare law – that it endorses a tax, not a wholesale government intrusion into the lives 
of Americans – to observers while also imparting the imprimatur of Court approval on the law.  
The second – the dissenting counterargument – casts doubt on the majority’s reasoning and 
reinforces negative attitudes towards the law.  The third – the voting coalition narrative – may, in 
this case, buttress the Court’s reputation as a non-partisan institution whose members put aside 
ideological predispositions when analyzing law. 
In even the most high profile rulings, when American attentiveness to the Court is high, it 
is rare for citizens to read judicial opinions directly.  Rather, they depend on the press to 
characterize rulings for them (Davis 1994, Franklin and Kosaki 1995).  The frames that the 
media employs – using the language of the majority voting coalition, explaining the objections of 
dissenters, depicting the Court as non-partisan – may affect popular opinion in meaningful ways.  
Indeed, they may exert the most important influence on public understanding of the law. 
But despite the fact that a wealth of research considers how public opinion reacts to 
Supreme Court actions, scholars have very little sense about how the press covers the institution.  
In fact, in many studies of the Court and opinion, the press is all but invisible.  And when 
experimental research acknowledges that the press may matter, it commonly does so by 
                                                
4 “Siding with the Liberal Wing.” New York Times. June 29, 2012. Crawford, Jan. “Roberts Switched Views to 
Uphold Healthcare Law.” July 1, 2012. http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-3460_162-57464549 
/roberts-switched-views-to-uphold-health-care-law. 
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presenting stylized news reports to subjects with the intention of communicating, simply, that the 
Court has ruled on an issue.  As the Obamacare case shows, however, media reports are rarely 
this straightforward.  But of how coverage takes shape, and how it may affect our understanding 
of popular opinion and the Supreme Court, we have little idea. 
 
Overview and Argument 
In this dissertation, I explore the content of press coverage surrounding Supreme Court 
rulings.  My research follows in the tradition of sociolegal studies, which commonly trace the 
stature of specific laws in American society, and also in a new line of public opinion research 
that explores the effect of judicial decisions on attitudes.  My approach differs from these lines of 
research, however, by viewing a Court ruling as one piece of the puzzle: an event that sets in 
motion a response from the media.  I suggest that the popular understanding of the law has its 
roots in the ways in which the press interprets and portrays judicial decisions.  These 
interpretations and portrayals are at once case specific and generalizeable.  In the case of the 
Obamacare decision, the specifics included a unique clash, drawn largely along partisan lines, 
between a sitting president and an entrenched opposition, adjudicated by a divided Court, to 
determine the fate of one of the most contentious political issues in recent decades.  At the same 
time, judicial decisions also lend themselves to systematic coverage in the press, since the 
procedures, traditions, and membership of the Supreme Court are a remarkably stable piece of 
American politics (Davis 1994). 
This dissertation is one of the first systematic studies to link Supreme Court decisions, 
press coverage, and public opinion.  By taking seriously the role played by the media in this 
process, I uncover a systematic bias in existing research, which largely neglects the press.  My 
findings are some of the first to demonstrate the powerful effects of judicial voting decisions on 
the popular portrayals of Supreme Court rulings.  They have implications for a diverse range of 
fields, including studies of political communication, accounts of public opinion, and models of 
judicial voting behavior. 
The dissertation proceeds as follows.  In Chapter 2, I review the literature on the popular 
importance of Supreme Court decisions.  Almost all of this literature treats judicial rulings as a 
simple event communicated directly to the public.  I explore some of the shortcomings of this 
approach and contrast it with the multiple method approach I employ.  In Chapter 3, I describe 
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Dissensus Dynamics Theory.  I argue that the content of media reports takes shape in response 
to the characteristics of judicial decisions, most notably the voting outcomes on the Supreme 
Court. 
 In Chapter 4, I provide the first test of Dissensus Dynamics Theory, using a case study of 
two takings law decisions: Lingle v. Chevron, Inc. (2005) and Kelo v. City of New London 
(2005).  I use a most-similar design, demonstrating that despite the substantive similarities of the 
rulings, differences in their voting outcomes lead to distinct media coverage of them.  The cases 
provide evidence that press coverage not only follows from votes but also from the arguments 
raised by the majority and dissenting coalitions in their written opinions.  In Chapter 5, I offer a 
more general test of Dissensus Dynamics Theory, looking at the way in which national 
newspapers report on important Supreme Court decisions.  I find evidence that the press portrays 
dissensual rulings in more unfavorable terms than consensual ones.  I also show that press 
coverage responds to the makeup of the Court’s voting coalitions, with dissensual and 
ideologically divided rulings receiving the most negative coverage.  Chapter 6 offers a further 
test of Dissensus Dynamics Theory, focusing on cable news reports.  Much like newspapers, 
cable news outlets respond to votes on the Supreme Court.  In particular, dissensual decisions 
engender incivility and negativity in broadcast news reports.   
In Chapter 7, I explore the impact of Court coverage on public opinion with an 
experimental study.  I demonstrate that people’s opinions about legal controversies change in 
response to the frames highlighted by the media.  This holds even after people are made aware of 
a Court ruling on the controversy.  I suggest that the media environment circumscribes the power 
of the Supreme Court to legitimate controversial policies.  I conclude by exploring the 
implications of these findings for research involving judicial politics, political communication, 
and public opinion. 
Throughout the dissertation, I argue that the shortcomings of existing research on the 
Supreme Court necessitate a careful examination of how the press covers the institution.  I show 
that the constraints of the newsroom cause reporters to shape their coverage in response to voting 
signals offered by the Court, which in turn has important consequences for how scholars 











Institutional Legitimacy and Public Reactions to Supreme Court Decisions: 
A Review of the Literature 
  
This dissertation begins with a simple question: What is the popular impact of high 
profile Supreme Court decisions?  Most studies that have attempted to answer this question focus 
on the attitudes of Americans towards judicial rulings.  I review that literature here.   
I begin by exploring the basis of Supreme Court legitimacy.  According to many scholars, 
this legitimacy enables the institution to create consensus and engender support for the policies it 
endorses – a process called policy legitimation.  Other research demonstrates important limits on 
legitimation by investigating the conditions under which the Court is most persuasive.  But the 
policy legitimation hypothesis fails spectacularly at times, since a number of rulings generate 
backlash after the Court releases them.   
After taking stock of this contradiction, I argue that simple models of opinion reaction to 
Supreme Court decisions leave out an essential piece of the story: the role played by the news 
media in translating decisions to the public.  By neglecting the news media, I suggest, existing 
research is systematically biased in favor of uncovering legitimation effects.  And at the same 
time, it is unprepared to offer any explanations about what may drive backlash.  I close with an 
argument for bringing the media into the study of the Supreme Court and the consequences this 
choice may have for our understanding of opinion reactions to rulings.  
 
Institutional Legitimacy 
 How do Americans view the Supreme Court?  Might the Supreme Court, as a credible 
source with a well of diffuse support, use its decisions to increase public approval of 
controversial policies (Mondak 1990, 1994)?  One landmark study uses the image of the 
institution as a “republican schoolmaster,” exploring whether it can instruct the public in a 
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manner that is “gentle but effective” (Franklin and Kosaki 1989, 781).  Others consider the 
possibility that the Court decisions increase policy compliance (Johnson 1967), policy 
acceptance (Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2005; Woodson, Gibson, and Lodge 2011), and 
popular support for controversial positions.  Given the standing of the Supreme Court in 
American politics, it is not surprising that many view the bench as having a unique ability to 
resolve political disagreements.  Indeed, Americans hold the Supreme Court in relatively high 
esteem compared with the other branches of government. 
 
The Basis of Diffuse Support 
 Favorable attitudes towards the Supreme Court arise out of perceptions of procedural 
fairness, which people value in legal disputes (Tyler 2006, Tyler 1990, Baird and Gangl 2006).  
People express steady support for courts when judges employ unbiased decision-making 
procedures.  By and large, Americans believe the Supreme Court uses principled decision-
making to resolve disputes, making it one of the most legitimate judicial institutions in the world 
(Woodson, Gibson, and Lodge 2011).   
Popular views about courts take shape early in life, as people learn about the role and 
responsibilities of judges in the American court system.  According to Federalist No. 78, “There 
is no position which depends on clearer principles … To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the 
courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which 
serve to define and point out their duty in every case that comes before them.”  Judges 
implement these principles with the goal of ensuring public deference and compliance (Davis 
1994).  The Supreme Court carefully manages its public image by highlighting the majesty and 
dignity of judicial proceedings. Depictions of the Court rely on symbolic language and imagery.  
Among the most important visual symbols are pictures of judges in robes, gavels, the Lady 
Justice, and the Supreme Court building itself, which help to emphasize the distinctiveness of the 
institution (Woodson, Gibson, and Lodge 2011; Brigham 1987).   
The justices use language to emphasize the unbiased application of law; indeed, even 
some of the most notorious Supreme Court decisions frame their outcomes as a matter of legal 
principle.  In Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), which upheld segregation by race, the Court begins with 
an innocuous characterization of its work: “This case turns upon the constitutionality of an act of 
the General Assembly of the State of Louisiana.”  Similarly, the Court emphasized that its 
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decision National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius was a legal, not a political one.  
At times, the justices seek unanimity to further legitimize rulings, though this practice has 
declined in recent decades (Epstein, Segal, and Spaeth 2001).  John Roberts, in his Senate 
confirmation hearings, reinforced the image of justices as principled decision makers, arguing, 
“Judges are like umpires.  Umpires don’t make the rules; they apply them.”5 
The ideal of mechanical jurisprudence – that judges apply simple legal principles in an 
unbiased fashion to arrive at the correct decision – is, of course, a myth.  The attitudinal model of 
judicial decision-making sees rulings as influenced by the personal preferences of judges (Segal 
1997, Segal and Spaeth 2002).  Others scholars contend that judges act strategically to achieve 
their most preferred policy outcomes (Harvey and Friedman 2006, Clark 2009).  And recent 
research suggests that both ideological and legal principles shape court rulings (Bailey and 
Maltzman 2008).  But the American belief in procedural fairness is not simplistic.  People 
believe judges can exercise discretion yet adhere to legal principles in their decision-making 
(Gibson and Caldeira 2011).  Most Americans agree that judges use discretion to apply the 
Constitution to modern problems and that their personal beliefs play a role.  Yet Americans tend 
to view judicial actions as principled, if not mechanical.  
What might undercut the symbolism and perceptions of procedural fairness integral to the 
popular legitimacy of the Supreme Court?  Three of the most likely explanations fall short.  
There is little evidence that political sophisticates view the Court as ignoring legal principles in 
its decision-making.  In fact, political awareness increases support for the Supreme Court due to 
the exposure that sophisticates have to legitimating symbols (Caldeira and Gibson 1992).  
Similarly, some have suggested that the spectacle of confirmation hearings can undermine the 
image cultivated by the Court (Davis 1994) but more recent evidence suggests that exposure to 
them increases the institution’s legitimacy under certain conditions (Gibson and Caldeira 2009a, 
2009b).  Finally, there is conflicting evidence as to whether the Court damages its legitimacy by 
becoming involved in political controversies and releasing unpopular decisions.  Grosskopf and 
Mondak (1998) suggest that Texas v. Johnson, which preserved the constitutional right to burn 
the flag, substantially damaged confidence in the Court, the result of a negativity bias whereby 
people assign asymmetric penalties to the institution depending on their views of its decisions. 
                                                
5 Cillizza, Chris. “John Roberts, Umpire.” June 28, 2012.  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/john-roberts-umpire/2012/06/28/gJQAx5ZM9V_blog.html  
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Other evidence, however, suggests that positivity bias exists: the effect of exposure to any news 
about the Court means that popular decisions increase diffuse support for the institution but 
similar decreases in legitimacy do not follow unpopular rulings (Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird 
1998; Gibson and Caldeira 2009a).  Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence (2003) show that in one of the 
most controversial and politicized decisions of all-time – Bush v. Gore – agreement with the 
outcome had little impact on how people viewed the Supreme Court.  They argue that the Court 
may only damage its legitimacy by issuing a series of high profile and unpopular decisions in 
succession. 
Diffuse support for the courts in America, then, arises out of the popular understanding of 
judicial responsibilities and the belief that judges exhibit a commitment to procedural fairness.  
These beliefs are reinforced by the language, symbolism, and imagery surrounding the courts. 
Americans view the Supreme Court favorably compared to other institutions and these attitudes 
remain quite durable. 
 
The Nature of Supreme Court Legitimacy 
 Easton (1965) defines legitimacy, also known as diffuse support, as “a reservoir of 
favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they 
are opposed or the effects of which they see as damaging to their wants” (1965, 273).  As such, 
the concept involves a more stable set of attitudes than those measured with items about 
“support” or “approval” of an institution.  Other research characterizes legitimacy as loyalty 
towards an institution, since short-term outcomes have little effect on longstanding support for it 
(Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2005; Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird 1998).  When the Court 
releases decisions, its legitimacy may also be considered a form of source credibility that enables 
it to influence popular attitudes (Mondak 1990, 1992, 1994, Bartels and Mutz 2009, Egan and 
Citrin 2009). 
 Scholars employ a number of measures to evaluate institutional legitimacy, but the 
standard is a six- (or sometimes four-) item scale developed by Gibson and colleagues.  The 
institutional legitimacy scale is specific to the Supreme Court, with items about its proper 




• If the U.S. Supreme Court started making a lot of decisions that most people disagree 
with, it might be better to do away with the Supreme Court altogether. 
 
• The right of the Supreme Court to decide certain types of controversial issues should be 
reduced. 
 
• The Supreme Court can usually be trusted to make decisions that are right for the country 
as a whole. 
 
• The decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court favor some groups more than others. 
 
• The U.S. Supreme Court gets too mixed up in politics. 
 
• The U.S. Supreme Court should have the right to say what the Constitution means, even 
when the majority of people disagree with the Court’s decision. 
 
Because the Supreme Court lacks the power to enforce decisions, it relies on its 
legitimacy to ensure their implementation.  And in a number of political controversies, judicial 
legitimacy has proven essential.  For instance, despite decision specific disapproval of the Court 
during the 1930s, Franklin Roosevelt’s plan to add justices was rejected as a politicized attack on 
the judiciary (Shesol 2010, Caldeira 1987).  And Bush v. Gore settled a political and 
constitutional controversy with little long-term cost to the Court’s reputation (Gibson, Caldeira, 
and Spence 2003).  The legitimacy of the institution remains relatively high. 
 Judicial legitimacy matters not just because it serves to safeguard Court jurisdiction and 
ensure the implementation of decisions, but also because it may sway public opinion about 
policies the Court endorses. 
 
Legitimacy Theory and Policy Legitimation 
According to the policy legitimation hypothesis, Supreme Court decisions persuade the 
public to support the specific policies it endorses.  The Court, by issuing a decision that upholds 
a controversial policy as constitutional, confers the legitimacy of the institution on the policy 
itself.  Attitudes towards the policy become more favorable along a number of dimensions: 
people express higher levels of acceptance for the policy, greater willingness to comply with it, 
and, most importantly, more support for it.  I define policy legitimation as a short-term increase 
in support, along a variety of dimensions, for a policy endorsed by the Supreme Court.  This 
increase in support occurs as a result of symbolic legitimation – the association between the 
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institution and the policy (Mondak 1994, Bartels and Mutz 2009).  American support for Court 
endorsed policies, then, arises out of a link between perceptions of procedural fairness, the 
institution itself, and its decisions. 
But while the theory of policy legitimation is well developed, testing it proves difficult.  
Scholars have yet to agree on how to define legitimation.  Does it consist of acquiescence to 
decisions?  Does it alter compliance with laws?  Does it alter support for the policy as well?  
Each definition has distinct consequences for our understanding of Court persuasiveness 
(Woodson, Gibson, and Lodge 2011).  Another difficulty is practical: tests of opinion change 
demand pre- and post-decision data on public opinion.  But the erratic timing of rulings makes 
such data scarce (Marshall 1989).  For these reasons, experimental settings saturate the study of 
policy legitimation, giving scholars control over measurement intervals and information 
environment. 
A number of experimental studies provide evidence of legitimation effects.  Scholars 
demonstrate the Court’s ability to increase policy support in cases involving censorship (Mondak 
1992, 1994), search and seizure (Mondak 1992, 1994), educational policy (Mondak 1994), 
abortion (Zink, Spriggs, and Scott 2009), school prayer (Zink, Spriggs, and Scott 2009), 
affirmative action (Bartels and Mutz 2009), flag burning (Bartels and Mutz 2009), bankruptcy 
law (Zink, Spriggs, and Scott 2009), taxation (Mondak 1992), campaign law (Mondak 1992), 
electoral disputes (Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2005), and funding for the arts (Hoekstra 1995).  
Some survey data provides additional evidence of legitimation.  For instance, Franklin and 
Kosaki (1989), in a landmark study, show that Roe v. Wade helped to legitimate abortions for 
health-related purposes, even as many Americans expressed deep reservations about the 
decision.  In other cases, policy support develops over a long period of time, as the public 
gradually becomes more comfortable with the consequences of rulings (Murakami 2008; Egan, 
Persily, and Wallsten 2008).  By and large, though, support for the policy legitmation hypothesis 
comes from laboratory studies that facilitate control of source, message, and measurement.   
  
Limits on Legitimation 
 In spite of evidence that demonstrates Supreme Court persuasiveness, “no single 
hypothesis provides a universally applicable explanation for how and when courts affect public 
opinion” (Persily 2008, 8).  Popular reactions to Court rulings vary considerably.  In many cases, 
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the public does not express immediate approval of rulings, but rather reacts with indifference.  
Over time, the public may express more support for controversial decisions, as it did in the case 
of Brown v. Board of Education (Murakami 2008).  Other decisions lead to divergent responses 
from various segments of the public.  The power of the Supreme Court to persuade is moderated 
by a range of factors, which I review below. 
 
Salience 
 The most significant factor that shapes the public response to judicial rulings is their 
salience.  The vast majority of Supreme Court decisions receive minimal attention from the 
press.  From 1946-1995, only about 15% of all rulings received a front-page mention in the New 
York Times, despite the fact that the paper offers some of the most comprehensive coverage of 
the institution (Epstein and Segal 2000).  These decisions are among the only ones to reach the 
less attentive portion of the public (Berkson 1978) and, as such, the only ones capable of 
generating widespread policy legitimation (Murphy and Tanenhaus 1968).  A number of Court 
rulings fail to persuade the public because most people remain unaware of them (Marshall 1989, 
Franklin and Kosaki 1995).  Even when Americans become aware of rulings, they must 
accurately interpret their outcomes for legitimation to occur (Murphy and Tanenhaus 1968).   
 Because salience plays an integral role in shaping public responses, experimental studies 
struggle to estimate accurately the prevalence and extent of policy legitimation.  Most of the 
evidence in favor of the policy legitimation hypothesis inflates the salience of Court actions by 
tasking subjects with reading about decisions (Hoekstra 1995, Mondak 1990, Bartels and Mutz 
2009; Zink, Spriggs, and Scott 2009).  In actuality, the majority of judicial decisions pass with 
little notice from average Americans, stripping the Court of its power to persuade. 
 
Pre-Existing Opinion and Interpretive Context 
 When Americans learn about Court rulings, pre-existing opinions further moderate their 
reactions.  The Court may do little to persuade strong opponents of a policy (though the 
institution may increase policy acceptance and acquiescence; Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 
2005).  Consider the case of Bush v. Gore, which did little to increase support for George W. 
Bush’s Electoral College victory among Democrats (though it did legitimize his election, 
effectively ending the legal controversy; Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2003). 
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 The Court similarly lacks the power to legitimate policies when facing a polarized public.  
Franklin and Kosaki (1989) demonstrate how the interpretative context through which people 
come to understand rulings – which takes shape in response to discussions with others – alters 
opinion responses.  For instance, because Catholics largely disapprove of discretionary abortions, 
Catholic opinion about Roe v. Wade developed in reaction to their social environment, causing 
individual reactions to move toward the group position (and away from the Court).  The authors 
offer the structural response hypothesis, which suggests the existence of multiple opinion 
reactions to any Court ruling.  According to the authors, “Members of microenvironments are 
positively affected by the group norms.  Thus the effect of group interaction is to increase 
agreement with the modal response within the immediate social environment.  When between-
group variance is high, we would expect group members to move in opposite directions, leading 
to polarization.  When between-group variance is low, then more uniform shifts in the population 
are the likely result” (Franklin and Kosaki 1989, 763; see also Stoutenborough, Haider-Markel, 
Allen 2006).  The structural response hypothesis helps to account for divergent reactions to 




 The order in which the Court releases rulings on a given issue impacts public responses 
as well.  Johnson and Martin’s (1998) conditional response hypothesis posits that only initial 
rulings on salient political controversies have the power to engender attitude change.  Because 
these rulings help individuals to fully elaborate relevant attitudes, their opinions remain stable 
even after subsequent Court rulings (Chaiken 1980, Petty and Cacioppo 1981).  More recent 
research draws on the Receive-Accept-Sample model (Zaller 1992, Zaller and Feldman 1992) to 
refine the conditional response hypothesis (Brickman and Peterson 2006). 
 
Decision Characteristics 
 Finally, research suggests that a variety of decision-specific factors impact public opinion 
about judicial rulings.  In accordance with their demand for procedural fairness, Americans view 
rulings more favorably when the justices eschew political bargaining and uphold existing law 
(Baird and Gangl 2006, Caldeira 1986).  They express more approval for rulings when the Court 
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makes strong persuasive arguments (Mondak 1990, 1994).  They are more likely to approve of 
unanimous decisions that uphold precedent (Zink, Spriggs, and Scott 2009).  And the connection 
of rulings to legal principles similarly affects the likelihood of popular acceptance and 
acquiescence (Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2005). 
 The idiosyncratic characteristics of decisions also affect their public reception.  No 
simple model of opinion response fully characterizes the reactions to Roe v. Wade, where people 
evaluated not only the policy outcome but also the facts of the case, the identities of the parties, 
the identities of the justices themselves, and the arguments they raised.  The majority’s opinion, 
for instance, which protected abortion under the right to privacy found in the Constitution’s 
“penumbras and emanations,” has come under attack, undermining the persuasiveness of the 
decision (Sirico 2010).  Might Americans have expressed more support for a decision framed in 
different terms?  And because many cases that come before the Court are the result of concerted 
efforts to win public and judicial support through the strategic use of claimants, popular approval 
of rulings may increase when the Court sides with sympathetic parties (Carpenter 2012; Nadler, 
Diamond, and Patton 2008; Carrubba et al. 2012). 
 All told, these findings demonstrate the limits of policy legitimation.  The Supreme 
Court’s ability to persuade is constrained, first and foremost, by the extent to which Americans 
are aware of its decisions.  But even in the most high profile cases, pre-existing attitudes, 
interpretive lenses, and decision characteristics moderate the effects of rulings on public opinion.  
The Court’s legitimacy, it seems, confers it only a circumscribed power to persuade. 
 
The Backlash Puzzle 
 No existing theories of public response account for one type of reaction to Supreme Court 
decisions: backlash, which I define as a short-term decrease in support for a policy after the 
Court endorses it.  People may become more supportive of a policy after a judicial ruling (the 
policy legitimation hypothesis), they may react based on social group norms (structural 
response), they may react only to certain rulings (conditional response), or they may fail to react 
at all when they have little knowledge of a ruling (null response).  But research fails to account 
for why the endorsement of a high credibility institution may dampen support for a policy.  And 
yet, a number of Supreme Court decisions exhibit signs of public backlash. 
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 For instance, Lerman (2008) demonstrates that a series of Court rulings (beginning with 
Miranda v. Arizona) had a negative effect on support for the rights of the accused.  Similarly, 
public support for capital punishment increased after the Court struck down the death penalty as 
unconstitutional in Furman v. Georgia (Hanley 2008).  A series of rulings that upheld 
affirmative action programs did little to stem popular disapproval for race-based preferences (Le 
and Citrin 2008).  Court decisions that gave legal status to same-sex partners and overturned 
sodomy laws halted increases in popular support for gay rights  (Egan et al. 2008).  Texas v. 
Johnson, which upheld First Amendment protections for flag burning, inflamed popular 
sentiment (Hansen 2008).  And the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kelo v. New London led to public 
backlash because Americans viewed its interpretation of eminent domain as a violation of 
property rights (Nadler, Diamond, and Patton 2008; Baron 2007).6 
Existing accounts of legitimation do not anticipate negative opinion responses to high 
profile Supreme Court rulings.  Indeed, there are few reasons to expect low levels of support for 
the policies endorsed by a legitimate institution like the Court.  Scholars have suggested, but 
never tested, two possible explanations.  Egan and Citrin (2009) speculate that backlash arises 
from one-sided elite debate following a judicial ruling, where supportive elites remain silent 
while those in opposition control the public discourse.  Franklin and Kosaki (1989) suggest that 
contextual effects may decrease support for rulings when the public uniformly opposes a policy 
before the Court endorses it. 
 Nonetheless, the prevalence of negative responses to high profile judicial rulings presents 
a puzzle for scholars.  The literature on institutional legitimacy and policy legitimation is unable 
to account for backlash.  In the following pages, I offer a critical review of this literature, 
demonstrating how its shortcomings – which include a reliance on laboratory settings and a 
failure to fully explicate the process by which the public learns about rulings – inhibit it from 





                                                
6 In some of these studies, evidence of backlash is incomplete because comparable pre- and post-decision opinion 
data does not exist.  Nonetheless, the public viewed Court decisions in largely unfavorable terms in each case listed 
here. 
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The Shortcomings of Research on Policy Legitimation 
 The Supreme Court, which Americans value for its commitment to procedural fairness, 
maintains a measure of diffuse support, yet only sometimes legitimates policies.  What accounts 
for the divergent portraits of Court persuasiveness in the literature? 
 First, the various measurements the literature employs affect the conclusions it draws.  
Scholars define policy legitimation differently across studies.  In some cases, they look at the 
Supreme Court’s ability to increase acceptance and acquiescence (Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 
2005).  At other times they focus on compliance with decisions (Johnson 1967).  Many more 
studies examine support for policies that Supreme Court endorses (Hoekstra 1995, Franklin and 
Kosaki 1989, Johnson and Martin 1998, Bartels and Mutz 2009).  When these measures are 
unavailable, scholars rely on items that focus on the extent to which Americans agree with 
specific decisions (which eliminates the possibility of measuring pre-decision attitudes).  As 
such, one must take care when comparing Court persuasiveness across studies that employ 
different measures of legitimation.7 
Furthermore, a full test of the policy legitimation hypothesis demands pre- and post-
decision measurements of opinion.  Scholars deal with data shortcomings in a number of ways.  
When only post-decision surveys are available, some studies explore the general tenor of 
attitudes to infer whether people view rulings in favorable terms (i.e., Nadler, Diamond, and 
Patton 2008).  Franklin and Kosaki (1989) use another approach, controlling for the effects of 
rulings by dividing survey respondents into groups that are aware of the decision in Roe v. Wade 
(the treatment group) and those that are not (the control group).  This technique allows them to 
make inferences about the impact of the ruling, but only across groups that have different levels 
of political awareness.  They cannot estimate the effect of Roe v. Wade on American opinion as a 
whole.  When pre- and post-decision opinion data is available, scholars explore how the Court 
may influence attitude change (i.e., Marshall 1989).  The shortcomings of this approach lay both 
in lack of control (since any event that transpires between pre- and post-surveys can cause 
attitude shifts) and lack of uniformity (since there exists neither standard nor acceptable intervals 
at which to measure opinion surrounding a ruling).  
                                                
7 In chapter 7, I develop a way to deal with questions about how to measure support for rulings.  I create a decision 
approval scale with multiple items (support, approval, etc.). 
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Most studies, however, deal with measurement issues by using an experimental approach, 
which allows control over the pre- and post-decision measures of opinion.  But the use of 
laboratory settings contributes to another major problem plaguing the study of Court 
persuasiveness: a troubling methodological divide in conclusions.  According to one study, 
“With few exceptions, experimental work finds much stronger effects of exposure to Supreme 
Court decisions than do observational studies” (Egan and Citrin, 2009, 7; see also Clawson, 
Kegler, and Waltenburg 2001).  Most evidence for the policy legitimation hypothesis comes 
from laboratory studies that maximize control (but see Baas and Thomas 1984), while most 
evidence that finds constraints on the Court ability to persuade comes from survey data that 
emphasizes external validity.  Little work aims to reconcile the divide between these methods 
(see Table 2.1).  Nonetheless, we may attribute experimental evidence in favor of policy 
legitimation to two factors. 
To begin with, experimental studies artificially raise awareness of Supreme Court 
decisions.  Most Americans express little interest in and knowledge about the vast majority of 
Court rulings (Marshall 1989) but experimental settings task subjects with reading about them 
nonetheless.  Scholars have seldom sought more externally valid approaches such as embedding 
ruling descriptions in a larger news environment (but see Zink, Spriggs, and Scott 2009); as such, 
experiments depict policy legitimation as prevalent.  By tasking subjects with reading directly 
about rulings, experimental studies also obscure important differences in salience across issue 
domains.  The news media affords the most coverage to rulings involving the First Amendment, 
civil rights, and the right to privacy (Davis 1987, Blake and Hacker 2010); experimental studies, 
on the other hand, explore the Court’s persuasiveness across a range of issues – including search 
and seizure, educational policy, taxation, election law, bankruptcy law, and funding for the arts 
(Mondak 1992; 1994; Hoekstra 1995; Zink, Spriggs, and Scott 2009).  Evidence of Court 
persuasion in these cases provides little information about legitimation in cases where public 
attitudes have crystallized. 
More importantly, literature on policy legitimation neglects entirely the role the media 
plays in translating decisions to the public.  In experimental settings, subjects typically read a 
brief description of a ruling or a stylized news report on it.  These materials serve to inform 
subjects about the content of a decision, but they do little to convey the complexity of 
information and diversity of perspective that commonly characterizes press coverage.  A handful 
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of studies on media coverage of the Court focus on the prevalence and accuracy of coverage but 
make few links between the press and popular reactions to specific rulings (Slotnick and Segal 
1998, Slotnick 1993, Brickman and Bragg 2007, Davis 2011, Davis 1994, Newland 1964). 
 
Table 2.1 Literature on Supreme Court Persuasion 
Study Method Court Influence 
Baas and Thomas 1984 
 













Baird and Gangl 2006 
 
Experimental Constrained legitimation 
Zink, Spriggs, and Scott 2009 
 
Experimental Constrained legitimation 
Bartels and Mutz 2009 
 
Survey experiment Legitimation 
Franklin and Kosaki 1989 
 
Survey Constrained legitimation 
Marshall 1989 
 
Survey Null effects 
Rosenberg 1995 
 
Survey Null effects 
Johnson and Martin 1998 
 
Survey Constrained legitimation 
Brickman and Peterson 2006 
 
Survey Constrained legitimation 
Stoutenborough, Haider-Markel, Allen 2006 
 
Survey Constrained legitimation 
Murakami 2008 
 




Gash and Gonzales 2008 
 
Survey Backlash 
Luks and Salamone 2008 
 




Mayeri et al. 2008 
 
Survey Null effects 








Survey Null effects 
Egan et al. 2008 
 
Survey Backlash 
Green and Jarvis 2008 
 
Survey Null effects 
Nadler, Diamond, and Patton 2008 
 
Survey Backlash 
Goux, Egan, and Citrin 2008 
 
Survey Null effects 
Mate and Wright 2008 
 
Survey Constrained legitimation 
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 Why might we care about the content of Supreme Court media coverage?  Why might 
coverage change our understanding about policy legitimation?  The reasons are threefold.  First, 
the vast majority of information Americans learn about Supreme Court decisions comes from the 
news media.  Unlike a president – who speaks directly to the American people on occasion with 
primetime television addresses, campaign events and advertisements, and a State of the Union 
message – Supreme Court justices maintain a low public profile.  And though justices are 
increasingly “going public” to fulfill personal objectives (Davis 2011), the Court itself offers no 
formal justifications for its decisions beyond those found in its written opinions.  Furthermore, 
these written opinions, which represent the public’s only direct access to rulings, rely heavily on 
legal analysis.  Most Americans lack the time, interest, and legal expertise required to make 
sense of them.  They instead look to major media outlets, which aim to interpret decisions in an 
accurate, simple, and entertaining manner.  Second, there is some evidence that the content of 
media coverage alters attitudes towards Court decisions.  In a carefully designed experiment, 
Clawson and Waltenburg (2003) show that media effects influence attitudes towards the Court’s 
ruling in Adarand v. Pena.  In this case, framing the affirmative action decision as one that 
reinforced the principle of equal treatment increases support for it among white respondents, 
while framing it as a dramatic setback for African Americans does not.  The results suggest that 
the persuasiveness of a Court endorsement depends on its media contextualization.  And third, 
there are reasons to expect experimental treatments and actual media coverage of Court rulings 
to differ systematically.  Unlike in laboratory settings, real world press coverage of judicial 
decisions focuses on a narrow range of newsworthy controversies; offers detail, complexity, and 
multiple perspectives; and includes abundant criticism of the Court.   
 Because existing theories of policy legitimation ignore press coverage, their conclusions 
diverge.  Studies that verify Supreme Court influence fail to consider how the unfavorable media 
coverage might circumscribe legitimation.  Studies that find evidence of backlash struggle to 
offer a systematic account of its causes, instead relying on case specific explanations.  At various 
times, this work suggests that backlash may arise from the violation of sacred American values 
(Hanson 2008), the failure of the Court to engage with popular sentiment in its opinions (Baron 




The Approach of This Study 
 In this dissertation, I use a multiple-method approach to explore popular understanding of 
judicial decisions.  I focus on the media in detail.  What determines how the press chooses to 
cover decisions?  How do reporters frame rulings?  What consequences might this have for the 
Court, and for our understanding of policy legitimation? 
By bringing the press back into the study of the Supreme Court decisions, we can better 
understand the panoply of responses to its decisions.  We also gain insight into the ways in which 
the existing literature fails to adequately characterize the process leading to popular responses.  
These responses depend not only on the symbolic association of the institution with a policy – 
moderated by pre-existing attitudes, interpretative contexts, and features of decisions – but also 
on the information communicated to the public about these decisions.  As the media environment 
becomes more favorable towards the Court – highlighting the basis of its legitimacy, 
emphasizing its adherence to law and commitment to procedural fairness, explaining its 
decision-making rationale, and giving voice to supporters – its decisions become more likely to 
legitimate policies. 
 In the following chapter, I present an account of how the press covers the Supreme Court.  
I offer an explanation of how decision specific coverage takes shape across a wide range of cases 



























Dissensus Dynamics Theory: 
An Account of Decision Coverage 
 
 Media coverage of the U.S. Supreme Court takes shape in an environment of institutional 
constraints.  News organizations focus on a handful of high profile rulings each year, aiming to 
draw public interest while also providing simple yet accurate information about legal affairs.  
These demands challenge journalists who cover the Court, all the more so because the institution 
does little to makes its actions transparent.  As a result the press relies on the voting signals sent 
by the justices to guide its coverage of rulings. 
 In the following pages, I describe a theory of Supreme Court journalism, based on the 
observation that institutional constraints on the Court beat and in the newsroom lead to 
distinctions in decision coverage depending on the size and makeup of majority voting 
coalitions.  I show how this theory extends our understanding of elite-driven accounts of political 
communication, while demonstrating important differences in how the press reports on the Court 
versus other political actors. 
 
On the Supreme Court Beat 
The Supreme Court choreographs a complex strategy for dealing with the press.  The 
Court carefully guards its legitimacy – the relative high levels of diffuse support Americans 
express for it – by emphasizing the legal and symbolic basis of judicial authority (Caldeira and 
Gibson 1992; Woodson, Gibson, and Lodge 2011; Johnson 1967).  It highlights the institution’s 
majesty and dignity, which it conveys “through the nature of the physical setting, the usage of 
ritual, and the style of communication” (Davis 1994, 12; Brigham 1987).   
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But the Court eschews more aggressive public relations strategies.8  It makes minimal 
effort to simplify or frame its rulings for public discussion.  It offers little transparency in its 
decision-making.  It has long resisted cameras in the Courtroom.  Perhaps this is for the best, as 
Americans may recoil at the behavior of the justices (their visceral disagreements with one 
another, for instance, or the sight of Justice Clarence Thomas napping during oral arguments).  
So the Court pays minimal attention to media demands, at best.  According to Linda Greenhouse, 
who spent two decades covering the High Court for the New York Times, the institution “is quite 
blithely oblivious to the needs of those who convey its work to the outside world” (Greenhouse 
1996).   
In fact, a review of the procedures used by the Supreme Court makes clear how little 
concern the institution has about packaging its work for media consumption.  Each year, the 
Court receives over 8000 case petitions, yet it only decides to hear about 80 of these per term 
(Carpenter 2012).  To hear a case, at least four justices must vote to issue a writ of certiorari, 
though these votes remain private.  Thus, the Court simply neglects to grant certiorari without 
explanation in the vast majority of cases it considers.   
The justices typically set aside a portion of one day to hear oral arguments in each case 
on the docket.  At any point thereafter, the Court can announce its ruling in the case (and only in 
recent decades did the Court begin to schedule announcement days on its calendar; Davis 1994).  
On the morning of the announcement, the Court distributes written opinions through its Public 
Information Office and, in recent years, on its official website supremecourt.gov.  Along with 
these formal opinions comes a case syllabus, prepared by the Reporter of Decisions at the Court.  
This syllabus is not formal law, but rather intended to summarize the main holdings of the 
Court,9 drawing directly from the written opinions.  Upon release of a decision, one justice 
verbally summarizes the holding and, on rare occasions, other justices may speak, offering 
dissenting opinions (Witt 1990).  Because the Court building has seats for only 250 observers, 
many activists and reporters are forced to wait outside the Courthouse to hear the first news 
about significant decisions.   
 The justices of the Supreme Court take no questions and offer few clarifications about 
their opinions (though they may illuminate their thinking when they choose to speak, either in 
                                                
8 The justices themselves, however, pay careful attention to their public images (Davis 2011). 
9 Throughout this dissertation, I follow standard practice in using “the Court” to refer the majority coalition when 
discussing a particular ruling. 
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oral arguments, when announcing a ruling, or when they make outside appearances).  They do 
little to simplify the complex legal analysis contained in their writing (Ginsburg 1995).  They 
have never allowed cameras inside the Courtroom, though an archive of audio recordings exists 
at oyez.org.  And the Public Information Office, created in 1935 to institutionalize relations with 
the press, provides minimal content to the media beyond that produced by the jurists.  Unlike 
other press offices, it makes no effort to frame stories about the Court or its rulings, instead 
accommodating the media only to the extent that it benefits the institution’s image.  According to 
a former public information officer for the Court, “We’re not spin doctors, as it were.  It is a very 
different office from the other two branches” (Davis 1994, 47). 
 Because the Court “speaks once and is silent” (Newland 1964), reporters face a unique 
and challenging environment.  The resources necessary to offer year-round coverage of the 
institution are considerable, both for journalists and news organizations as a whole.  Full-time 
Court reporters must be well versed in legal affairs (Hess 1981).  Some, but not all, journalists 
who cover the Court receive a coveted media credential, granting them access to a seat in the 
Courtroom for oral arguments and decision announcements.  Their training often includes 
journalism and law school, coupled with years of experience in the field (though reporters 
disagree as to whether a law degree aids them in covering the Court; Davis 1994, 67).  A news 
outlet must be able to devote a full-time member of it staff to report on an institution that releases 
a small number of rulings each year, only a handful of which will generate public interest.  For 
these reasons, leading national news organizations offer most of the original reporting on the 
Court (The New York Times, Washington Post, ABC, NBC, CBS, CNN, Fox News, MSNBC, 
and National Public Radio, etc.).  
Reporters focus most of their coverage on the cases that reach the Court’s docket 
(Slotnick and Segal 1998).  To shape this coverage, they typically familiarize themselves with 
the background of the cases to which the Court grants cert (Greenhouse 1996).  Such background 
includes the case history, factual circumstances, legal controversies, and political implications.  
The case history encompasses the process by which the case makes its way through the judicial 
system until the High Court grants cert.  Factual circumstances of the case involve the scenario 
that gives rise to the legal challenge before the Court.  The legal controversy is among the most 
important and complex matters with which reporters have to deal.  It includes the legal matters 
highlighted by the cert petition, which commonly involve a conflict between the language or 
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application of a law and the Constitution.  Finally, journalists also familiarize themselves with 
the political implications of a dispute, as many cases draw public attention for their political 
consequences more than their legal ones.   
 To understand the extent of background knowledge necessary for journalists on the 
Supreme Court beat, take the Affordable Care Act case as an example.  The case history began 
with a challenge joined by 26 states and the National Federation of Independent Business to the 
PPACA’s constitutionality.  The Federal District Court for the Northern District of Florida found 
the law’s individual mandate to be an unconstitutional exercise of federal power.  The Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld this ruling on appeal, but found that the mandate could 
be severed from the rest of the PPACA, allowing it the remainder of the law to stand.  After this, 
the Court agreed to hear an appeal of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision – National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius.  The factual circumstances of the case were straightforward – 
the states challenged the major portion of the PPACA (the individual mandate), which had not 
yet taken effect.  In this case, the Court allowed the challenge to proceed, but in some cases the 
Court finds that plaintiffs do not have legal standing to challenge a law (Roberts 1992).  The 
central legal dispute in NFIB v. Sebelius involved whether the national healthcare mandate 
exceeded the scope of Congress’s powers to regulate interstate commerce or to levy taxes.  
Finally, the case’s political significance was well known and monumental; indeed, many more 
Americans were likely interested in the political battle over national healthcare than in the 
Court’s interpretation of the Commerce Clause.  News organizations covered all of these aspects 
of the Affordable Care Act case to provide a full and accurate portrait to their audience. 
 All told, journalists covering the Supreme Court face a complex environment 
(Greenhouse 1996).  They must bring expertise to bear on controversies with a variety of 
dimensions.  They must familiarize themselves with case specifics as well as history, law, and 
politics.  And they must do so subject to the restrictive media standards developed by the Court 
itself (Witt 1990). 
 
Constraints in the Newsroom 
 The journalistic pressures placed on Supreme Court reporters are just as great as the 
expertise required of them.  Coverage of the Supreme Court must meet a variety of professional 
objectives.  It must be simple, accurate and timely while meeting the criteria of newsworthiness 
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According to a veteran Supreme Court journalist, “A judge may take three pages to 
discuss a minute point of law, while a reporter may have three sentences to explain the meaning 
and impact of the entire decision” (Knoche 1987, 268).  Indeed, the need for simplicity presents 
a particular challenge for journalists who cover the Supreme Court, whose rulings delve into 
legal minutiae.  The news audience has little pre-existing knowledge of the legal and 
constitutional issues at stake in a given case, meaning that coverage must not only explain an 
outcome but also the background necessary to understand it (Greenhouse 1996). 
Consider one of the landmark holdings of the 20th century, Roe v. Wade, where the 
Supreme Court struck down bans on abortion as incompatible with the Constitution.  To provide 
Americans with an accurate account of the decision, the press had to explain the majority’s 
reasoning, which was based on a complex legal analysis.  Though the Constitution does not 
explicitly mention abortion, the Court found that abortion was protected as part of the 
fundamental right to privacy enjoyed by all Americans.  But the right to privacy itself does not 
receive explicit mention in the Constitution, either.  Rather, the Court reasoned that the right to 
privacy is ensconced in the document in multiple places, including in “penumbras” and 
“emanations” found in the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments protecting private associations, 
security of person and property, and a zone of privacy from self-incrimination, respectively 
(Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)).  At the same time, the Court ruled that the state has two 
legitimate interests in regulating abortion: protecting prenatal life and a woman’s health.  
Because the Court found that the balance of these interests with the right to privacy changes 
throughout a pregnancy, it used a trimester system to determine the restrictions that can 
constitutionally be placed on abortions (Roe v. Wade (1973)). 
The case is an extraordinarily complex one from a legal perspective, and yet reporters 
faced the daunting task of simplifying its outcome for the millions of average Americans who 
took an interest in it.  Reporters also had to simplify a range of other information in their 
coverage, including the facts of the case and its implications for ordinary Americans and the 
American political system. 
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But even less complex cases require a great deal of simplification in the news.  Every 
case that reaches the Court has a dense history behind it (e.g., Carpenter 2012).  Because every 
ruling requires that the press provide some historical context to understand it, and because every 
ruling may be framed along both political and legal dimensions, the need for simplicity places 
acute demands on Supreme Court reporters (Goldstein 2012). 
 
Accuracy 
Court reporters could more easily simplify judicial rulings if they did not need to achieve 
accuracy.  For instance, a simpler portrait of the holding in Roe v. Wade would note that the 
Constitution protects a “right to abortion.”  While easy to understand, this account makes two 
mistakes: it confuses a right to abortion, which is not an explicit part of the Constitution, with the 
implicit right to privacy, which is, and it implies that the right to abortion is absolute (as we have 
seen, the Court found that the right to privacy must be balanced against state interests in 
regulating abortion for the health of the mother and life of the fetus).  In complex scenarios like 
this, simplicity and accuracy can be at odds; indeed, there are numerous examples of the media’s 
errors in reporting on judicial decisions (Greenhouse 1996, Goldstein 2012, Newland 1964).  The 
media commonly mischaracterizes the legal meaning of Court actions by, for instance, reporting 
cert denials (the refusal to hear a case) as decisions on the merits (rendering a judgment about a 
case’s outcome; Slotnick and Segal 1998). 
But news organizations strive for and often achieve accuracy in their coverage.  They do 
so by relying first and foremost on the expertise of reporters with experience and legal training 
(Hess 1981, Davis 1994).  These reporters familiarize themselves with the facts of a case, 
arguments made, and potential decisions before the Court releases its ruling (Sherman 1988).  In 
so doing, they are well prepared to make sense of it. 
The coverage of the Obamacare decision from scotusblog.com, a leading website for 
judicial reporting, provides an example of the care that many news organizations take to report 
on decisions in simple and accurate terms.  The website’s publisher describes the strategy for 
reporting in a timely and correct manner on the ruling: 
 
Today, our entire team will work together in person, including Lyle [Denniston], who is 
the most experienced member of the press corps, having covered the Court for more than 
five decades, and who has written about the case with incredible depth; and four lawyers 
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who have collectively argued thirty-four Supreme Court cases and taught Supreme Court 
litigation at Harvard and Stanford for more than twenty years. 
 
And nothing will to go onto the Live Blog about the Court’s ruling until I say I agree with 
it.  If we make a mistake, I will be personally responsible…. 
 
Within a few seconds of getting the opinion, I realize from reading the syllabus – and 
announce into the conference call – that the government has lost the Commerce Clause 
argument, but that there is much more going on that is going to require careful study…. 
 
It takes me almost one minute exactly to analyze the decision.  After about twenty 
seconds, I am almost certain that the government has won under the tax power.  But I 
worry the opinion itself would have important nuance or qualification.  So I read all the 
first sentences of each paragraph in the critical part of the opinion announcing the tax 
holding.  It is clear that although the Court has rejected the government’s Commerce 
Clause argument, it has upheld the mandate without qualification. 
 
I turn to Lyle – who has been focusing on the Commerce Clause section of the syllabus 
on his copy, but also skimmed the tax power discussion in the syllabus – and say, “They 
win under the taxing power.”  Lyle responds, “Yes.”  Kevin Russell has gotten a third 
copy of the opinion from an NBC runner; he agrees.  (Lyle then turns immediately to 
writing the overwhelming majority of our team’s analysis of the case, as he has 
throughout.) 
 
I dictate to [SCOTUSblog editor Amy Howe]: She repeats it to me to confirm, and 
publishes the update announcing the decision to our readers. (Goldstein 2012) 
 
The account hints at the various demands placed on news organizations when the Court 
releases a landmark decision.  The early stages of reporting – providing the first summary of the 
ruling minutes after it is released – focus on speed, simplicity, and accuracy.  But despite the 
demand for the former two, many media outlets strive for the latter as well.  In the case of 
Obamacare, SCOTUSblog (and other organizations) used a team of experienced reporters to 
parse the decision and confirm their analysis.10  In cases where the demand for information is 
less immediate, news outlets might rely on the analysis of a single experienced reporter to 




                                                
10 Nonetheless, the demand for timely coverage in this case was so great that CNN and Fox News initially reported, 
incorrectly, that the Court had struck down the Affordable Care Act. 
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Timeliness 
The need for fast and accurate reporting on High Court rulings is an ever-present worry 
for reporters.  On decision days, the justices announce their rulings beginning at 10am eastern 
standard time.  This gives print reporters approximately one half of one day to file their reports 
for the next morning’s paper.  In this time, the reporters must organize their pre-existing 
information on the case, interpret the ruling and the opinions of dissenting justices, speak with 
legal experts to clarify and expand on their interpretations, and seek out other interested parties 
for their reactions (Greenhouse 1996).  They must then craft a story worthy of publication.   
In recent years, the time demands have become much more acute.  24-hour cable news 
channels often broadcast their first reports within minutes of a decision announcement.  The 
internet can yield its first headlines in under a minute.  In the Affordable Care Act case, CNN 
and Fox News put up banner headlines announcing the outcome about 50 seconds after its 
release.  Other organizations followed suit within a minute.  Unfortunately, CNN and Fox News 
filed erroneous reports, suggesting that the Court had invalidated the PPACA.  Their mistakes 
stemmed from an incomplete reading of the decision: while its first few pages described the law 
as an unconstitutional exercise of Commerce Clause powers, its later pages declared the law 
constitutional since it imposed a tax.  Again, the complexity of judicial decisions, coupled with 
the media’s need for timely reporting, created this situation.   
But even in less monumental cases, reporters face the challenge of portraying the work of 




The goal of newsworthiness also informs the work of Supreme Court reporters (Katsch 
1983, Davis 1994).  So coverage must create drama that draws attention from potential readers, 
viewers, or listeners.  Indeed, most news organizations see attracting an audience as a central 
goal (Gans 1979).  Depending on the case, journalists may develop drama by highlighting 
human-interest stories, reactions to a ruling, or tension on the Court itself.   
Reporters often draw human-interest stories from the facts of the case (Slotnick 1991).  
For instance, much of the coverage of Atwater v. Lago Vista (2001) focused on the legal 
violation that gave rise to the case – the failure of a woman to wear a seatbelt in her car, leading 
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to her arrest as her two children watched from the backseat.  These circumstances allowed the 
media to describe prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures.  Similarly, the press 
focused on ordinary homeowners in its coverage of an eminent domain case, Kelo v. New 
London (2005).  USA Today described the plaintiff’s view that “protecting her Victorian dream 
house from the urban renewal bulldozer was always going to be an uphill fight.”  CNN aired an 
interview in which the guest described the stakes of the case, noting, “The house, you know, is 
not a commodity to my father.  My father came over from Italy in 1962 and, you know, land to 
him means that he’s rich and that he’s got all the gold in the world.  You take that away from 
him, and you know, he has nothing.”11  Such interviews provide the necessary drama to keep 
viewers interested, while at the same time making plain the stakes surrounding the work of the 
Supreme Court. 
Similarly, reporters may focus on reactions to rulings to create drama.  In many cases, 
interested parties serve as compelling sources.  A range of coverage involving the healthcare 
decision emphasized the reactions of President Obama and other politicians.  Other reports 
looked to activists that had an interest in the case.  The Washington Post, for instance, posted a 
story entitled, “Health-care Ruling Reactions from the Supreme Court Steps.”12  At other times, 
reactions provide dramatic visual cues.  For this reason, CNN reported live from the University 
of Michigan in 2003, when the Court upheld a portion of the school’s race conscious admission 
policy.  In the background, students marched and chanted in support of the ruling.13 
Finally, most cases provide some measure of intrigue from the Court itself.  This begins 
with oral arguments and continues with the tension in the days leading up to a decision 
announcement.  In many cases, disagreements among the justices also lend drama to a decision.  
On rare occasions, the reading of oral dissents from the bench produces unscripted moments of 




                                                
11 “Ruling Leaves Door Open to Abuse.” USA Today. June 24, 2005. O’Brien, Don and Kathleen Koch. CNN 
Newsroom. December 10, 2007. 
12 Chavar, A.J. “Health-care Ruling Reactions from the Supreme Court Steps.” June 28, 2012. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/health-care-ruling-reactions-from-the-supreme-court-
steps/2012/06/28/gJQA9kuJ9V_video.html. 
13 Flock, Jeff. News from CNN. CNN. June 23, 2003. 
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Conflict 
 Finally, reporters face the challenge of emphasizing conflict in their coverage of the 
Court.  Doing so helps to create a dramatic narrative while following institutionalized practice of 
highlighting multiple perspectives.  Because each case involves, at its essence, a dispute between 
two or more parties, the opportunities to portray conflict are ample.  Reports may focus on the 
disagreements between the petitioners and respondents in a case, between their legal teams, or 
between various amicus curiae who have taken sides before the Court.  Many cases also 
engender disputes outside the Courthouse building, between interest groups, activists, and 
politicians.  And journalists can further highlight conflicts within the legal profession, either 
between lower courts that have disagreed about the case or the Supreme Court justices 
themselves. 
 Once again, the Obamacare case, given its high stakes, allowed the media to portray all 
manner of conflict.  This included disputes between the federal government and the states, 
President Barack Obama and Republicans, hospitals and insurance companies, and appeals 
courts and the Supreme Court.  Some headlines on the case made plain such conflict: 
“Conservatives Turn on Roberts,” “Decision on Obamacare Fuels Obama-Romney Presidential 
Campaign,” “Corporate Winners, Losers Under Healthcare Ruling.”14 
More dramatically, a number of news organizations explored the conflicts between the 
justices, manifest by the splintering of the Court’s conservative wing with John Robert’s decision 
to write for the majority.  As one story noted, Roberts “originally sided with the four justices 
who thought the individual mandate was unconstitutional, then changed his mind and wrote the 
majority opinion for the liberals who wanted the law to stand.  And even as he signaled he was 
siding with the left side of the bench, the justice who was thought to be the swing vote, Anthony 
Kennedy, lobbied Roberts intensely but to no avail.”15  The vote switch had everything that 
Court reporters desire: a simple and accurate way to frame the case outcome in a manner that 
emphasized drama and conflict. 
                                                
14 Goodwin, Liz. “Conservatives Turn on Roberts, Supreme Court After Health Care Ruling.” July 16, 2012. 
http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/ticket/conservatives-turn-roberts-supreme-court-health-care-ruling-184226194.html. 
Miller, S.A. “Supreme Court Decision on Obamacare Fuels Obama-Romney Campaign.” New York Post. June 29, 
2012. Krauskopf, Lewis. “Corporate Winners, Losers Under Supreme Court Healthcare Ruling.” June 29, 2012. 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2012/06/29/253680.htm. 
15 Negrin, Matt. “Chief Justice John Roberts’ Switch on ‘Obamacare’ Health Care Ruling Signals a Leaky Supreme 
Court.” July 2, 2012. http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/OTUS/chief-justice-john-robertss-switch-obamacare-health-
care/story?id=16698557. 
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One longtime reporter, taking stock of how the press covers the Court, views conflict as 
central.  “The overwhelming impression that journalism about the Court – including my own – 
probably conveyed to the casual reader was of an institution locked in mortal combat, where 
sheer numbers rather than force of argument or legal reasoning determined the result” 
(Greenhouse 1996, 1551-1552). 
 
The Theory of Dissensus Dynamics 
 Unique challenges face news organizations and reporters who cover the U.S. Supreme 
Court.  Chief among these are the need to present complex judicial decisions to the public 
speedily, in a newsworthy manner.  The Court itself does little to aid journalists in meeting these 
objectives.  The institution does not frame its decisions for public consumption, it does not 
clarify them upon their release, and it does not even provide notice as to when it will rule. 
 To understand how media organizations shape coverage of judicial rulings in this unique 
environment, I develop Dissensus Dynamics Theory, described below.  The theory is based on a 
simple premise: given considerable constraints, news organizations rely on straightforward and 
readily available pieces of information that allow them to balance a range of objectives in their 
portrayals of Supreme Court rulings.  These objectives include achieving accuracy and 
simplicity while emphasizing drama and conflict.   
It is important to note that Dissensus Dynamics Theory is not an account of salience.  It 
does not explain what makes the press more attentive to some decisions than others (though 
other research examines very question; see Franklin, Kosaki, and Kritzer 1993; Franklin and 
Kosaki 1995; Spill and Oxley 2003; Davis 1994).  Here I am interested in exploring the content 
of coverage.  Given that the press pays attention to a Supreme Court decision, what determines 
the nature of its coverage? 
 
The Scope of the Theory 
 Dissensus Dynamics Theory focuses on the content of coverage of high profile Supreme 
Court rulings from leading national news organizations.  There are a few reasons for the model’s 
design.  First, I explore decision-centered coverage since the justices’ main responsibility is to 
resolve legal disputes with their rulings.  The study of rulings grounds the work of the Supreme 
Court in specific legal and political controversies.  But not all rulings receive equal attention.  
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Most press coverage focuses on a handful of high stakes cases each year, which reach both 
attentive and less attentive audiences (Berkson 1978, Greenhouse 1996).  These cases, along 
with Supreme Court confirmation hearings, constitute the main source of popular knowledge 
about the Court (Gibson and Caldeira 2009a).  Dissensus Dynamics Theory further concentrates 
on national press organizations because these are the most visible and influential sources of 
judicial reporting.  The training of the reporters at these institutions, coupled with the resources 
at their disposal, allows them to offer some of the most comprehensive accounts of judicial 
branch action (Davis 1994).  Their reports not only reach a large number of interested 
Americans, but also powerfully affect subsequent coverage.  Indeed, many smaller news 
organizations that lack Court reporters republish the work of these major media outlets.  
Furthermore, I expect (and test) that similar factors influence the content of reporting across 
leading national news outlets since they operate with analogous goals and under comparable 
constraints as they cover the Court. 
Exploring Dissensus Dynamics Theory fully (across a wide range of high profile rulings) 
requires generalizeable hypotheses, portable measures, and a broad sample.  These things are 
rare in the sociolegal literature, where most studies focus on a single case or a narrow area of the 
law.  And indeed, it is easy to envision how an inquiry into press coverage may analyze the 
Affordable Care Act case alone (i.e., tracing the various frames used to describe the ruling, 
outlining the legal arguments discussed, cataloguing statements of praise and criticism from 
interested parties, accounting for the balance of partisan sources used by the press).  But 
reporters on the Supreme Court beat confirm the systematic nature of their coverage.  According 
to one journalist, the development of the initial report on a decision proceeds as follows: 
 
It’s almost a formula story: Supreme Court upheld, struck down, did x, y, z.  Then I try to 
give a sense of the vote and perhaps implications.  This would include a quote from the 
majority, a little background of the case, a quote from the dissent, and then more 
background.  It’s not real hard to do.  It’s almost like a science. (Davis 1994, 83) 
 
The question then becomes how to catalogue a diverse range of reporting, touching on a 
variety of legal controversies, according to a portable standard of coverage content.  To speak 
more generally about a range of judicial decisions, I focus on the tenor of published reports.  I 
expect that coverage of a high profile Court ruling can vary from favorable to unfavorable 
depending on the frames it employs, arguments it raises, sources it quotes, and tone it evinces.  
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To be sure, a broad conceptualization such as this has its shortcomings, particularly in its loss of 
issue specific detail.16  But the comparative value of a cross-case concept far outweighs these 
shortcomings since the determinants of coverage are likely operate across cases and because very 
few existing studies have attempted to explore these determinants. 
In the following chapters and in Appendices A and B, I discuss the decision support 
measure of coverage content – which captures the degree of favorable coverage afforded any 
single decision – more fully.  But first, I offer an account of the factors that influence the content 
of decision coverage. 
 
Shaping Coverage of Supreme Court Decisions 
 What factors determine the extent of favorable coverage afforded to a Supreme Court 
ruling?  Recall again the premise of Dissensus Dynamics Theory: given considerable 
constraints, news organizations rely on straightforward and readily available pieces of 
information that allow them to balance a range of objectives in their portrayals of Supreme 
Court rulings.  The information from which news outlets can draw includes information released 
by the Court (case syllabus, written opinions, oral summaries, voting outcome) and materials 
provided by outside sources (statements from lawyers and scholars, issue activists, parties to the 
case, politicians, and other interested observers).  But outside source material only becomes 
valuable for media outlets after they have an understanding of a decision, which requires them to 
rely on information provided by the Court first and foremost.  As experienced legal reporters 
begin to make sense of a ruling, they then call on sources for further context, interpretation, and 
reaction.  Indeed, Court reporters attest that they first consult the written work of the justices 
after its release (Slotnick and Segal 1998, Davis 1994). 
 The information released by the Supreme Court is thus the most important for media 
coverage of rulings.  But each piece of this information has a distinct value.  First, consider the 
written opinions.  In these pages, the justices lay out the entirety of their legal analyses.  The 
majority opinion represents controlling law.  In it, the justices review the facts of the case, the 
legal controversies it involves, their views of the relevant laws, and their holdings in the case.  
The opinion often uses footnotes heavily, referencing other cases that come to bear on the 
                                                
16 In Chapter 4 and Appendix B, I explore the relationships between issue-specific coverage and the more broad 
measure of favorable content. 
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decision.  The majority opinion can vary considerably in length, from a few words (i.e., 
Claiborne v. U.S. 2007) to dozens of pages (Roe v. Wade 1973).  Other justices often file 
concurring or dissenting opinions of their own.  These opinions perform similar functions to the 
majority opinion – analyzing the case, making a determination about the law, responding to other 
arguments – but they do not represent controlling law. 
 Reporters may draw the most comprehensive and accurate portrayal of a ruling from its 
written opinions.  These opinions also help capture specific points of conflict between the 
justices where they exist.  But they are particularly poor at providing a simple, dramatic, and 
rapidly interpretable account of a decision.  Even reporters with extensive legal training may find 
it impossible to quickly read and accurately summarize entire written opinions (Greenhouse 
1996).  This task is made all the more complex by the fact that a single opinion may constitute 
the holding of different coalitions of justices at different points.  A Supreme Court judge may 
choose to join some parts of one opinion (like that issued by the majority) and other parts of 
another (i.e., the dissenting opinion).  She may also file her own concurrence or dissent, in 
addition to joining parts of other opinions.  In the Obamacare ruling, the opinion of the Court 
included four parts, all written by Chief Justice John Roberts but signed by various coalitions 
(four justices joined parts I, II, and III-C; two joined part IV; and none joined parts III-A, III-B, 
and III-D).  Additionally, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed an opinion, concurring in part with 
Roberts and dissenting in part, joined by Justice Elena Kagan in its entirety and by two other 
justices in part.  Four justices signed a dissenting opinion and Justice Clarence Thomas added his 
own dissent. 
 The reporting of CNN and Fox News on the PPACA makes plain another risk of relying 
on written opinions: the loss of accuracy.  Erroneous reports based on written opinions are most 
likely to be filed when journalists do not have the expertise to interpret them and when time 
pressures are great.  As such, the language of written opinions exerts a relatively small effect on 
the favorable coverage a decision garners. 
 Similarly, oral summaries provided in the Courtroom on decision day provide little value 
to journalists, who must be present and take accurate notes.  In most cases, these summaries are 
not particularly newsworthy either, since cameras are not allowed to capture the scene, 
disagreements are rare (except when a justice reads an oral dissent), and the justices offer little 
information beyond what can be found in their written opinions. 
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 The most simple, accurate, and easy to understand pieces of information available to 
reports on the Supreme Court beat are the case syllabus and voting outcome (Davis 1994).  But 
the case syllabus only presents text from the Court’s opinion (and not the dissents), so what it 
gains in simplicity it loses in its ability to capture conflict.  Reporters cannot accurately portray 
disputes on the Court from the case syllabus alone.  On the other hand, the final voting outcome 
in a case provides a straightforward indicator of conflict – the size of the majority and dissenting 
coalitions. 
In any given case, the voting outcome provides a wealth of information about the 
diversity of opinion surrounding a decision.  A unanimously decided case sends a strong signal 
to reporters that the legal and political principles at hand are without controversy, so much so 
that nine ideologically-diverse Court justices reach agreement about them (see Epstein, Segal, 
and Spaeth 2001).  In these cases, the balance of coverage characteristics is weighted heavily 
towards simplicity and accuracy.  Reporters are unlikely to search widely for critics of such 
decisions because of the strong judicial indication that they are uncontroversial.  Journalists 
themselves may further be leery of criticizing such rulings given the justices’ expertise in 
constitutional law.  Five-to-four rulings, on the other hand, provide a clear indication that the 
Court’s decision is controversial, contested, and potentially incorrect.  In these cases, the balance 
of coverage characteristics is weighted more heavily towards drama and conflict.  Indeed, if the 
justices themselves – whose analysis is purportedly based on a careful interpretation of the law 
alone – cannot reach agreement, it is likely that many other political partisans will have strong 
reasons for disagreeing with the Court.  In these cases, judicial dissent should have the effect of 
limiting the favorable press coverage afforded a ruling. 
As such, Dissensus Dynamics Theory suggests that the most influential factor that shapes 
coverage of rulings is that which provides a framework for capturing drama and conflict where 
possible, in a simple, accurate, and timely matter: judicial voting outcomes.  Reporters will use 
frames that reflect positively on a ruling when the justices signal their agreement about the legal 
principles at stake with large majority voting coalitions.  And decisions that engender dissent on 
the Court will similarly lead reporters to frame them in an unfavorable light. 
 
Dissent Hypothesis – As the number of dissenters increases, Court rulings will garner 
less favorable media coverage. 
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The Dissent Hypothesis echoes Greenhouse’s argument that “sheer numbers” guide the 
media portrait of conflict on the Court (1996).  It is not, however, only the size of dissenting 
coalitions to which the press likely pays attention.  Most journalists familiar with the Court can 
readily identify justices by their ideological predilections.  For many years, the press tagged 
Justice John Paul Stevens as the Court’s most liberal jurist, and Justice Antonin Scalia has earned 
a reputation as its conservative leader.  Similarly, the press often divides the Court between its 
liberal and conservative wings, with one or two justices considered swing votes (a role currently 
occupied by Justice Anthony Kennedy).  Because of the judges’ well-known ideological 
preferences, they send another signal with their votes: the ideological controversy that may 
surround a case. 
 Consider two hypothetical decisions, both decided by five-four votes.  In the first, a broad 
coalition of the Court’s two most liberal members and three moderate conservatives vote in the 
majority.  In the second, the Court’s five most conservative members vote disagree with its four 
more liberal justices.  The “ideologically diverse” decision indicates to the press that, while 
controversy exists about the ruling, it is rooted in neither partisan nor ideological disputes.  But 
the “ideological divided” decision suggests the presence of both legal and political controversy.  
The press may highlight criticism of it from not only unsympathetic law professors but also from 
liberal Democrats and interest groups that disagree with it. 
 Recall again the Affordable Care Act decision, whose majority opinion was written by 
the normally conservative Chief Justice John Roberts and signed by four liberal justices.  The 5-4 
vote demonstrated clearly the presence of legal and perhaps political controversy (though the 
case would have received a wealth of critical attention regardless), but the ideologically-diverse 
majority coalition likely insulated the Court from some of the most vehement criticism (see 
Chapter 1).  Elites found it more difficult to attack the opinion as an example of liberal bias when 
a conservative justice (who had been appointed by a Republican president) penned it.  Indeed, 
after the ruling a large amount of press coverage centered on a resurgent Republican push to 
repeal the law rather than to denounce the decision. 
 
Ideological Diversity Hypothesis – As the Court’s majority coalition becomes more 
ideologically-diverse, a ruling will garner more favorable media coverage. 
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The Dissent and Ideological Diversity Hypotheses provide the basis for Dissensus 
Dynamics Theory, linking the demands of Supreme Court journalism with the most powerful 
tool that the press can use to make sense of ruling: the votes of the justices themselves.  The 
theory suggests that these votes will have the strongest influence on the framing of judicial 
decisions because they provide a path for the media to emphasize drama and conflict in a simple, 
accurate, and timely manner.  Simply put, Court rulings that bring together large and 
ideologically-diverse coalitions will receive more positive depictions than those with a small and 
narrow majority. 
Though no scholarship offers a comprehensive account of how the press covers a cross-
section of Supreme Court rulings, other studies provide some support for the basic tenets of 
Dissensus Dynamics Theory.  Veteran journalists suggest that, to the extent they adhere to 
consistent procedures in reporting on judicial branch decisions, they reference voting outcomes 
and draw from the majority and dissenting opinions where available (Davis 1994, Greenhouse 
1996).   
More importantly, the political communication literature demonstrates the central role 
that political elites (like the justices) play in framing issues in the media.  Indexing theory 
suggests that elites define the range of perspectives presented by the media (Bennett 1990; 2007; 
Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston 2006; Bennett and Livingston 2003).  According to Bennett, 
“Mass media news professionals, from the boardroom to the beat, tend to ‘index’ the range of 
voices and viewpoints in both news and editorials according to the range of views expressed in 
mainstream government debate about a given topic” (1990, 106).  In a similar vein, Entman’s 
cascading activation model explores the activation and spread of frames from high level elites to 
other elites, the news media, and the public (2003, 2004).  The model provides explanations 
about “how thoroughly the thoughts and feelings that support a frame extend down from the 
White House through the rest of the system – and who thus wins the framing contest and gains 
the upper hand political” (Entman 2004, 9).  But it also speaks indirectly to the role that judicial 
elites may play in framing struggles over legal affairs. 
 Indeed, research on framing suggests that elites control the framing environment most 
effectively when they enjoy high status (e.g., White House sources in foreign policy conflicts) 
and when they espouse unified and culturally congruent framing perspectives.  How do these 
insights inform our understanding of journalism at the Supreme Court?  Consider, first, that in 
 39 
the realm of legal affairs, the justices occupy the highest place in the American political system.  
As members of an “official decision circle” (Bennett 2006, 468) with a high degree of credibility 
(Bartels and Mutz 2009, Druckman 2001), Supreme Court justices will exert powerful influence 
on the media’s coverage of law and politics.  At the same time, the range of perspectives 
espoused by the justices also affects press coverage.  The Court can most effectively frame legal 
decisions when it endorses a unified perspective with large and ideologically-diverse majority 
coalitions. 
Dissensus Dynamics Theory, then, follows from a tradition of political communication 
research that sees high-level elites as the most influential source of frames for the press.  But it 
also recognizes the constraints facing journalists who operate in the singular environment the 
Court fosters.  These journalists rely, first and foremost, on judicial voting outcomes to guide 
their coverage of High Court rulings. 
 
Alternative Hypotheses 
  Dissensus Dynamics Theory views elite disagreement, as expressed through the votes of 
the justices, as the most important factor to influence coverage across a range of rulings.  But 
alternative explanations for decision coverage exist.  I explore four of the most powerful 
alternative explanations below, discussing why they lack the explanatory value of Dissensus 
Dynamics Theory. 
 
Alternative Explanation #1: Non-Judicial Elites Influence Coverage 
Does the press shape its coverage of Supreme Court rulings in response to other elites 
besides the justices?  There are a number of reasons to expect it might.  To begin with, existing 
research shows the influence of executive branch sources on coverage (Bennett 1990, Entman 
2004).  Given the visibility of a sitting president, he is certain to have an impact on coverage of 
the Supreme Court when he expresses strong opinions.  Furthermore, by highlighting the views 
of other politicians, the press may focus on inter-branch conflict to enliven its reporting.  And 
political opinion on High Court actions gives the media an opportunity to use partisan frames 
that make coverage easier to understand and more dramatic for their audiences. 
On the other hand, there is evidence that the press pays attention to the relative status of 
its sources.  According to one study, “The spread of frames is stratified; some actors have more 
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power than other to push ideas along to the news and then to the public” (Entman 2004, 9).  
While presidents may enjoy the highest status in foreign policy debates, the Supreme Court is 
seen as the ultimate arbiter of legal conflict (Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2003).  We would 
expect the justices to exert the most powerful influence relative to other elites (including the 
president) in shaping how the press coverage Court rulings. 
But elites outside the judicial branch are unlikely to affect coverage for an even more 
important reason: they have limited incentives to disagree with the justices.  The judiciary 
maintains a wealth of support and strong institutional legitimacy (Gibson and Caldeira 2009a; 
Gibson and Caldeira 2009b; Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2003).  Americans strongly dislike 
outright attacks on the Court (Shesol 2010, Caldeira 1987).  So political elites, who are often 
unwilling to the pay costs associated with attacking the judiciary, instead choose to express 
support for decisions with which they agree and remain mostly silent when they disagree.  For 
this reason, unanimous rulings receive favorable coverage not only because the justices set the 
terms of debate for the media, but also because they make partisan elites reluctant to attack the 
Court.17 
Even in closely divided decisions, elites have limited incentives to launch outright attacks 
on the Court.  Their criticisms do not have any direct effect on the law in the United States and 
even the president – who has the authority to disobey judicial decisions – risks his reputation in 
doing so.  Most Americans strongly dislike strident attacks on the Court, even when they 
disagree with its decisions. 
 The Obamacare ruling provides an example of elite reluctance to criticize the Court.  The 
presence of four dissenters allowed Republican elites some measure of cover to denounce the 
ruling, relying on the dissenting opinions.  The presence of dissenters also enabled Republicans 
to denigrate Roberts’s vote “switch” (which may have received less attention if the ruling were 
not decided by a 5-4 vote).  But few Republican elites showed a willingness to excoriate the 
decision, despite their antipathy to it.  In a press conference after the ruling was announced, 
presidential candidate Mitt Romney did little to attack the Court or its decision, but rather 
focused more broadly on the negative aspects of the Affordable Care Act and the need for its 
repeal.  The New York Times covered Romney’s response in detail: “Mitt Romney declared 
                                                
17 Furthermore, the attitudinal model of judicial behavior implies that a unanimous Court is unlikely to adopt a 
policy so far from the ideological mainstream that it would warrant strong criticism (Segal 1997, Segal and Spaeth 
2002). 
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Thursday that he would ‘act to repeal Obamacare’ if he was elected president, saying that he 
agreed with the dissenting justices in the Supreme Court ruling on Thursday… Mr. Romney 
might have been hoping for a different Court decision, but his campaign staff was not 
complaining.”18 
The measured response of many elites even in this most emotional of cases demonstrates 
the power that the Supreme Court has to set the terms of public debate about its rulings.  Other 
elites are simply unwilling to attack many decisions outright and aggressively, meaning that the 
elites most responsible for shaping their coverage are the justices themselves. 
 
Alternative Hypothesis #2: Political Context Matters 
 But perhaps the tenor of decision coverage changes depending on the political 
circumstances at the time.  The press may, for instance, frame decisions in more conflictual 
terms when the Court seems out of step with other political actors (regardless of whether these 
elites express their disagreement with the Court).  For instance, the media may scrutinize more 
carefully a liberal outcome, agreed upon by a liberal judicial majority, when Americans have 
elected a conservative president and Congress.  This scenario makes the frame of ideological 
conflict readily available to reporters.  Or consider the example of Obamacare again.  The 
political context explanation in this case would suggest unfavorable coverage of the ruling stems 
from the ability of the media to frame it as an anathema to the Republican-controlled House of 
Representatives.  
 But the political context explanation falls short on three counts.  First, it flies in the face 
of existing research that shows that journalists rely on elite sources to shape their coverage 
(Bennett 1990).  Without partisan elites willing to criticize the Court, it is unlikely that the media 
could successfully employ partisan conflict frames in their coverage.  Indeed, the most powerful 
elites sources available to the press are the voices of the justices themselves.  The explanation 
also demands much of journalists, who would face the task of making inferences about the 
ideological characteristics of a ruling, a Court majority, and other politicians without the benefit 
of elite sources.  Given the complex nature of legal decisions, it is difficult to characterize them 
along an ideological spectrum, particularly for reporters who face considerable constraints 
                                                
18 Shear, Michael D. and Ashley Parker. “Romney Says He Will ‘Repeal Obamacare’ if Elected.” June 28, 2012. 
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/28/romney-says-he-will-repeal-obamacare-if-elected/. 
 42 
(Greenhouse 1996).  According to Dissensus Dynamics Theory, the best avenue for 
characterizing decisions involves reference to the voting coalitions formed by the justices.  And 
finally, the existence of ideological conflict between the Court and prevailing political mood is 
unlikely absent division amongst the justices themselves.  How would journalists frame conflict 
between a unanimous Court and conservative politicians, when any unanimous decision includes 
the votes of the most conservative jurists?  Once again, journalists are more likely to rely on the 
voting signals sent by the justices themselves than on their interpretations of the political 
environment. 
 
Alternative Hypothesis #3: Issue Area Matters 
Another explanation for the nature of decision coverage revolves around the issues before 
the Court.  Are not certain rulings likely to invite challenge if they violate longstanding cultural 
values about a policy area (Entman 2004, 14)?  Are not some controversial political matters – 
like the case of Obamacare, or other rulings involving abortion rights or the death penalty – 
likely to generate unfavorable coverage when taken up by the Court, no matter the specifics of its 
rulings?  Indeed, research shows that the media’s attentiveness to Court rulings varies 
dramatically depending upon the issue at hand.  Cases involving social policy, civil rights and 
liberties, criminal justice, and First Amendment law receive outsized attention in the press 
(Davis 1987, O’Callaghan and Dukes 1992, Blake and Hacker 2010, Slotnick and Segal 1998, 
Hall 2009, Katsch 1983).  All of this suggests that news outlets might cover rulings differently 
depending on the issues they involve. 
Consider a case involving the death penalty before the Court.  The issue is among the 
most controversial in American politics today, defined by polarized and durable attitudes and, 
more importantly, committed activists on both sides of the debate (Hanson 2008).  Any ruling 
involving the issue is likely to draw the attention of these activists, some of whom will disagree 
with the Court.  One might hypothesize that, for these reasons, coverage of any decision 
involving a controversial issue like the death penalty will present it in a more unfavorable light 
than one involving an uncontroversial issue, all else equal.  
Nonetheless, press coverage should remain dependent on judicial votes, even once we 
control for issue specifics.  The Supreme Court’s handling of some of the most fraught political 
controversies (abortion, gun control, et cetera) is unlikely to generate substantial negative press 
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absent the presence of judicial dissent.  Reasons why are plentiful.  Most importantly, the press 
must rely on elite sources to bring conflict to life.  If high profile elites lack the motivation to 
criticize the Court about decisions involving sensitive issues, coverage will also strike a 
deferential posture towards the Court.   
The justices use consensual decisions to temper criticism in other ways as well (Epstein, 
Segal, and Spaeth 2001).  In achieving unanimity or near-unanimity, they raise the costs for 
critics by depriving them of the ability to side with some (dissenting) justices and use their 
analysis against the majority.  Consensual decisions further reduce controversy and criticism 
because, in attracting the votes of many justices, they are more likely to be narrowly-tailored and 
carefully delineated.  This form of judicial restraint throws into question the simple analysis that 
a decision may be controversial because of the issue it involves, and not its substance.  Supreme 
Court justices have a great deal of discretion at their disposal: which cases to hear, which legal 
challenges to consider, which constitutional remedies to prescribe and proscribe.  For any given 
issue, the justices may shape a ruling in a manner that attracts varying degrees of support.  For 
instance, though the Court decided 78 cases involving the death penalty between the 1981 and 
2007 terms (Spaeth 2010), only a handful of these received substantial attention and criticism in 
the mainstream media.  For reporters who cover the Court, then, the concept of inherent 
controversy in a case is less efficacious than whether the justices make controversy apparent with 
their votes. 
 
Alternative Hypothesis #4: Decision Characteristics Influence Coverage 
 If news organizations cannot cover elite conflict over Supreme Court rulings absent elite 
sources, perhaps they can simplify the equation by providing distinct coverage depending on the 
characteristics of the decisions themselves.  The media might exhibit more deference to the 
Court when the chief justice pens a decision, offering it more favorable coverage.  It might report 
more positively on rulings that uphold existing laws and respect precedent (in turn avoiding the 
dreaded label of judicial activism; see Kmiec 2004, Green and Jarvis 2008).  Or it might frame 
decisions that have a particular ideological bent in a positive light.  For instance, the press may 
be particularly sympathetic to rulings decided by liberal majority coalitions, which may speak 
more readily about the types of newsworthy modern-day implications that reporters covet. 
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 Each of these explanations is, on its own, plausible.  Each demands only a limited amount 
of knowledge and offers a pre-existing framing structure for reporters, and each may present a 
compelling storyline for the audience.  At the same time, the explanations all require elite 
sources to speak about decision characteristics.  Reporters may indeed structure their coverage 
around both the voting outcome in a case and specific features of a decision, affording more 
positive stories to rulings reached by large majority coalitions and respecting existing precedent, 
for instance.  But, in accordance with Dissensus Dynamics Theory, the press still relies, first and 




 Coverage of high profile Supreme Court decisions plays an important part in shaping 
popular understanding about the law, the judicial branch, and political controversies.  But despite 
the unique constraints that impact Supreme Court journalism, scholars know little about how 
coverage of rulings takes shape. 
 To remedy these shortcomings, Dissensus Dynamics Theory explains the content of 
coverage across a variety of cases as a consequence of voting outcomes on the Court.  Because 
news outlets face time pressures as well as the need to report in simple, accurate, and dramatic 
terms on rulings, they rely on the informative signal of judicial votes to guide their coverage.  
When the divisions between the justices become sharp, they express them with dissensual 
decisions, which in turn causes the press to highlight elite disagreement.  As a result, dissensual 
decisions receive more unfavorable portrayals than those decided by large judicial majorities.  
Because of press reliance on elites’ voices, the influence of judicial votes has the most powerful 
impact on the content of coverage, even once we account for the opinions of other political 
actors, the characteristics of decisions, and the issues under consideration. 
 In the following chapters, I offer a series of tests to explore Dissensus Dynamics Theory 
and its implications.  In Chapters 5 and 6, I review evidence for the major prediction of the 
model – that media framing of rulings follows from voting outcomes on the Court.  I use a 
random sample of high profile rulings released between 1980 and 2008.  For each decision, I 
analyze the content of national newspaper and cable news coverage to measure the extent to 
which it is framed in favorable terms (the decision support scale). 
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 But first, I test, refine, and expand Dissensus Dynamics Theory in Chapter 4.  I use a 
most-similar case study of two eminent domain rulings.  The design allows me to explore how 
media coverage of this area of law changed from the spring of 2005 (before either ruling) to the 
summer (after both had been announced).  I track the frames the national press uses to discuss 
the issue and the influence of the Court’s rulings on these frames.  I find evidence that coverage 
of eminent domain confirms some of the predictions of Dissensus Dynamics Theory, as the 
media discussion of the issue and the Court becomes more critical following the dissensual and 
































“All Private Property is Now Vulnerable”: 
A Case Study of Consensus and Dissent in Two Supreme Court Eminent Domain Rulings 
 
 At the end of its 2004-2005 term, the Supreme Court redefined takings law in the United 
States.  First, in May, it substantially broadened the power of the government to seize private 
property even if the seizure did not advance legitimate government interests (Lingle v. Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc.).  One month later, the Court expanded the takings power by permitting the seizure of 
private property for the purposes of private economic development (Kelo v. City of New 
London).  The Washington Post admired the former decision for its candidness and restraint.  Yet 
it argued that the latter was unjust though ultimately correct.19  Other media outlets would not be 
so forgiving in their coverage of Kelo. 
 In the following chapter, I explore Dissensus Dynamics Theory through a case study of 
these two eminent domain rulings.  I show how the newsworthy features of Kelo raised the 
salience of government takings during this time frame.  I demonstrate that the press’s portrait of 
property rights shifted dramatically between April and July.  But more importantly, I show how 
different voting outcomes in the cases strongly influenced their coverage.  The unanimously-
decided Lingle did little to disturb vague media narratives about the invulnerability of American 
property rights, even as it rendered these narratives hollow.  But the 5-4 outcome in Kelo had 
both direct and indirect effects on coverage.  Internal disagreements on the Court caused the 
press to call into question the wisdom of the decision and raise alarms about property rights in 
the United States.  Dissenting justices most effectively influenced media coverage when they 
employed evocative language to describe the ramifications of the decision.  At the same time, 
                                                
19 “Judicial Takings and Givings.” Washington Post. May 29, 2005. “Eminent Latitude.” Washington Post. June 24, 
2005. 
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though, the presence of judicial disagreement caused reporters to highlight other critics of the 
ruling, from high-ranking members of Congress to ordinary homeowners. 
 The results provide evidence for the basic tenet of Dissensus Dynamics Theory: that the 
press fashioned its coverage of eminent domain rulings in response to the level of internal 
disagreement among the justices themselves.  But they also add to our understanding of the 
model, demonstrating how coverage of a legal controversy changes over time and how the 
effects of judicial dissensus are idiosyncratic, as the press highlights only the most newsworthy 
frames espoused by Supreme Court justices. 
 
The Case Study Approach 
Case studies allow researchers to identify causal mechanisms and clarify concepts and 
measures in a manner not afforded by large N research (Gerring 2007, Mahoney 2000).  Case 
studies further allow the generation and evaluation of key hypotheses when done with care.  In 
this chapter, I appraise how the national press frames Supreme Court rulings through a case 
study of property rights law.  I expect that Court voting coalitions influence the content of press 
reports, with more dissensual and ideologically-narrow rulings garnering unsupportive coverage.  
While exploring this hypothesis, I intend to provide a more robust portrait of press coverage.  
What frames does the media use to characterize Supreme Court decisions?  What influence do 
written opinions have on coverage?  How do decisions change the coverage of an issue over 
time?  What other mechanisms translate rulings into press reports?  
 To answer these questions, I use a most-similar design.  This approach enables the 
researcher to isolate an explanatory variable while controlling for other confounding factors in 
the cases under investigation (Gerring 2007, Seawright and Gerring 2008).  Ideally, a most-
similar design would control for the following case features, listed in order of importance: issue 
under consideration, substance of decision, ideological direction of decision, time period, legal 
significance of decision, Court membership, political climate, and involvement of other political 
actors.  At the same time, the cases selected should differ in the Court voting coalitions – one 
consensual, the other dissensual and ideologically-divided.   
 Two important property rights cases meet the criteria laid out above quite well.  In Lingle 
v. Chevron and Kelo v. New London, the Court dealt with the ability of government to “take” 
property from private parties, in accordance with the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.  The 
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cases were decided exactly one month apart, in 2005, with the Court offering a broad 
interpretation of government power in both.  Many scholars consider Lingle and Kelo to be 
among the most significant property rights rulings in decades (Baron 2007; Nadler, Diamond, 
and Patton 2008).  But despite these similarities, the justices themselves diverged in their 
interpretations of the cases, splitting 5-4 in Kelo while reaching a unanimous agreement in 
Lingle. 
 In the following pages, I trace the history of Lingle and Kelo, exploring their important 
similarities, differences, and how well they fit the most-similar case comparison criteria. 
 
The History of Lingle and Kelo 
  On Tuesday, February 22, 2005, the Supreme Court heard arguments in two cases that 
would soon form a major part of its takings jurisprudence.  Both cases dealt with the Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause, which provides, “…nor shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation.”  The Court has traditionally interpreted this clause to give the 
government wide latitude in seizing property for public use and to require the government to pay 
fair market value for such property (Dana 2006, Sax 2005, Sterk 2006, Berman v. Parker). 
 In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A Inc., the Court was adjudicating a dispute on appeal from the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  The case involved a challenge to a law enacted in 
the state of Hawaii in 1997 to curb high prices on gasoline.  The law placed a limit on the 
amount of rent that oil companies could charge to lease their service stations.  The gasoline 
refiner Chevron U.S.A. challenged the act as an unconstitutional regulatory taking of property,20 
and two lower courts sided with Chevron, finding that the Hawaii law did not “substantially 
advance a legitimate state interest.”  The Supreme Court heard arguments as to whether the 
“substantially advance” test, which it had applied in earlier property rights decisions, was an 
appropriate one for evaluating regulatory takings. 
 On May 23, 2005, the Court released a unanimous verdict, written by Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor, that struck down the “substantially advance” formula.  In finding that earlier 
applications of the formula were unclear, the justices ruled that courts should not evaluate the 
purpose of regulations to determine whether they constitute a compensable taking.  Though the 
                                                
20 A “regulatory taking” does not involve the physical taking of property but rather occurs when government 
restrictions become so onerous as to have similar consequences to a physical taking. 
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Supreme Court remanded the case for further consideration, the decision debilitated Chevron’s 
challenge to the rent-control act.  Lingle v. Chevron substantially broadened government power 
to regulate property and conduct takings without having to demonstrate a “legitimate” interest in 
doing so (Baron 2007, Barros 2006, Merrill 2010). 
 Similarly, the Court offered a broad interpretation of government power under the 
Takings Clause in Kelo v. New London.  At issue in the case was an economic development plan 
approved by the city of New London, Connecticut to deal with its financial distress.  The plan 
capitalized on the arrival of the pharmaceutical giant Pfizer to the area by creating space for a 
hotel, restaurants, retail outlets, and offices, among other things.  The city intended to use its 
eminent domain power to acquire land from homeowners who were unwilling to sell it, 
providing them with compensation for their property.  Two of these homeowners, Susette Kelo 
and Wilhelmina Dery, challenged the city’s use of eminent domain as a violation of the “public 
use” requirement in the Fifth Amendment. 
 On June 23, 2005, the Court ruled against the plaintiffs, finding that New London’s 
economic development plan did indeed serve a “public purpose.”  Writing for the majority, 
Justice John Paul Stevens noted that public benefits of the economic development plan fulfilled 
the public use requirement.  Furthermore, he emphasized deference to the New London 
legislature, affirming an expansive government power to employ eminent domain where 
lawmakers deem appropriate (so long as they provide compensation for seized property). 
 Four justices raised strong objections to the decision.  One dissenting opinion, written by 
O’Connor and signed by Justices William Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas, 
charged the majority with abandoning a “long-held, basic limitation on government power.”  
They argued that economic development projects served a private purpose, not public use.  
Ominously, they warned, “Under the banner of economic development, all private property is 
now vulnerable to being taken and transferred to another private owner” (Kelo v. New London, 
O’Connor dissenting).  In a separate dissent, Thomas offered a textual analysis of the Fifth 
Amendment to show that the majority had misinterpreted it.  He further suggested that the 
decision would give new power to wealthy interests at the expense of minorities and the poor 
(Kelo v. New London, Thomas dissenting). 
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To make meaningful inferences about the effect of judicial votes in these two cases, one 
must be confident that Lingle and Kelo are similar in many of their other characteristics.  Table 
4.1 catalogues the most important features of the cases, which I discuss in further detail below. 
 
Table 4.1 Comparison of Two Takings Clause Rulings 
 Lingle v. Chevron Kelo v. New London, CT 
Issue Fifth Amendment;  
regulatory takings 
 
Fifth Amendment;  
eminent domain 
Substance of decision Prescribes a new test to evaluate 
regulatory takings 
 
Clarifies the meaning of “public 
use” 
Direction of decision Substantially broadens 
government takings power  
 
Possibly broadens government 
eminent domain power 




Time period Hearing: February 2005 
Decision: May 2005 
 
Hearing: February 2005 
Decision: June 2005 
Court membership Rehnquist court 
 
Rehnquist court 
Political climate Unified Republican government 
 
Unified Republican government 
Perceived victim / 
losing party 








Most Similar Features 
Lingle and Kelo are among the small number of cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court 
that concern with the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  Though the circumstances and 
details surrounding each case differ, they typically involve the government’s ability to curtail or 
eliminate private property rights for public goals.  Indeed, a wide range of legal scholarship 
acknowledges the similarities between Lingle and Kelo, considering their joint implications for 
takings law in the United States (Baron 2007; Barros 2006; Wroth 2005; Breau 2006; Fletcher 
2006; Ely 2004; Nadler, Diamond, and Patton 2008). 
 Nonetheless, the cases deal with different aspects of takings: Kelo with the physical 
seizure of private property known as eminent domain and Lingle with regulatory takings 
(whether a legal regulation is so onerous as to constitute a compensable taking of property; 
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Baron 2007).  This distinction has little legal or practical significance; according to O’Connor, 
regulatory takings and eminent domain appropriations are “functionally equivalent” (Lingle v. 
Chevron, 539; see also Kent 2011).  Both regulatory takings and eminent domain decisions 
adjudicate whether the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment permits specific invasions of 
private property rights.  
 The Supreme Court’s rulings in Lingle and Kelo reinforce the parallels between the 
regulatory takings and eminent domain questions.  In the most reductive terms, Lingle remanded 
the dispute over Hawaii’s rent control act to a lower court while making it more difficult for 
challenges to the act to succeed.  Kelo allowed the use of eminent domain for economic 
development to proceed in New London and other cities.  Both cases offered a similarly broad 
interpretation of the government’s power under the Fifth Amendment (Fletcher 2006, Ely 2004).  
They rendered it significantly more difficult for property owners – whether companies or 
individuals – to successfully block government takings.  Indeed, scholars have viewed Lingle as 
noteworthy for eliminating the due process “substantially advances” test, affording government 
more latitude and requiring less justification for takings (Baron 2007, Barros 2006).  Others view 
Kelo as redefining “public use” to similar ends (Kelo v. New London, O’Connor dissenting, 
Thomas dissenting; Kanner 2006). 
 The temporal proximity of the Lingle and Kelo decisions further underscores their 
similarities.  Argued on the same day, the cases were decided exactly one month apart, near the 
end of the Court’s 2004-2005 term.  The same nine justices heard oral arguments and voted in 
each case, ensuring that the different press reactions to each cannot be attributed to views about 
the Court’s membership itself.  Similarly, the makeup of the other branches of government 
remained constant between the two cases, with Republicans controlling both houses of Congress 
and the presidency.  Most importantly, the minimal time span between the Lingle and Kelo 
decisions ensures that the popular understanding of property rights remained largely identical.  
Between May 23 and June 23, there were no major shifts in the way in which the media or public 
discussed property rights in the United States and no other major controversies involving the 
Takings Clause. 
 These broad similarities make Lingle and Kelo strong candidates for a most-similar case 
study design, allowing us to rule out the alternative explanations that differences in the content of 
coverage stem from distinctions in their issue area, legal significance, or political context.  
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Distinctions and Other Accounts of Differences in Coverage 
One of the most important distinctions between Lingle and Kelo involves their voting 
outcome (the explanatory variable in Dissensus Dynamics Theory).21  In the following pages, I 
will make the case that the voting outcome on the Court is responsible for many of the major 
differences in the coverage of Lingle and Kelo, but I will also disentangle why and how voting 
outcomes matter.  I suggest that variations in majority coalition size are largely responsible for 
distinctions in the coverage of Lingle and Kelo, while the ideological predilections of the justices 
mattered minimally. 
 One other important difference between Lingle and Kelo complicates the analysis of their 
press coverage: the identity of the losing party (Nadler, Diamond, and Patton 2008; Baron 2007).  
The Chevron corporation, a major oil refiner, was unlikely to elicit sympathy from either the 
press or the public after the Supreme Court ruled against it in Lingle.  On the other hand, 
plaintiffs Susette Kelo and Wilhelmina Dery made ideal protagonists as humble homeowners 
seeking to defend their property from the invasion of the New London municipal government.  
As Nadler, Diamond, and Patton (2008) argue, human-interest stories played a large part in the 
public’s revulsion to the Kelo ruling. 
 It is imperative that any study of the divergent press reactions to Lingle and Kelo account 
for how much can be attributed to the judicial voting coalitions and how much to their perceived 
victims.  One way to do so involves entertaining two counterfactuals.  First, how would press 
coverage of Kelo have changed if the plaintiffs elicited less sympathy?  On the one hand, it is 
likely that some of the human-interest coverage of the case would have evaporated.  And public 
antipathy would have diminished to the extent that Americans did not view the ruling as 
violating the property rights of sympathetic claimants (Nadler, Diamond, and Patton 2008; see 
also the discussion of culturally congruent frames in Entman 2004).  But a number of stories 
involving Kelo framed the case as one that had little to do with its victims and more to do with its 
legal shortcomings.  These frames, raised by O’Connor and others in their dissenting opinions, 
would have remained.   
                                                
21 One may question why the voting outcomes differed so dramatically in the cases if they were otherwise similar.  
Recent scholarship suggests that the justices have preferences not only about resolving the legal issues in a case but 
in resolving a concrete dispute between parties (Carrubba et al. 2012).  For this reason, we may speculate that the 
justices were more reluctant to rule against the New London homeowners than they were against Chevron (and, at 
any rate, the Court’s decision to remand in Lingle allowed it avoid ruling against Chevron directly). 
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Second, one might ask, had Kelo been decided by a unanimous vote, how would this have 
changed its press coverage?  To answer this, consider that the Supreme Court’s eminent domain 
jurisprudence, which covered twelve cases as of 2005, has featured a variety of petitioners.  
Almost all of these cases have passed without substantial negative attention in the press and 
almost all of them were decided by consensual votes on the Court (Sax 2005).  For instance, the 
unanimous ruling in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff (1984) upheld the state’s plan to seize 
property from individuals who held large swaths of land and transfer it to others.  In Berman v. 
Parker (1954), the Court upheld, by a vote of 8-0, the use of eminent domain on an entire 
blighted neighborhood in Washington, D.C.  In these cases – where the Court ruled against a 
wide range of claimants – unanimity protected the institution from press backlash.   
In the follow pages, I will make the case that the negative frames used by the news to 
characterize Kelo can be traced in large part to its status as the only 5-4 ruling in Takings Clause 
jurisprudence at the Court.  I explain how two otherwise similar takings cases, decided just one 
month apart, garnered very different treatment in the press as a result of their voting outcomes. 
 
Study Design 
 The mainstream news media affords limited coverage to property rights as a general rule.  
But as we will see, the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. New London triggered a spike in 
attention, as news outlets discussed eminent domain with regularity.  Why did Kelo lead to such 
different reactions than Lingle?  How did media discussions of property rights evolve from the 
spring of 2005, before these decisions, to the summer?  What frames did the press highlight?  
How did it portray the Court’s rulings? 
 To answer these questions, I gather coverage of the property rights issue from ten leading 
media organizations.  I use stories from the New York Times, Washington Post, Washington 
Times, USA Today, CNN, Fox News, MSNBC, Newsweek, the National Review, and National 
Public Radio.  These sources vary in both ideological orientation and medium (newspaper, cable 
news, magazine, and public radio).  Nonetheless, because each source offers original reporting 
on the Supreme Court, I expect the factors and constraints influencing their coverage to be 
similar (see Chapter 3).  I conduct Lexis-Nexis keyword searches for any of the following terms: 
“private property,” “eminent domain,” “fifth amendment,” “takings clause,” “lingle,” or “kelo.”  
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There are 394 news articles and segments that mention one or more of these terms between April 
23 and July 22, 2005.22 
 To analyze the effects of the Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence on coverage of 
property rights, I divide the coverage period into three phases: Phase 1 pre-Lingle (April 23-May 
22), Phase 2 post-Lingle, pre-Kelo (May 23-June 22), and Phase 3 post-Kelo (June 23-July 22).  
Figure 4.1, which plots the number of property rights stories on a daily basis, makes clear the 















                                                
22 All sources offer substantial coverage of property rights, except Newsweek.  By source, the number of articles / 
segments: New York Times 71, Washington Post 83, Washington Times 51, USA Today 19, CNN 61, Fox News 25, 











 One observable implication of Dissensus Dynamics Theory is that the press will frame an 
issue in different terms depending on whether a relevant Court ruling is consensual.  We would 
expect the media to employ distinct frames to characterize property rights after Lingle than it 
does after Kelo.  And indeed, each decision has a distinct effect on the media’s characterization 
of the issue (see Figure 4.2).  Stories discussing the Fifth Amendment decline from 36 percent of 
all property rights news in Phase 1 to 29% in Phase 2 and then to 23% in Phase 3.  On the other 
hand, the post-Kelo world becomes one in which the eminent domain frame defines the issue 
(over three-fifths of stories include its mention).  Not surprisingly, the Court’s announcement of 
decisions also changes the shape of coverage, with discussions of Lingle peaking in Phase 2 (7% 
of stories) and those of Kelo in Phase 3 (22% of stories). 
 Given the considerable similarities between Lingle and Kelo, why might press coverage 
of government takings have changed so dramatically from April to July 2005?  Recall that two 
major differences in the cases involve their perceived victims and voting outcomes.  We can 
explore the salience of these features as expressed by the content of media coverage across the 
three phases.  To do so, I conduct searches for mentions of “dissent” and indicators of victims in 
property rights struggles.  I use the Supreme Court’s written opinions in Lingle and Kelo as a 
guide for how victimhood may be framed, focusing on invasions or intrusions of personal 
property, as well as mentions of vulnerable populations like the poor, the weak, and minorities.23  
As a percentage of all property rights coverage, mentions of victims occur least frequently in 
Phase 3, after Kelo limits the rights of homeowners to fight eminent domain.  At the same time, 
mentions of judicial dissent alongside discussions of property rights spike in Phase 3, as Figure 
4.3 indicates. 
 The media’s apparent attentiveness to judicial dissensus following the Kelo decision does 
not verify that the dissenters’ arguments dominated coverage.  Nor does it explain why the case 
drew so much notice.  But it does indicate that the press pays attention to dissent on the Court.  
Between the end of May and the end of June, the media’s coverage of property rights expanded 
dramatically, with discussion of the Fifth Amendment receding and that of eminent domain 
                                                
23 In Lingle, the Court makes no mention of the “victims” of its ruling.  In Kelo, the majority and minority struggle 
over the impact of its decisions on blighted areas.  More importantly, Thomas’s dissenting opinion expresses worries 
about the impact of the ruling.  It mentions the poor, weak, blacks and other minorities and warns against the 
invasion of “traditional” property rights (Kelo v. New London 2005, Thomas dissenting, 14).  Based on an analysis 
of these opinions, I use the following search terms to denote victimization in the press: “victim”, “invas”, “invad”, 
“intru”, “poor”, “weak”, “black”, “minor”. 
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swelling.  Against the backdrop of this significant change, Americans were also learning more 
frequently about judicial disagreements surrounding property rights. 
 
Content of Coverage 
 A number of explanations may account for how judicial dissensus sets apart coverage of 
Lingle and Kelo.  One account suggests that the cases receive identical portrayals, but that 
dissensus raises the salience of Kelo alone.  This account runs contrary to the predictions of 
Dissensus Dynamics Theory.  And as we have already seen, it is also inaccurate, for the 
substance of property rights discussions changes alongside the volume of its coverage across the 
three phases.  Another explanation is that the relationship between press coverage and judicial 
dissensus is, in this case, spurious.  There is little evidence for this explanation, given the fact 
that the Supreme Court decided by large majorities other property rights issues in its recent 
history, none of which led to a dramatic reversal in press coverage.  Lingle and Kelo themselves 
differ minimally in the nature and direction of their decisions, occur within the same time frame 
and political climate, and yet vary dramatically in their media treatment.  A third explanation 
sees judicial dissensus as an important signal that only indirectly influences press coverage of an 
issue.  In this scenario, consensual and dissensual decisions trigger different types of coverage, 
but the Court’s opinions do little to shape the content of this coverage.  In the case of Kelo, the 
specific arguments raised by O’Connor and other dissenters would be much less relevant than the 
fact that they dissented in the first place.  Finally, another explanation suggests that the press 
draws directly on the frames and arguments supplied by dissenters when shaping its coverage.  
For instance, media outlets may choose to highlight criticisms of the majority’s definition of 
“public purpose” in Kelo precisely because the dissenters offer this argument. 
 In the following pages, I will make the case that dissent in Kelo exerts both a direct and 
an indirect effect on coverage of property rights.  The frames used by the dissenters have some 
effect on the content of media coverage, but their impact is idiosyncratic.  O’Connor’s warning 
about the vulnerability of property rights in the wake of Kelo strongly influences coverage.  
Other frames track closely the debate between the majority and dissent, but some do not.  For 
instance, Thomas raises two key considerations – an originalist interpretation of the Constitution 
and the effects of eminent domain on minorities and the poor – but only the latter gains traction 
in the media.  
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Based on this evidence, I argue that the specific frames used in written opinions gain 
traction to the extent that they help the press craft simple yet dramatic coverage.  So while the 
voting outcome in Kelo allowed the press to offer a variety of counter-frames to rebut the Court 
majority, it only drew on the most newsworthy arguments raised by the dissenters. 
 
Phase 1: Pre-Lingle 
 Prior to Lingle, the national press offers a steady but small stream of property rights 
coverage.  The coverage ranges from detailed examinations of eminent domain to appeals 
regarding property rights to reports on property law and courts; from invocations of American 
values to unrelated discussions of the Fifth Amendment.24  The modal story gives only passing 
mention to a vague notion of private property, with little discussion of the concept.  A 
Washington Post story from May 20 is typical.  The article discusses federal efforts to reshape 
the Endangered Species Act, noting a need to balance private property rights with habitat 
protection.25  A May 6 segment on Fox News illustrates even more clearly the offhand references 
to private property that occur in the pre-Lingle phase, with a guest on The Big Story joking that 
“there’s no controversy about Marxism, except for the sticky bit about no private property.”26  
News coverage often reinforces the assumption that private property rights are sacrosanct.  
According to Fox News host Bill O’Reilly, “seizing private property after an American dies is 
simply socialism.”27 
 Such straightforward invocations of property values make up a large portion of pre-
Lingle coverage.  Nearly half of all articles in this phase talk about private property and the 
average story includes 13 related words (i.e., “home”, “right”, “own”).  The frequency of private 
property discussions here is not out of the ordinary, however, as this frame dominates coverage 
even after the Supreme Court’s rulings in Lingle and Kelo.  It is more notable, in fact, that the 
press does little to flesh out its portrait of property rights in more detailed terms. 
                                                
24 Applebome, Peter. “Clear the Way, Fellows. The Yellow Brick Road is Coming Through.” New York Times. May 
8, 2005. “Defending the Neighborhood” Washington Post. May 7, 2005.  Downey, Kirstin. “Revitalization Projects 
Hinge on Eminent Domain Lawsuit.” Washington Post. May 21, 2005. Rahn, Richard W. “A Run on the World 
Bank.” Washington Times. June 3, 2005. Kasindorf, Martin. “Jackson Defense Strategy: ‘A Lot of Witnesses.’” USA 
Today. May 2, 2005. 
25 Eilperin, Juliet. “Legislators Working to Reshape Endangered Species Act.” Washington Post. May 20, 2005. 
26 Gibson, John. The Big Story with John Gibson. Fox News. May 6, 2005. 
27 O’Reilly, Bill. The O’Reilly Factor. Fox News. April 29, 2005. 
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 Two other important frames play a large part in Phase 1 coverage.  Discussions of 
eminent domain and the Fifth Amendment take place with regularity.  Both topics come up more 
frequently than in the post-Lingle phase (though Kelo returns the issue of eminent domain back 
to the media’s gaze).  Most of the coverage of the Fifth Amendment, however, has little to do 
with property rights and more to do with the Michael Jackson child molestation trial during this 
time period (cable news, in particular, paid careful attention to the witnesses’ frequent 
invocations of the right against self-incrimination). 
 Eminent domain is another matter.  News organizations publish 18 stories on the topic 
that deal with a range of projects and controversies.  Most of these stories are impressively 
detailed.  The Washington Post offers a portrait of the Kelo case.28  Other articles focus on 
projects using eminent domain in Brooklyn; Manhattan; Salina, N.Y.; and Washington D.C.29 
 Consider one article, entitled “Fighting the Power to Take Your Home,” which explores 
the process for condemning homes.  The piece catalogues the emotional reactions of 
homeowners to eminent domain, characterizing the power as commonly used.  Though the story 
raises some concerns about the tactic – and mentions the impending Kelo decision – it also 
depicts takings law as fairly straightforward.  “Most people accept the practice of eminent 
domain, even if they consider it unpleasant and distasteful,” the article notes.  According to one 
lawyer, “without eminent domain, we’d hamstring the general public’s interest at the expense of 
one individual.”30 
 Despite conventional wisdom that Kelo thrust the spotlight on a little known area of the 
law, then, eminent domain issues were not entirely obscure in the spring of 2005.  In fact, fully 
one quarter of the stories involving property rights in the mainstream press discuss this 
government power.  But in the pre-Lingle phase, the media depicts property rights in vague and 
uncontroversial terms.  Private property is lauded and eminent domain recognized, but very few 
reports detail dramatic struggles between states and property owners.  Against this backdrop, the 
                                                
28 Downey, Kirstin. “Revitalization Projects Hinge on Eminent Domain Lawsuit.” Washington Post. May 21, 
2005. 
29 Cardwell, Diane. “Ferrer and Mayor Clash on Brooklyn Rezoning.” New York Times. May 10, 2005. Murdock, 
Deroy. “Scrap the Freedom Tower.” National Review. May 9, 2005. Applebome, Peter. “Clear the Way, Fellows. 
The Yellow Brick Road is Coming Through.” New York Times. May 8, 2005. Nakamura, David. “Stadium Talks 
with Landowners Set to Begin.” Washington Post. May 5, 2005. Fisher, Eric. “DCBSA Bid Gains Support on 
Council.” Washington Times. May 17, 2005. 
30 Downey, Kirstin. “Fighting the Power to Take Your Home.” Washington Post. May 7, 2005. 
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Supreme Court prepared to release its May 22 opinion that broadened the ability of the 
government to conduct regulatory takings. 
 
Phase 2: Post-Lingle, Pre-Kelo 
 The Court’s Lingle decision passed with little notice, in spite of the fact that it violated a 
popular presumption about the imperviousness of property rights.  Though existing models of 
framing suggest that culturally incongruent frames like the one espoused by the Court – that the 
government need not demonstrate a legitimate interest in taking property – should activate 
counter-frames in the press (Entman 2004), the press does not frame Lingle as a violation of 
American values.  In fact, the few stories that comment directly on the ruling express deference 
to the Court.  According to Dissensus Dynamics Theory, the justices fostered favorable coverage 
by achieving unanimity. 
The New York Times first reports on the decision on May 24 in a six paragraph article, 
noting, “In a unanimous ruling, the court clarified its private property precedents.”  The article 
draws heavily on O’Connor’s majority opinion in describing the ruling as one that lifts confusion 
in takings jurisprudence.31  Five days later, the Washington Post editorializes that the court 
“unambiguously repudiated a dangerous doctrine it had articulated in 1980, a doctrine with 
horrid implications for environmental and other regulatory enforcement.”  The Post relies on the 
language of the O’Connor’s opinion in its analysis and largely focuses on the ruling’s apparent 
legal implications.  It gives only passing mention to the rent-cap on Chevron’s Hawaii filling 
stations that sparked the lawsuit.32  In another article, law professor Richard Garnett praises the 
Supreme Court’s ability to achieve unanimity.  He contends that, despite the fact that people 
focus on controversy, the Court sometimes achieves consensus in difficult-to-decide cases.33 
 Garnett’s offhand characterization of Lingle as a complicated legal matter belies the 
Times and Post coverage portraying the decision as self-evident.  It does, however, echo much of 
the legal literature on the case.  In fact, there are three reasons that the ruling might have fostered 
greater attention and controversy in the media.  First, the outcome of the case surprised some 
legal observers (Fletcher 2006), which may have drawn the attention of reporters and editors 
                                                
31 Greenhouse, Linda. “In Free-Speech Ruling, Justices Say All Ranchers Must Help Pay for Federal Ads.” New 
York Times. May 24, 2005. 
32 “Judicial Takings and Givings.” Washington Post. May 29, 2005. 
33 Garnett, Richard W. “Unanimous!” National Review. June 1, 2005. 
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under the right conditions.  Second, many scholars view the ruling as one of the most significant 
in takings law (Baron 2007, Barros 2006).  They argue that by discarding the “substantially 
advances” test, the Court fundamentally altered three decades worth of limits on the takings 
power, with major ramifications for property owners.  News organizations could have used the 
Lingle ruling as an opportunity to explore judicial limits on property rights.  They may have 
further framed the case as a precursor to the Court’s consideration of “public use” requirements 
in Kelo.  And finally, the decision appeared to violate the common assumptions about the secure 
nature of property rights.  Some press outlets might have chosen to explore further the 
implications that the government does not need to feign a legitimate interest in taking property, 
that it can enact rent caps on business whenever it deems appropriate. 
 Instead, Lingle passed with little fanfare.  But favorable coverage of the ruling (which the 
Court helped to ensure by achieving consensus) left other media narratives about property rights 
undisturbed; they remained largely unchanged from the pre-decision phase.  Once again, 
mentions of private property occur with frequency – in nearly 60% of the articles in the Phase 2 
sample.  Some invocations of the term are purely descriptive.  At other times, reports emphasize 
respect for property rights.  A Washington Times Op-Ed typifies such a story, arguing, “Without 
a responsible rule of law that protects private property rights, incentives and free markets, there 
can be no sustained development.”34  A guest on NPR depicts the violation of property rights as 
unethical.”35 
 With the Michael Jackson testimony ending, references to non-Takings Clause portions 
of Fifth Amendment decline.  Similarly, the media focuses less on potential threats posed by 
eminent domain in the post-Lingle phase.  As of June 22, 2005, the media had made little effort 
to portray property rights as under threat, despite the Supreme Court’s significant enhancement 
of takings power in Lingle.  Eminent domain and regulatory takings constitute a small minority 
of property rights news.  Rather, most coverage continues to frame private property as a bedrock 
principle of American society, albeit one subject to reasonable limits imposed by the government 
and the judiciary. 
 
 
                                                
34 Rahn, Richard W. “A Run on the World Bank.” Washington Times. June 3. 2005 
35 Inskeep, Steve. Morning Edition. National Public Radio. June 7, 2005. 
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Phase 3: Post-Kelo 
 The ruling in Kelo v. New London alters dramatically the media portrayal of property 
rights.  Without question, Kelo’s influence can be traced in part to its violation of strong cultural 
norms and values regarding property (Nadler, Diamond, and Patton 2008; Lee 2006; Sax 2005).  
But this explanation is not enough on its own, for Lingle similarly curtailed protections for 
private property.  Why, then, did Kelo change the way in which the media discussed property 
rights? 
 Initial reports in the wake of a news event may be quite influential.  In the case of judicial 
decisions, this influence is magnified.  Legal rulings present difficulties to reporters that must 
trace a case history, interpret complex jargon, parse legal implications, and explore societal 
aftereffects in a compelling and entertaining manner (Greenhouse 1996).  In most cases, a small 
cadre of reporters, who have legal training and years of experience working at the Supreme 
Court, shape initial coverage of a ruling (Davis 1994).  Their reports help structure a press 
narrative over time.  Kelo provides evidence for this pattern.  The initial reports on the decision 
focus more on its legal meaning and offer more diverse viewpoints than many subsequent 
stories, but they also highlight many of the same arguments that recur in later coverage.   
 In the first two days after Kelo’s announcement, over 40 stories consider the case and its 
ramifications.  Many news sources explain the ruling as the result of a broad interpretation of 
public use – that courts often read the Fifth Amendment to favor the government over individual 
property owners.  The public use frame reflects positively on the ruling in Kelo, as it echoes 
closely the majority’s analysis.  It further gives the impression that the types of takings endorsed 
by the majority are not altogether novel, but rather a continuation of a long-recognized, rarely 
used government power.  Indeed, some reports emphasize that the Court defers to lawmakers 
concerning eminent domain because the public helps constrain their interpretation of “public 
use.”  According to CNN legal analyst Jeffrey Toobin:  
 
And basically what the majority said is, look, this belongs in the political system.  If you 
don’t like how your mayor is exercising the power of eminent domain, vote him out of 
office, but the Constitution is no bar to it.  We’re not going to get involved in 
micromanaging how mayors run their cities and how they exercise all their powers.  The 
Constitution says – the literal words in the constitution are “public use.” Eminent domain 
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can be used for a public use.  Under the majority’s view, public use includes some kinds 
of private development that benefits the community.36 
  
These reinforcing frames – that the Constitution allows takings for public purposes, 
broadly defined, and that courts defer to legislative judgments about them – occur with some 
regularity in both the initial coverage of Kelo and in Stevens’s majority opinion.  Though it is not 
the place of the Court to adopt a new “bright-line rule” about the meaning of public use, 
according to Stevens, “nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further 
restrictions on its exercise of the takings power.”  Had the media limited its coverage of Kelo to 
this argument, the portrait of the case in the press would not have differed markedly from that of 
Lingle. 
 Instead, however, a preponderance of the coverage frames the decision in less deferential 
terms.  Stories highlight the Court’s redefinition of public use as public purpose, the hardships 
the ruling will impose on homeowners, the vulnerability of private property in a post-Kelo 
society, the expansion of government power, and the privileging of wealthy interests over those 
of the poor.  Almost all of these frames are new to the discussion of private property since the 
spring of 2005.  Many of these arguments originate in the opinions released by the Court 
(particularly those of the dissenters), namely: the redefinition of public use, the vulnerability of 
property, the expansion of government power, and the harm done to the poor.  The media readily 
employs the language of dissenting opinions to make these arguments (although, as we will see, 
some of the most compelling language in them receives a disproportionate share of the 
attention).  On the other hand, the powerful human-interest frame gains traction due mainly to 
the sympathetic nature of the victims in Kelo.  All of these frames take shape in the days after the 
ruling and continue to shape the discussion of the case throughout Phase 3.  I consider each of 







                                                
36 O’Brien, Soledad. American Morning. CNN. June 24, 2005. 
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Table 4.2 Post-Kelo Framing of Property Rights 
Frame Part of Dissenting Opinions? 
 






Redefinition of public use 
 
Yes; 
“The Court has erased the Public Use Clause 
from Our Constitution” (Thomas) 
 
 
Vulnerability of property 
 
Yes; 
“All private property is now vulnerable to 




Expansion of government power 
 
Yes; 
“An external, judicial check … is necessary if 
this constraint on government power is to 
retain any meaning” (O’Connor) 
 
 
Privileging of wealthy interests 
 
Yes; 
“These losses will fall disproportionately on 
poor communities” (Thomas) 
 
The Hardships on Ordinary Homeowners 
 A number of stories in Kelo’s aftermath employ a human-interest angle, exploring the 
effects of the ruling on the plaintiffs and other homeowners.  Susette Kelo, in particular, offered 
a gripping personal story.  “Protecting her Victorian dream house from the urban renewal 
bulldozer was always going to be an uphill fight,” USA Today notes.  Kelo laments, “I am sick. 
Do they have any idea what they’ve done?”37 
 The media’s attention to sympathetic homeowners is not limited to the plaintiffs, 
however.  A number of other reports explore the ramifications of the Court’s decision for a wide 
variety of property owners.  For instance, CNN airs an interview with the son of another New 
London property owner, who makes plain the stakes surrounding takings: “The house, you know, 
is not a commodity to my father.  My father came over from Italy in 1962 and, you know, land to 
him means that he’s rich and that he’s got all the gold in the world.  You take that away from 
him, and you know, he has nothing.”38  Other reports follow suit, cataloguing the battles of 
ordinary homeowners to maintain their property in the face of government power.  For instance, 
                                                
37 “Ruling Leaves Door Open to Abuse.” USA Today. June 24, 2005. Salzman, Avi and Laura Mansnerus. “For 
Homeowners, Frustration and Anger at Court Ruling.” New York Times. June 24, 2005. 
38 O’Brien, Soledad. 2005. American Morning. CNN. June 24, 2005. 
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the use of eminent domain for a baseball stadium project in Washington D.C. had been praised 
by newspapers in May 2005 but earns some unflattering press in a story entitled “Half St. 
Citizens Continue to Fight Ballpark Bullies.”39 
 The human-interest hardship frames can be traced most directly to the sympathetic nature 
of the victims in Kelo.  These frames are powerful, indeed, and likely had a major impact on the 
public’s negative reactions to the decision (Nadler, Diamond, and Patton 2008).  Nonetheless, 
they represent just one change in press coverage of private property post-Kelo, and the only one 
directly traceable to the identity of the parties in the case.  Other private property frames are 
related more directly to the Court’s voting coalitions. 
 
The Redefinition of Public Use as Public Purpose 
 The day after the release of the Kelo decision, Matt Dery, the son of the case’s plantiff, 
spoke to NPR, saying, “Yes, the Constitution does allow the taking of private property for public 
use, but redevelopment is not a public use.”  Dery gave voice to an argument that had animated 
the history of Kelo and informed the analysis of its dissenters, but had seldom appeared in the 
media’s discussions of private property.  Other commentators take issue with the majority’s 
definition of public use as well.40 
 Not surprisingly, the most comprehensive analysis of the public use requirement comes 
from reporters with extensive experience at Supreme Court.  These include Linda Greenhouse at 
the New York Times, Charles Lane at the Washington Post, Guy Taylor at the Washington Times, 
Nina Totenberg at NPR, and Jeffrey Toobin at CNN.  Their detailed coverage of the Court’s 
opinions regularly informs other pieces.  Totenberg and Greenhouse put the dispute over the 
public use at their center of their analysis, with Greenhouse alternately quoting from Stevens’s 
broad reading of the clause and O’Connor’s objections.  “The decision was a clear defeat for the 
long-term effort by Chief Justices Rehnquist and Justice Scalia to limit government control over 
private property.”41 The story also uses the powerful language of Thomas’s dissenting opinion: 
“The court has erased the Public Use Clause from our Constitution.” 
                                                
39 Knott, Tom. “Half St. Citizens Continue to Fight Ballpark Bullies.” Washington Times. July 6, 2005. 
40 Inskeep, Steve. 2005. Morning Edition. National Public Radio. June 24, 2005. Will, George F. “Damaging 
‘Deference.’” Washington Post. June 24, 2005. Simon, Scott. Weekend Edition. National Public Radio. June 25, 
2005. 
41 Greenhouse, Linda. “Justices Uphold Taking Property for Development.” New York Times. June 24, 2005. 
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 Indeed, nearly all discussion of public use in the press can be traced to the Court’s 
controlling and dissenting opinions themselves.  Compared to other concepts, “public use” and 
its associated terms occur with a high degree of frequency in Kelo (and in the dissenting opinions 
in particular).  The media’s use of this frame in the post-Kelo phase follows from the fact that the 
dissenters decry the “redefinition” of public use. 
 
The Vulnerability of Private Property 
 The idea that Kelo suddenly made private property vulnerable shattered the pre-ruling 
myth of its inviolability.  The tenuous hold that Americans had on their homes and other 
possessions became a central storyline in the press.  Consider the progression of print headlines 
regarding eminent domain: “The Limits of Property Rights” on June 24, “Your Castle No More” 
on June 27, “Uninformed Expropriation” on June 29, “Homeowners Lose on Property Rights” on 
July 1, “Your Land is My Land” on July 5, “Home, Seized Home” on July 18.42  Many media 
outlets focus on the impact of Kelo on the ordinary homeowner, but others explore the its 
implications for the poor or even for large retailers.43 
 Consider how this coverage differs from the press characterization of Lingle’s effect on 
property rights.  Why did Kelo suddenly cause reporters to suggest that the Court had attacked 
private property?  The vulnerability frame comes directly from O’Connor’s dissenting opinion in 
Kelo, where she argues, “All private property is now vulnerable to being taken and transferred to 
another private owner.”  This powerful and alarming argument has a major effect on the way in 
which the press views the decision’s impact.  Eight stories quote this phrase directly and many 
others build on the argument.  In one of the earliest reports on the ruling, CNN warns that, “You 
never know when your home or business is going to be targeted.”44  The frame retains its power 
throughout most of July 2005, with stories raising the vulnerability concern again and again. 
 The influence of O’Connor’s dissent suggests that justices may be particularly powerful 
in shaping the responses to their opinions if they craft a compelling portrait of them in a way to 
engage the press and public.  Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s oral dissent in Ledbetter v. 
                                                
42  “Limits of Property Rights.” New York Times. June 24, 2005. Hudgins, Edward. “Your Castle No More.” 
Washington Times. June 27, 2005. Rahn, Richard W. “Uninformed Expropriation.” Washington Times. June 29, 
2005. “Homeowners Lose on Property Rights.” USA Today. July 1, 2005. Tierney, John. “Your Land is My Land.” 
New York Times. July 5, 2005. Lambro, Donald. “Home, Seized, Home.” Washington Times. July 18, 2005. 
43 Knott, Tom. “Land Grabbers’ Aim At Skyland is Way Off Target.” Washington Times. July 21, 2005. 
44 Blitzer, Wolf. Wolf Blitzer Reports. CNN. June 23, 2005. 
 67 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. had a similar effect, leading to a backlash to the ruling and paving 
the way for the Lilly Ledbetter Act in Congress (Toobin 2012). 
 In an interesting twist, the media also notes an effort to seize the home of Supreme Court 
Justice David Souter in response to Kelo.  The plan recommended building a Lost Liberty Hotel 
to increase tourism and tax revenue on the site owned by “someone largely responsible for 
destroying the property rights of all Americans.”45  CNN, Fox News, MSNBC, The Washington 
Times, and USA Today covered the effort throughout July 2005. 
 
The Expansion of Government Power 
 The theme of property vulnerability couples nicely with two other arguments that 
regularly surface in press coverage of Kelo: that the decision represents a dramatic expansion of 
government power and that it privileges the interests of the wealthy.  Importantly, the ideological 
divide between the justices becomes most salient when the government power frame is used.  
NPR’s legal expert characterizes the ruling as “the sort of expansive definition of government 
that economic conservatives generally object to.”46  The Washington Times pays careful attention 
to the matter.  In its initial report on the ruling, it mentions the dissenters’ argument that the 
Court abandoned a longstanding limitation on government power.  The accompanying editorial 
calls the decision a victory for big government.  The paper argues, three days later, that calling 
the decision “corporatist or fascist is no mere epithet.  It designates a system that maintains the 
veneer of property while political authorities have extensive powers to limit rights in the name of 
economic planning.”47  Guests on cable news programs pick up on these arguments and raise 
them with regularity. 
 The characterization of Kelo as sanctioning an all-powerful government, however, was 
misleading.  Rather than endorsing government overreach, the Court majority made clear that its 
decision followed the Constitution and exhibited deference to the will of elected representatives.  
The decision portrayed the courts as a neutral arbiter in the fight over the constitutionally 
mandated power of eminent domain.  Furthermore, according to the Court, the public sharply 
constrained the ability of lawmakers to abuse this power (Kelo v. New London, Hawaii Housing 
                                                
45 Pierce, Greg. “Souter’s Property.” Washington Times. June 29, 2005. 
46 Chadwick, Alex. Day to Day. National Public Radio. June 23, 2005. 
47 “A Win for Big Government.” Washington Times. June 24, 2005. Taylor, Guy. “Supreme Court Backs Eminent 
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Authority v. Midkiff).  Congress, too, failed to cooperate with the news portrayal of a unified 
large government apparatus.  A bipartisan group of representatives called Kelo a serious mistake.  
Congressmen pledged to block federal funds for state and local governments using eminent 
domain.48 
  Though some news reports blame the expansion of government power on a coalition of 
the Supreme Court’s five most liberal justices (who made up the majority in Kelo), this depiction 
fails to gain widespread traction.  In fact, though the decision arguably increased government 
power, it did not fit soundly an ideological narrative.  For instance, the ostensibly liberal majority 
had not only sided with the government but also, apparently, with the interests of large 
corporations over those of ordinary Americans.  And Clarence Thomas – perhaps the most 
conservative justice – used his dissent to discuss Kelo’s ramifications for minorities and the poor. 
 
The Privileging of Wealthy Interests 
 Commentators demonstrate particular concern that the redefinition of public use as public 
purpose would make legislatures more likely to upgrade property by transferring it to businesses 
(the Court majority and dissenters debated this very point in their opinions).  According to 
Thomas: 
 
Allowing the government to take property solely for public purposes is bad enough, but 
extending the concept of public purpose to accomplish any beneficial goal guarantees that 
these losses will fall disproportionately on poor communities… It encourages ‘those 
citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the political process, including 
large corporations and development firms’ to victimize the weak (Kelo v. New London, 
Thomas dissenting) 
 
Though the media demonstrates less outright concern for the rights of the poor than those 
of “ordinary” homeowners in Kelo’s wake, the decision’s unequal impacts did not go unnoticed.  
In fact, many of the claims the press makes about the use of eminent domain in blighted areas are 
quite dramatic: “This is only the beginning of fleecing the poor to give to the rich.”  “Our new 
city-kings can take any property they choose – particularly if they take from the poor and give to 
the higher-tax paying rich.”  “Several justices said this is a ruling for the wealthy and against the 
                                                
48 Hurt, Charles. “Congress Assails Domain Ruling.” Washington Times. July 1, 2005. 
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poor.” “This situation, it seems to me, is ripe for abuse by rich developers preying on the poor, 
the weak.”49 
 
The Impact of Dissent 
  Lingle and Kelo receive dramatically different coverage, despite their similarities.  In 
both cases, the Court upheld a broad reading of the Takings Clause, making it easier for 
governments to seize private property for economic development, without demonstrating a 
legitimate interest in doing so.  Prior to these rulings, many news outlets portrayed property 
rights as a bedrock of American society.  A few stories drew attention to eminent domain 
condemnations, depicting them as a rarely used tool for the good of society as a whole.  Though 
Lingle did little to upend the general tenor of property rights coverage, the media used a frame of 
deference to characterize the decision.  But Kelo introduced a host of new frames into the 
coverage of property rights, many of which raised concerns about government takings. 
 Two major differences drive the divergent press reactions to the decisions.  To begin 
with, the nature of the victims in the two cases likely fostered more critical coverage of Kelo 
(Nadler, Diamond, and Patton 2008).  This can be seen most directly in reports that discuss the 
hardships on ordinary homeowners that the decision would bring about.  Because the dramatic 
stories of the Kelo plaintiffs were particularly newsworthy, this contributed to the outsize press 
attention to the decision.  At the same time, the public’s negative reaction to the decision may 
have been animated by feelings of threat aroused by the coverage of ordinary Americans losing 
their homes. 
 And yet, the media shaped its coverage not only around the case’s victims, but in 
response to the closely-divided nature of its outcome.  A 5-4 vote sets Kelo apart from the 
remainder of the Supreme Court’s Takings Clause rulings.  And absent Kelo’s dissenters (and 
two powerful dissenting opinions), many reporters might have continued to portray property 
seizures as rare, limited, and for the benefit of society overall.  But the dissenters impacted the 
coverage of property rights both indirectly, by drawing attention to the case and supplying fodder 
for critics who disagreed with the decision, and directly, by providing frames that resonated in 
                                                
49 Knott, Tom. “Eminent Domain Ruling Slaps Down the Owner.” Washington Times. June 30, 2005. Gaziano, 
Todd and Paul Rosenzweig. “A Fitting Property Rights Memorial.” Washington Times. July 7, 2005. Conan, 
Neil. Talk of the Nation. National Public Radio. June 23, 2005. Carlson, Tucker. The Situation. MSNBC. June 
23, 2005. 
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the press.  In fact, the media was about three times more likely to mention judicial disagreement 
in its property rights coverage post-Kelo.  And four of the frames employed by the dissenters in 
their written opinions came to dominate coverage of the issue in June and July 2005.   
In Figure 4.4, I provide more evidence that the opinions of the justices influenced directly 
the content of coverage.  To create this figure, I analyze the written opinions in Kelo to develop 
keyword searches for the most prevalent frames they employ (issue specific frames, legal frames, 
originalism, deference, etc.)  These are plotted along the x-axis.  The figure depicts the framing 
struggles in which the majority and dissenting engaged (the red line) and changes in the media 
framing of property rights from pre- to post-ruling (the blue line).  These track close with one 
another, suggesting that the written opinions in Kelo have a direct effect on media framing of 
property rights, in addition to their indirect effect. 
 
Figure 4.4 Framing of Property Rights, in Kelo and in the News 
 
Blue line represents the change from Phase 2 to Phase 3 in the number of words per story using the given frame in 
the media.  Red line represents the difference in frequency of dissenters and majority using the given frame 
(absolute value).   
  
And what of the nature of the Court’s voting coalitions?  In the case of Kelo, there is little 
evidence to suggest that the media paid special attention to partisan politics in its discussion of 
property rights, in spite of the fact that the more liberal and conservative members of the Court 
divided over its outcome.  One reason why the ideological rupture may have failed to resonate 
involves the unique nature of the decision, which saw liberal justices favoring an economic 
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development plan over, according to the dissenters, the interests of the poor.  To the extent that 
these actions were inconsistent with existing narratives about liberalism, the media gave them 
minimal attention.  Indeed, after the ruling, many liberal and conservative politicians joined 
together in attacking the Court’s definition of property rights. 
 
A Post-Hoc Account 
Divergent press coverage of Lingle and Kelo provides evidence in favor of Dissensus 
Dynamics Theory, but it also furnishes a more full portrait of how the press uses negative frames 
to characterize dissensual decisions.   
In order to craft simple, accurate, and dramatic accounts of legal controversies, news 
organizations draw on the straightforward information that the Supreme Court communicates. 
The justices represent the highest level of elites in legal controversies and, as other research 
shows, press coverage tends to highlight the range of perspectives and frames used by such elites 
(Bennett 1990, 2003).  So when a decision is consensual, reporters rely on the analysis of the 
justices alone.  They explain the Court’s reasoning and highlight the outcome, portraying it as 
uncontroversial. But when a decision is conflictual, reporters use the opportunity to discuss 
multiple, competing perspectives on the legal controversy.  They explain the findings of the 
Court majority but also emphasize the criticisms raised by dissenters.   
But while dissent powerfully impacts the press coverage, the effects of dissenting 
opinions are idiosyncratic.  The specific arguments raised by dissenting justices receive coverage 
to the extent that they are relevant and resonant.  Other criticisms that the dissenters fail to raise 
may nonetheless gain news coverage due to the press’s willingness to employ outside sources 
following dissensual decisions.  The role of dissenters, then, is to cause reporters to offer 
competing perspectives in their coverage of Supreme Court rulings, based on newsworthy frames 
from inside and outside the Courthouse. 
In 2005, the Supreme Court’s property rights jurisprudence helped to illustrate this 
process.  The media’s reports on Lingle framed the decision as an unremarkable application of 
the Takings Clause, replete with recognition that the government at times possessed the power to 
sharply regulate and/or seize private property.  Because the press made little effort to give voice 
to Lingle’s critics, the decision passed with minimal notice.  It did little to change news coverage 
of property rights in the United States.  But judicial division over Kelo allowed the press to 
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highlight criticisms of the Court’s application of the Fifth Amendment.  The media may have 
ignored Clarence Thomas’s textualist critique of the decision, but it seized on O’Connor’s 
contention that the Court had made all personal property vulnerable.  Over time, the media built 
on this warning by emphasizing the human-interest consequences of the ruling. 
It is important to note, however, the Kelo’s extraordinary resonance cannot be traced 
simply to divisions between the justices themselves.  Rather, a confluence of factors – including 
O’Connor’s evocative warnings, the sympathetic nature of the victims in the case, and the 
willingness of other critics to attack the Court – raised alarm that the decision violated “bedrock” 
private property rights. 
 Kelo continued to resonate.  Before the decision, most national news coverage portrayed 
property rights in vague terms, as a sacred part of the political system.  One year later, 
discussions of the issue most prominently explored the intricacies of government takings.  Over 
60% of the stories published on the issue between June 23 and July 22, 2006 continued to 
mention eminent domain controversies.50 
Judicial dissent in Kelo had set forth an arresting account of property rights abuse that 
continued to shape coverage long after the decision was announced.  In this sense, it was truly 
unique.  But the case also illustrates how the media responds to judicial voting coalitions in 
covering the Court.  In the following chapter, I explore whether leading newspapers in the U.S. 
shape their coverage similarly, with an eye towards judicial votes, across a range of high profile 














                                                
50 I generate this data using Lexis-Nexis keyword searches as described earlier in the chapter, during the period from 








“I Respectfully Dissent”: 
5-4 Decisions, Ideological Division, and Newspaper Coverage of Supreme Court Rulings 
 
 According to one veteran print journalist, “A useful story about a Supreme Court 
decision, in my view, is necessarily interpretive …  Readers also need to know the content of the 
decision, what the decision means, how the case got to the Court in the first place, what 
arguments were put to the Justices, what the decision tells us about the Court, and what happens 
next.  Not all of these elements are necessary in each story, and not all of the questions can be 
answered in every case” (Greenhouse 1996, 1545).  This perspective suggests a compelling 
alternative to Dissensus Dynamics Theory – that there is little systematic in how newspapers 
cover a wide range of judicial decisions.  After all, each case brings forth a unique set of facts, 
claimants, legal principles, and political implications.  Can we really expect news organizations 
to use simple voting cues in shaping their coverage of diverse rulings?  Do similar principles 
guide coverage of 5-4 decisions involving both abortion rights and tax law simply because of the 
votes of the justices?  Do the same factors that shape coverage of the Court’s property rights 
jurisprudence also influence reporting on other decisions? 
 To be sure, the media highlights distinct features of each Court decision.  It employs 
different frames to discuss the various issues on which the justices rule.  At the same time, 
however, the environment facing journalists on the Supreme Court beat is relatively stable.  The 
Court has followed a similar set of procedures in handing down decisions throughout its history 
(Epstein and Walker 2010).  It releases a fixed set of information that includes written opinions 
and the case syllabus (Davis 1994).  Reporters are largely at the mercy of the Court, lacking 
knowledge about when it will rule and access to speak with the justices (Greenhouse 1996).  
They remain under considerable constraints, required to simplify decisions in an entertaining and 
timely manner.  As such, many of the same ingredients shape journalism at the Supreme Court 
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for various news organizations across cases and time.  And some reporters who work on the 
Supreme Court beat confirm that they sketch their coverage using a consistent set of parameters 
(Davis 1994, 83). 
 Dissensus Dynamics Theory predicts that we can trace the consistent features of press 
coverage to the constraints placed on journalists and news organizations.  To the extent that 
reporters observe divisions among the justices, they become more likely to highlight criticisms of 
a ruling raised by both the dissenters and other elites.  In this chapter, I provide the first statistical 
tests of the theory by exploring how three leading newspapers have covered high profile 
Supreme Court decisions in recent decades.  Newspaper coverage provides an interesting test 
case for Dissensus Dynamics Theory.  On the one hand, organizations like the New York Times 
provide some of the most comprehensive reporting on the Court.  Because many of their judicial 
reporters have followed a large number of cases (Davis 1994), they may more readily rely on 
formula in shaping their coverage.  At the same time, however, these journalists also have 
unparalleled knowledge.  They are well equipped to ignore simple cues like the voting signal 
sent by the Court, instead drawing on their own understanding of the law and on contacts with 
sources to sketch a unique portrait of each decision.  To the extent that these journalists have 
expertise in judicial affairs, they may rely less on simple pieces of information in fashioning their 
coverage, making the newspaper context a difficult test of the theory. 
 Nonetheless, in the following pages I show that the New York Times, Washington Post, 
and Washington Times use judicial votes to guide their coverage of the Supreme Court, 
presenting more favorable portraits of rulings reached by large and ideologically-diverse 
majority coalitions.  This is some of the first evidence to demonstrate the systematic nature of 
reporting on the Supreme Court beat. 
 
Study Design 
 In this chapter, I test Dissensus Dynamics Theory with newspaper coverage of judicial 
rulings.  I utilize a random sample of all high salience decisions handed down by the Court 
between 1981 and 2008.  The universe of high salience cases is based on an index from Epstein 
and Segal (2000) that identifies rulings that received a front-page story in the New York Times 
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the day following their official announcement.51  I focus on high profile rulings since most 
Americans pay attention to only a limited amount of salient judicial decisions.  The sample 
consists of 88 cases.52 
 For each case, I conduct a Lexis-Nexis search of New York Times, Washington Post, and 
Washington Times
53 coverage of the decision by using a keyword that includes either the name 
of the plaintiff, or (in cases in which the plaintiff had a common name, e.g., the United States) 
the name of the defendant.  This selection of sources includes three leading national news 
organizations that cover the Court extensively, provide information to many other local papers, 
and help shape public understanding of judicial action.  Furthermore, their editorial boards 
represent an ideologically-broad spectrum of opinion (Ho and Quinn 2008, Peake 2007, 
Groseclose and Milyo 2005).  I read and coded all articles (545 total) focusing on the Court’s 
decision in the relevant case that were published within 30 days of the ruling. 
 
Dependent Variable: Decision Support 
The Construct 
 Media coverage of a single Supreme Court decision provides a profusion of frames that 
may reflect either positively and negatively on it.  For instance, the media’s treatment of property 
rights law during 2005 highlighted a variety of perspectives.  Some of these reflected positively 
on the rulings in Lingle v. Chevron and Kelo v. New London (i.e., that eminent domain is used 
rarely and for the good of society); many of them did not (i.e., that a decision was an example of 
the government abusing its power).  The distinction between positive and negative decision 
frames can be carried across other cases as well. 
 In this study, I am interested in thinking broadly about how media coverage varies 
between more and less favorable across a wide-range of Supreme Court rulings.  The cost of 
doing so involves a loss of issue-specific detail.  But the benefit involves a better understanding 
of how issue-independent features of judicial decisions impact their reception in the press.  This 
may have important consequences for both the political communication literature, which largely 
                                                
51 I focus on cases that receive front-page attention to explore the content of press coverage (and not why the press 
covers some decisions and ignores others). 
52 The original version of this study over-sampled decisions released before 1987 and after 2005.  To correct for this 
imbalance, I report results that include a probability sampling weight correction (reported findings are robust to the 
exclusion of the weights, as well). 
53 Washington Times coverage available from 1989-present.  I examine whether source-specific effects altered the 
major findings present here; because they do not, I pool analyses across all sources. 
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overlooks the judiciary (e.g., Entman 2004, Bennett 1990), and for public opinion scholars who 
seek to understand more generally the conditions under which the Court can persuade (e.g., 
Hoekstra 1995, Johnson and Martin 1998).  
To characterize media coverage in broad terms, I focus on two questions.  First, to what 
extent does coverage depict rulings in positive terms using either implicit cues or explicit 
arguments?  This is the supportive tone of an article (author coded) – whether it directly or 
indirectly expresses approval of a decision.  Second, to what extent does a Court majority 
effectively frame news coverage?  This is the frame dominance of an article (author coded) – 
how extensively it explains the decision, gives voice to justices in the majority coalition, and 
mentions supporters vis-à-vis critics of the decision.   
I combine the article level measures supportive tone and frame dominance – which tap 
different portions of the favorable coverage construct – into a decision support scale (also at the 
article level).  But Dissensus Dynamics Theory requires a decision-centered measure.  So I 
average article scores across all coverage of a case.  The ruling-centered measure of decision 
support (the DV) captures the degree of favorable coverage (in tonal and framing terms) afforded 
any single ruling across the entirety of its coverage. 
 
Reliability 
The reliability of a measure is the extent to which it is free from random error (Hoyle, 
Harris, and Judd 2002).  To improve reliability, I formalize a set of coding standards for both the 
supportive tone and frame dominance measures.  These coding standards are included in 
Appendix A.  Using these standards, a research assistant who was blind to the study’s hypotheses 
read and coded news coverage of a random sample of cases (10.3% of the newspaper articles). 
 I evaluate the reliability of supportive tone and frame dominance using percent agreement 
and Krippendorff’s alpha.  Percent agreement is .64 for the tone measure and .55 for the frame 
dominance measure (three coding categories for each, .33 agreement expected by change).  
Krippendorff’s alpha is among the most conservative standards for intercoder reliability, 
guarding against agreement by chance (Lombard, Snyder-Duch, and Bracken 2002; Lombard, 
Snyder-Duch, and Bracken 2004; Krippendorff 1987; Freelon 2010).  Krippendorff’s alpha 
scores range from .425 (the frame dominance category) to .542 (the supportive tone category).  
These reliability scores fall short of accepted standards, which is to be expected given the 
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complex nature of the coding task.  To the extent that measurement error is non-systematic (i.e., 
the difficulty of the coding task leads to random error in article level coding), this will decrease 
the efficiency of estimated effects without biasing them (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). 
 Nonetheless I take two steps to further improve reliability.  First, I use a decision-
centered dependent variable (decision support) to alleviate inefficiencies that arise in the coding 
of individual articles.  Though we cannot use intercoder reliability scores to assess this summary 
measure of decision-centered coverage, we would expect the effect of article level coding error 
to diminish as the media publishes more stories on a given ruling.  To test this possibility, I run a 
simple OLS model of Dissensus Dynamics for print outlets only (see Table 5.2 on page 88).  
Since we expect more coverage to generate a more reliable decision support measure, the error 
term should be smaller for the most high salience decisions.  This is indeed the case – high 
coverage volume decreases the size of the residual term (though this relationship is not 
significant and other diagnostics indicate that heterogeneity is not a problem for the models 
presented in Chapters 5 and 6).  This suggests that combining multiple articles into a decision-
centered measure, as I do here, may increase the efficiency of estimates and reliability of the 
dependent variable. 
 Additionally, combining the supportive tone and frame dominance measures improves 
reliability (the decision support scale).  The measures are highly correlated with one another; the 
scale reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s alpha) is .898 for the newspaper sample. 
 
Validity 
 The validity of a measure is the extent to which it reflects only the desired construct 
without contamination from other systematically varying constructs (Hoyle, Harris, and Judd 
2002).  We can assess the validity of the decision support measure in a variety of ways. 
 Convergent validity represents the overlap between measures of a single construct that 
have different sources of systematic error.  The measures of favorable decision coverage that I 
employ are supportive tone and frame dominance.  The former taps the portion of the construct 
associated with direct praise for a ruling, which is most often found in editorials and Op-Eds.  
This measure fails to account for the ways in which a ruling can receive favorable coverage 
absent direct praise.  Most importantly, it does not allow us to distinguish between framing 
contexts depending on whether they adhere to or depart from the Court’s analysis.  The frame 
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dominance measure, on the other hand, allows us to tap framing contexts that are favorable to the 
Court, but it overlooks whether the frames are employed to praise or criticize a ruling.  For 
instance, coverage of Roe v. Wade may employ the “zone of privacy” frame to denounce the 
ruling as misguided (even though the majority coalition developed the frame).  The shortcomings 
of the supportive tone and frame dominance measures are a result of the different sources of 
systematic error in each; I therefore combine these distinct measures of the favorable coverage 
construct into a scale of decision support. 
 A measure with discriminate validity serves to distinguish between the construct it taps 
and other constructs.  One concept that is associated with but ultimately distinct from favorable 
coverage is judicial activism charges.  The activism critique suggests that a court has 
“overstepped its institutional role” (Young 2002, 1140) by, among other things, striking down 
the actions of other branches, ignoring precedent, and creating legislation (Kmiec 2004).  
Articles scored as mentioning judicial activism either explicitly employ the term to describe 
Court decisions or extensively charge the Court with acting in an activist manner without 
explicitly using the term (author coded, see Appendix A for codebook).  For example, an 
activism charge suggests that the Court is acting improperly as a policy-maker, substituting its 
political judgments in place of those made by legislative bodies, or overturning established law 
or precedent. 
As we might expect, accusations of judicial activism correlate negatively with decision 
support (r =-.337) but decrease the reliability of the scale when added to it.  The decision support 
scale, then, appears to tap the desired construct while discriminating between the related yet 
distinct construct of judicial activism charges in the news. 
 Finally, the decision support measure has strong predictive validity.  To test this, I use Ho 
and Quinn’s analysis of newspaper editorials on Supreme Court decisions from 1994 to 2004 
(Ho and Quinn 2008).  In a sample of 25 papers, the authors rank the New York Times and 
Washington Post as the most liberal and seventh most liberal sources.  They rank the Washington 
Times as the third most conservative.  Thus, we would expect a valid measure of decision 
support to show that favorable coverage varies depending on the relationship between source and 
decision ideology, all else equal.  I measure decision ideology with the Bailey ideal point 
estimate of the median justice in a majority coalition (see Carrubba et al. 2012) and offer 
separate models of decision support for liberal (the New York Times and Washington Post) and 
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conservative (the Washington Times) newspapers.  In a simple model of the effect of majority 
median on decision support by source, liberal newspapers project less support for rulings reached 
by conservative majority coalitions on the Court, as expected.  This result further attests to the 
validity of the decision support measure.  See Appendix B for more details involving the 
construction, reliability, and validity of the DV. 
 
Independent Variables from Dissensus Dynamics Theory 
Dissent 
Using the Supreme Court Database (SCDB, Spaeth 2010), I focus on conflict between the 
justices in a given case, including the absolute size of the majority coalition (majority votes).  
Because majority and minority coalition sizes exhibit an almost-perfectly inverse relationship, I 
expect that as the number of majority votes decreases so too will decision support in the press 
(the Dissent Hypothesis).  I also consider whether media coverage responds to other indicators of 
dissent, including whether a decision is unanimous, with no dissenting justices, or whether it is 
decided by a 5-4 vote.  
 
Ideological Diversity 
I expect that news outlets pay attention not only to the presence of dissent but also the 
ideological makeup of the justices in the Court’s voting coalitions.  Martin and Quinn (2002) and 
Bailey (2007, Bailey and Maltzman 2009) provide widely used ideal point estimates for every 
Supreme Court justice in every year of his tenure.54  I employ these estimates to characterize a 
case’s majority and minority voting coalitions based on the year it was decided.  To measure 
ideological diversity I take the absolute value of the distance between the most liberal and most 
conservative justices in the majority coalition, with the expectation that rulings with more 




                                                
54 The results are substantively similar for either set of measures.  Because Bailey estimates allow for inter-
institution comparisons, I report them here. 
55 Ho and Quinn (2010) caution that labels like “liberal” and “conservative” are arbitrarily assigned when describing 
Martin-Quinn scores.  But because the press commonly assigns these designations to two distinct wings of the 
Court, I follow this practice here. 
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Independent Variables from Alternative Hypotheses 
Non-Judicial Elites 
One important alternative hypothesis to Dissensus Dynamics Theory states that political 
elites shape coverage of rulings when they disagree with them.  To test this alternative 
hypothesis, I compare the ideological preferences of leading political actors with the ideological 
substance of Court rulings using Bailey’s ideal point estimates, which are comparable across 
institutions and time.  I construct the decision-president distance measure by taking the absolute 
value of the distance between the median member of a ruling’s majority coalition and the 
president. Similarly, the decision-House distance captures the absolute value of the ideological 
preference difference between the median members of the Court majority and the House of 
Representatives.56  These measures allow me to test whether disagreement with rulings from 
other political elites shapes the media coverage afforded them. 
 
Political Context 
 A second alternative hypothesis to Dissensus Dynamics Theory suggests that the media 
offers more unfavorable coverage of rulings when it perceives inter-institutional conflict.  So, for 
instance, any high profile decision handed down by a liberal Court is likely to receive negative 
coverage when conservatives control the other branches, since this scenario allows the press to 
highlight critics of the Court with ease.  Using Bailey’s institutional ideology scores (2007, 
Bailey and Maltzman 2009), I create measures of the Court-president and Court-House distance, 
with larger values indicating inter-institutional preference differences.  And I control for the 
presence of divided government when a decision is released. 
 
Issue Area and Issue Controversy 
A third alternative explanation to Dissensus Dynamics Theory is that certain cases and 
issues will be inherently divisive, garnering critical press attention even when Supreme Court 
justices reach a consensus in ruling.  I employ a measure of controversy, adapted from Blake and 
Hacker (2010), based on the issues on the Court’s docket that receive disproportionate media 
                                                
56 The justification for using the majority median to measure the substance of Supreme Court decisions is supplied 
by Carrubba and colleagues (Carrubba et al. 2012). 
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coverage (BH controversy).57   Another measure of contentiousness involves the extent to which 
a given case generates pre-decision interest.  Because interested parties can take part in a case by 
filing “friend of the court” briefs, I assume that the number of amici curiae provides a proxy for 
the controversy and attention surrounding a case (amici n).58  Finally, I use the presence of lower 
court dissenters in a case history to measure its divisiveness.  This measure, available in the 
Supreme Court Database, captures the existence of dissent in a lower court case being reviewed 
by the Supreme Court.  The measure allows me to consider whether certain cases or issues are 
inherently controversial as they make their way through the judicial system. 
 
Decision Characteristics 
 Finally, I also test whether specific characteristics of the ruling (beyond the voting 
outcome) affect coverage.  An alternative hypothesis to Dissensus Dynamics Theory is that the 
ideological characteristics of a decision affect coverage.  For instance, the press may be 
particularly unsympathetic to rulings decided by conservative majority coalitions, which employ 
textual analysis that lacks the simplicity and drama the media craves.  To account for this 
possibility, I control for the majority median of a ruling using Bailey estimates to measure 
decision content.  This measure of ideology is among the best available ways to characterize 
Supreme Court rulings (see Carrubba et al. 2012).   I also control for whether a decision altered 
precedent or declared law unconstitutional.  These measures are taken from the Supreme Court 
Database, whose coding is based on an analysis of the written opinions of the Court.  I further 
control for end of term rulings (which I define as those announced in June or July) and those 
written by the chief justice (chief justice authorship).  Both of these measures use data on rulings 




                                                
57 Using the SCDB’s categorization of the major substantive issue upon which the Court rules in a given case, I also 
create a measure of controversy for issue that arouse deeply held personal convictions in most individuals (Wisneski 
et al. 2009, Skitka et al. 2002).  Issues coded as controversial were as follows: abortion, affirmative action, 
desegregation, First Amendment / obscenity, and sex discrimination. Non-controversial issues, which frequently 
involve legal provisions, include: libel, national supremacy, securities, and state regulation.  Estimated effects are 
substantively similar for both measures of issue controversy and I utilize the BH controversy measure in all reported 
models. 
58 I generate this data by analyzing the number of amici mentioned in published case materials from Lexis-Nexis. 
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A Summary Portrait of Supreme Court Coverage 
 Before offering the first statistical test of Dissensus Dynamics Theory, I provide a general 
portrait of how leading national newspapers portray High Court rulings.  In so doing, I 
demonstrate important variance in coverage across cases.  This variance occurs not only in the 
volume of reports (which has been explored previously) but also in content.  I suggest that the 
decision support scale provides a meaningful look at the content of coverage. 
But first I offer a few words about salience.  Newspapers cover landmark Supreme Court 
rulings with varying degrees of intensity.  Some of the most prominent decisions saturate the 
news, with coverage most prominent the day after their announcement.  While papers publish 
fewer articles on a case over time, it is not uncommon for the most high profile cases to be the 
subject of five or more stories in the month after the Court releases them.  At the other end of the 
spectrum, even low impact decisions in the sample receive, at minimum, front-page coverage in 
the New York Times.  The average ruling in the sample garners about six unique print articles 
after its announcement. 
Figure 5.1 plots the volume of coverage for sampled cases, which has remained fairly 
constant since the early 1980s.  Nonetheless, from time to time, monumental decisions lead to a 
spike in coverage.  Kelo v. City of New London stands out as one such ruling; the 2005 decision 
caused newspapers to publish a host of stories that examined its implications for property rights 
in the United States.  The press similarly paid careful attention to the abortion rights ruling in 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, printing nearly two stories per day on the case for an 
entire month.  Coverage of Webster unfolds in accordance with a common pattern, where the 










                                                
59 Ponce, Linda. “Justices’ Decisions in High Profile Suits Defy Easy Labeling.” Washington Times. July 5, 1989. 
Dellinger, Walter. “The Abortion Decision: Momentum to Confusion; The Court Steers Us Toward Social 
Disaster…And Threatens Other Personal Liberties as Well.” Washington Post. July 9, 1989. Balz, Dan and David S. 





What allows certain rulings to draw the attention of the press?  The cases I review above 
suggest that decision salience stems in large part from newsworthiness.  As the previous chapter 
demonstrates, media outlets focused on the most dramatic features of the Kelo ruling to shape 
their coverage.  They allowed ordinary homeowners to discuss their personal anguish about the 
decision and they emphasized O’Connor’s striking warning about its consequences.  In both Kelo 
and Webster, the press uses the rulings to highlight human-interest perspectives, surprise 
outcomes on the Court, and controversy over the cases in American society. 
 More germane to our purposes, however, is the content of coverage in high profile cases.  
Do newspapers largely defer to the analysis set forth by the Court majority?  Do they employ 
alternative frames that reflect poorly on rulings?  The decision support scale provides a valid 




The Spectrum of Coverage 
Consider a few Supreme Court rulings that meet with the most positive newspaper 
clippings.  In U.S. v. Winstar Corporation (1996, decision support=1), the Court ruled that 
Congress violated contracts with savings and loans when it tightened their accounting rules, and 
ordered the government to pay damages.  In its lead story on the decision, the Washington Post 
focuses on the Court’s reasoning.  It quotes a Washington attorney who portrays the ruling as 
self-evident, “a straight contract law case.  They [the justices] ruled that the government can’t 
renege on a contract.”  According to the story, the government issued no comment about the 
ruling.  The Post’s editorial board views the ruling as “Costly but Correct.”60 
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (2006) garners similarly 
supportive coverage (decision support=.944).  In the case, the justices upheld federal financing 
cuts for universities that restrict access to military recruiters.  Notably, newspapers find few 
sources to criticize the decision.  Even gay rights groups, who opposed the military’s “don’t ask, 
don’t tell” policy, saw a “silver lining”: the ruling would build momentum for a repeal of 
discriminatory policies.  Editorial boards offer similar praise for Miller-El v. Dretke (2005, 
decision support=.875): “an important ruling that reiterates to all courts the importance of 
keeping discrimination out of jury selection” and a “strike against bias.”61 
How does this type of coverage contrast with less favorable reports on a ruling?  A small 
number of judicial decisions raise the ire of print media outlets.  They include R.A.V. v. City of 
St. Paul (1992, decision support=.313), Bennis v. Michigan (1996, decision support=.194), and 
Kelo (2005, decision support=.098).  Unfavorable coverage frequently takes the form of 
editorials that offer direct criticism of the Court.62  But even straightforward news stories portray 
these rulings in an unfavorable light by focusing on arguments raised by the dissenting justices 
and by outside sources.63 
                                                
60 Knigh, Jerry and Joan Biskupic. “High Court Ruling May Add Billions to S&L Cleanup Cost.” Washington Post. 
July 2, 1996.. “Costly but Correct.” Washington Post. July 5, 1996. 
61 Files, John. “Advocates Hope Supreme Court Ruling Can Renew Attention to ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.’” New York 
Times. March 12, 2005. “Prosecutorial Racial Bias in Texas.” New York Times. June 15, 2005. “Strike Against Bias” 
Washington Post. June 14, 2005. 
62 Hentoff, Nat. “Scalia Outdoes the ACLU.” Washington Post. June 30, 1992. Fein, Bruce. “Benchmarks of 
Absurdity.” Washington Times. March 12, 1992. 
63 Marcus, Ruth. “Supreme Court Overturns Law Barring Hate Crimes.” Washington Post. June 23, 1992. Murray, 
Frank J. “High Court Backs Asset Confiscation.” Washington Times. March 5, 1996. Biskupic, Joan. “Court 
Upholds Criminal Forfeiture Law.” Washington Post. March 5, 1996. 
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On average, decisions receive neutral-to-favorable news notices, with reporters quoting 
from or explaining rulings to readers.  Coverage of the Court’s landmark decision involving gun 
rights in D.C. v. Heller is emblematic of how newspapers offer a variety of perspectives on a 
ruling while remaining largely deferential to the judgment of the justices.  The New York Times, 
Washington Post, and Washington Times published 20 stories on the case.  One editorial in the 
Post offers strong criticism of the Court, calling the decision a “misguided” form of judicial 
overreach.  A number of other stories praise the ruling as a wise and reasonable interpretation of 
the Second Amendment.64  The vast majority of coverage, however, does not take a strong stance 
on the ruling, but instead defers to the Court majority while mentioning its critics.  So, for 
instance, in the New York Times’s 1800-word lead story on the ruling, the first six paragraphs 
describe the legal reasoning behind the decision.  The next six paragraphs highlight a dispute 
between the majority and dissenting coalitions over the text and history of the Second 
Amendment.  The article goes on to review the history of gun rights in the United States and 
concludes with more detail about how the Court interpreted the “operative clause” of the Second 
Amendment.65  Despite the controversial issue at the center of D.C. v. Heller, then, its coverage 
approximates that of the average case in the sample, featuring a diverse set of perspectives 
counterbalanced by deference to the majority’s written opinion. 
 
Table 5.1 Selected Summary Statistics of Newspaper Coverage 
Variable Mean SD Min Max Obs 






.71 .23 .11 1 88 






.10 .22 0 1 88 
Stories per case 
 
6.19 6.49 1 51 88 
 
What factors influence how newspapers cover important Supreme Court rulings?  Why 
does the media portray many rulings in uncontroversial terms, while it denounces the justices at 
other times?  And when are Supreme Court rulings most vulnerable to the type of press censure 
that characterized Kelo? 
                                                
64 “Handguns Supreme.” Washington Post. June 27, 2008. “Gun Ban Ends.” Washington Times. June 27, 2008. 
Duggan, Paul. “Having Toppled D.C. Ban, Man Registers Revolver.” Washington Post. July 19, 2008. 
65 Greenhouse, Linda. “Justices, Ruling 5-4, Endorse Personal Right to Own Gun.” New York Times. June 27, 2008. 
 86 
 
Results and Analysis 
Framing Supreme Court Decisions 
 I begin by exploring the effects of a fractured Court with a simple model of decision 
support.  In accordance with Dissensus Dynamics Theory, I expect that coverage of decisions 
becomes more favorable when their majority coalitions are large and ideologically-diverse. 
 Figure 5.2 shows the actual sample means of decision support by the number of votes in 
a majority coalition.  It suggests that the justices can, indeed, earn favorable coverage for their 
decisions when they assemble large majority coalitions and limit dissent.  Whereas roughly 80% 
of the coverage of unanimously decided cases presents them in a positive light, less than 60% of 
articles involving closely-divided decisions are similarly supportive.  Furthermore, the ability of 
the Court majority to dominate press coverage depends directly on its size.  Decisions reached by 
nine-member majorities receive more support than those of eight-member majorities, which 
receive more support than those reached by seven justices, and so on.  There is nothing in 
unanimity that changes dramatically the media’s responsiveness to coalition size.  Supreme 
Court journalism appears unique in the sense that reporters respond not to the presence of 
conflict (i.e., they do not treat unanimous decision different than others) but rather to extent of 
dissent. 
 They also, it seems, respond to the nature of conflict.  Figure 5.3 plots the relationship 
between ideological diversity in a ruling (the distance between the most conservative and most 
liberal members of the majority) and support for it in the news.  Broad and ideologically diverse 
















Figure 5.2 Majority Votes and Decision Support 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Ideological Diversity and Decision Support 
 
 
 But not surprisingly, there exists a strong correlation between the size and ideological-
diversity of majority coalitions (r =.605), raising the question of whether press support for 
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rulings more directly follows from one or the other.  Does the Court majority set the terms of 
coverage in 8-1 rulings because reporters defer to the judgments of a large majority coalition or 
because they defer to the judgments of an ideologically-broad spectrum of the Court?  To what 
extent can we even distinguish between these things? 
 

































R-sq .227 .189 .221 .273 
N 88 88 88 88 
Results are OLS coefficient estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses.  Model 4 includes controls for 
alters precedent and declares unconstitutional (estimates not reported).  *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01. 
 
Table 5.2 illustrates a basic test of Dissensus Dynamics Theory, where the press pays 
attention only to the voting signals sent by the justices.  It provides preliminary support for both 
the Dissent and Ideological Diversity Hypotheses, suggesting that the larger and broader the 
majority voting coalition, the more able the Court to garner supportive coverage for its decisions.  
These results hold across a number of indicators of decision support including, most surprisingly, 
whether news outlets include accusations of judicial activism.66  Large majority coalitions act as 
a bulwark against the charge, even once we control for the substance of their decisions (whether 
they alter precedent or declare laws unconstitutional).  The media’s attentiveness to judicial 
voting signals indicates that the Court may insulate itself from criticism when it reaches 
consensus. 
 What other factors may influence the manner in which the press frames judicial 
outcomes?  Perhaps reporters pay attention not only to the signals sent by the Court but those 
offered by other elites.  Perhaps certain issues on the Court’s docket will generate critical press 
attention regardless of a ruling. 
                                                
66 Activism charges, by definition, describe judges “legislating from the bench” (i.e., striking down laws, ignoring 
precedent); the formal concept has no relation to coalition size. 
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 I test the most powerful alternative explanations to Dissensus Dynamics Theory: whether 
elite disagreement, political context, issue area, or ruling characteristics affect coverage (Table 
5.3).  There are reasons to expect that the media might pay attention to each of these features.  
For instance, perhaps the press depends on other elites to determine which legal rulings deserve 
unfavorable attention (Entman 2004).  One might expect that the president impacts media 
support for decisions depending on the extent to which he agrees with them.  Presidents may 
praise the Court when it rules in accordance with their own ideological preferences and upbraid 
it when they differ.  They may more willingly criticize Courts that have a reputation for ignoring 
their wishes.  Or, given the popular standing of the Supreme Court and the risks that criticism 
entails, they may remain silent.  Can leading political figures diminish the persuasive power of 
the Court with their criticism?  To test this possibility, I look at what happens when the Court 
comes into conflict with political elites.  Models 1 and 2 confirm that elite disagreement with the 
Court does little to alter the media coverage it receives.  On the other hand, elite disagreement 
within the Court (voting coalitions) continues to matter.  
But perhaps criticism of the Court will follow depending on the cases it chooses to 
decide.  For instance, certain cases, like those involving abortion rights, are likely to be 
inherently divisive, which allows reporters to seek out critics of regardless of the outcome on the 
Court.  Again, the data does not support this alternative explanation: there is no indication that 
issue controversy shapes press coverage of the Court.  Controlling for the issue area (Model 3), 
attention to the case, and presence of conflict in a case history does little to diminish the impact 
of majority coalition size and diversity.  All else equal, the presence of one additional vote in the 
majority coalition leads to coverage that is roughly 3.3% more supportive of the decision.67  If 
the additional vote also adds to the coalition’s ideological diversity (i.e., the justice who casts it 








                                                
67 The effect is statistically significant for Washington Times coverage and for New York Times and Washington Post 
coverage. 
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Table 5.3 Dissensus Dynamics Theory: Decision Support in Newspapers, 1981-2008 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
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R-sq .270 .243 .195 .294 .348 
N 88 88 .87 88 87 




Indeed, there is strong evidence that press coverage of the Court responds directly to the 
signals sent by the justices alone.  Most importantly, large majority coalitions effectively frame 
decisions by garnering supportive media coverage, regardless of the issues on which they rule, 
the substance of their decisions, and the opinions of other elites.  Across all models, the presence 
of one additional majority vote generates coverage that is between 2.9% and 5.3% more 
supportive.  To evaluate the significance of this, consider that the press portrays otherwise 
identical decisions that are reached by five and nine member majorities in very different terms.  
The latter decision will receive up to 21% more positive coverage.  Americans who read about 
these two decisions will come away with very different portraits of them.  Consider the case of 
D.C. v. Heller again.  Of the 20 articles published, approximately one in four portrayed the 5-4 
decision in unfavorable terms.  Had the justices achieved unanimity while reaching an identical 
decision, direct criticisms of it may have entirely disappeared from the press.  In their place, 
readers would have likely read editorials praising the ruling. 
 It is unclear whether ideologically-diverse majority coalitions can similarly shape press 
coverage.  Ideological diversity has uneven effects across the range of models presented in Table 
5.3.  This may be due, in part, to multi-colinearity in the more full specified models.  It is worth 
noting that majority votes and ideological diversity are closely related (r =.605), particularly in 
the most consensual decisions. This suggests that the diversity cue is most informative to the 
press in closely-divided rulings. 
 To test this effect, I re-run Model 3 separately for 5-4 decisions and all others, with the 
expectation that ideological diversity most powerful affects media coverage when dissensus is 
high.  Figure 5.4 presents the estimated coefficients and confidence intervals on ideological 
diversity in these cases, providing support for the Diversity Hypothesis in the case of 5-4 rulings.  
The effect of ideological diversity is significant in closely-divided decisions alone, meaning that 
newspapers frame 5-4 rulings in more favorable terms only when their majority consists of an 










Graph shows the estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals of the effect of ideological diversity on 
decision support from Model 3, run separately for 5-4 rulings (n=30) and all others (n=58).   
 
I use coverage of Kelo to provide an example of the magnitude of effects.  As we have 
seen, the media presented the ruling in a negative light, warning about the expansion of 
government power and the dangers it posed to ordinary homeowners.  Many of these arguments 
are drawn directly from the written opinions of the dissenting justices.  As a result, Kelo receives 
the most unfavorable newspaper reports of any case in the sample (decision support=.098).  The 
press greeted the ruling, reached by five of the Court’s most liberal jurists, with tremendous 
skepticism. 
What does Dissensus Dynamics Theory tell us about how the voting outcome in Kelo 
contributed to its coverage?  I use coefficient estimates from Model 3 to explore this question.  In 
Figure 5.5, I first graph the number of favorable (blue) and unfavorable (red) stories that were 
published on the decision.  Then, using the coefficient estimates, I predict how this breakdown 
changes in four instances: when one additional justice joins the majority, when all four dissenters 
join the majority, when the next most conservative justice replaces a member of the majority, 
and when the most conservative justice replaces a member of the majority.  All of these shifts 
have modest, yet statistically significant, effects on Kelo’s coverage.  All told, changes in the 
voting outcome alone shift coverage of the maligned decision in a noticeably more positive 








As the press shapes its coverage of high-profile Supreme Court rulings, these results 
demonstrate the attention they pay to the justices themselves.  Most importantly, jurists can 
strongly signal the presence of consensus by forming large majority coalitions and, in turn, 
impact positively the coverage their rulings receive.  When dissenters become more numerous, 
however, press attention becomes more critical.  But the media pays attention to another 
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important signal in closely-divided decisions: the makeup of the Court’s voting coalitions.  An 
ideologically-broad spectrum of justices can limit the most aggressive press censure that often 
accompanies 5-4 rulings.  When ideological division accompanies dissent, on the other hand, the 
Court loses its ability to frame effectively its decisions. 
 
Discussion 
 While national newspapers cover extensively some of the most important Supreme Court 
rulings, the nature of their coverage varies dramatically from case to case.  Rather than defer to 
the judgments of the Court majority, reporters shape their coverage in response to the size and 
alignment of the majority and dissenting coalitions.   
 Newspaper coverage of the Court has characteristics similar to that in other areas of 
American politics, particularly in its reliance to elite sources (Bennett 1990, Entman 2004).  But, 
in legal controversies, the media defers to the justices themselves at the expense of all other 
elites.  Given the Court’s popularity, it is unlikely that political actors have the incentive to 
criticize decisions reached by a large majority.  And, given the institutional constraints faced by 
reporters, they too rely on the signals sent by the justices.  Most directly, the size of the majority 
voting coalition influences strongly whether a decision meets with favorable coverage.  As more 
justices join the Court majority, the arguments against its decision become both less numerous 
and less powerful, leading to more sympathetic coverage.  In closely-divided cases, on the other 
hand, media outlets more willingly highlight criticisms of a decision.  But closely-divided 
decisions come in different forms.  When a five-member majority coalition is ideologically 
diverse, critics of the Court can effectively contest its decision on legal grounds, using the 
arguments raised by dissenters.  But when the five-member majority is ideologically narrow, the 
media highlights both legal and political challenges to a ruling.  It is these types of cases – 
decided by homogenous five member majorities – in which the print media may most directly 
circumscribe the Court’s ability to persuade. 
 How do reporters translate voting signals into a diverse array of coverage?  Evidence 
from the previous chapter suggests that judicial dissensus has both a direct effect on coverage by 
supplying criticism of a ruling and an indirect by broadening the scope of conflict, which allows 
outside sources to frame a ruling in negative terms.  Coverage of D.C. v. Heller shows these 
mechanisms in action.  Initial reports on the decision include prominent discussions of dissent, 
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which allows journalists to effectively navigate the constraints associated with work on the 
Supreme Court beat.68  By exploring internal disagreements on the Court, reporters illuminate 
the meaning and scope of legal disputes in a manner that showcases conflict to keep readers 
interested.  Reporters may also use a frame of ideological conflict when discussing rulings over 
which the justices disagree. 
 But dissent on the Court has an indirect effect as well – broadening the range of sources 
that reporters to consult to help shape their coverage.  In its coverage of Heller, the Washington 
Post published a story on “new skirmishes” between advocacy groups that the ruling would 
engender.  The report solicits reactions from presidential candidates John McCain and Barack 
Obama, congressmen, mayors, historians, law professors, the National Rifle Association, and 
Democratic and Republican campaign strategists.  Many of these sources raise considerations 
that Supreme Court had not addressed.  Pollsters debate which party would benefit more from 
the ruling.  Mayor Richard M. Daley of Chicago asks, “Does this lead to everyone having a gun 
in our society?”69 In broadening the sources it consulted, the Post provides a portrait of Heller 
that considers its negative consequences more fully than did the justices themselves. 
 This chapter provides the first comprehensive test of Dissensus Dynamics Theory across 
a range of decisions.  Though there are reasons to expect that leading print journalists may 
eschew formulaic coverage given their considerable knowledge about the law, evidence suggests 
that the size of the majority coalition has the strongest influence on positive coverage afforded a 
decision.  Though experienced journalists disagree about whether they rely on a template to 
cover the Court (Davis 1994, Greenhouse 1996), evidence from this chapter shows that they 
cannot help but respond to judicial voting signals. 
 Does press attentiveness to voting coalitions hold across other forms of media?  In the 
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Barnes, Robert. “Justices Reject D.C. Ban on Homeownership.” Washington Post. June 27, 2008.  









Dissent, Debate, and Depictions of Decisions on Cable News 
 
  On the morning of June 28, 2012, Americans who watched cable news saw a stunning, 
complex, and ultimately erroneous account of the Supreme Court’s Affordable Care Act ruling.  
Minutes after the Court released the decision, a CNN reporter noted, “It appears as if the 
Supreme Court justices have struck down the individual mandate, the centerpiece of the 
healthcare legislation.”  The network quickly posted onscreen two banner headlines: “Supreme 
Ct. Kills Individual Mandate” and “Individual Mandate Struck Down.”  Shortly thereafter, the 
station switched gears, with its anchor cautioning that the Court’s action “would” be dramatic, 
but more information was to follow. 
 On Fox News, the story was similar.  A news anchor reported that the mandate was 
unconstitutional, with a banner headline noting the same.  Quickly, though, Fox began to 
backtrack.  Another anchor stepped in to suggest that the justices had upheld the Affordable Care 
Act law as an exercise of the taxing power (though the erroneous headline remained onscreen).  
CNN then updated its banner headline: “Supreme Court Rules on Obamacare.”  The network 
continued to portray the decision incorrectly, but added qualifications to its analysis.  After 
nearly ten minutes of confusion, both CNN and Fox News confirmed that the Court upheld the 
individual mandate in Affordable Care Act (Goldstein 2012). 
 These developments help to crystallize the unique challenges facing cable news networks 
in their coverage of the Supreme Court.  While networks strive for accuracy, they place a greater 
premium on instantaneous reporting than print outlets.  They also may focus more on the 
sensational and dramatic in their coverage (Graber 2001).  And the structure of cable news 
reporting differs in important ways from newspaper coverage.  In place of edited copy written by 
a single journalist, cable news networks feature a variety of anchors, reporters, and guests (with 
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varying degrees of expertise) in their Supreme Court coverage.  Because of these characteristics, 
cable news channels are even more likely to rely on simple cues like judicial voting signals in 
shaping their reports. 
 But no existing research examines the basis of Supreme Court coverage on cable news 
channels.  This gap in the literature detracts from our understanding of popular responses to 
rulings since many Americans learn about judicial politics from television broadcasts.  And 
because of the singular nature of the cable news environment, televised stories may have 
complex effects on American attitudes towards the law.  The rapidly shifting and unclear reports 
on the Affordable Care Act ruling, for instance, provide a stark contrast to the straightforward 
information presented to subjects in experimental studies of policy legitimation (i.e., Hoekstra 
1995, Bartels and Mutz 2009).  How might differences in the informational environment affect 
American responses to high profile judicial decisions? 
 In this chapter, I apply Dissensus Dynamics Theory to cable news reports on the Supreme 
Court since 1995. 
  
Cable News Coverage of Supreme Court Rulings 
Compared to newspaper accounts, cable news coverage of the Supreme Court tends to be 
less technical, less precise, and less structured.  But cable news channels more readily emphasize 
drama in their reports and they more willingly feature variegated perspectives offered by 
multiple on-camera personalities.  Consider how the following cable news discussions of Kelo v. 
New London, CT (2005) employ speculation in place of legal analysis: 
 
• “How do you justify this kind of opinion? I mean a lot of people, lay people are going to 
look at this and they’re going to say wait a second, so some mayor wants to build a new 
waterfront and he can just say all right, you know what, I’m going to take that home and 
that home and that home and that home, and I’m going to get rid of them.” 
 
• “This situation, it seems to me, is ripe for abuse by rich developers preying on the poor, 
the weak and the unpolitically connected. Why shouldn’t people who are powerless fear 
that their land is going to be taken?” 
 
•  “I think it’s an example of Chief Justice Rehnquist, who may be leaving the Court 
shortly, not having had his way on several important issues. And this is an issue he has 
believed in for a long time, limiting the power of government, limiting eminent domain. 
But he’s in the minority. He never persuaded his colleagues. And 5-4 is the same as 
unanimous. It’s the law of the land. So this gives local politicians, local government 
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authorities, more or less carte blanche to condemn property and give it to other private 
people if they believe it’s in longer term interests of the community.” 
 
• “The Supreme Court is made up of appointees from both administrations. And in this 
particular instance, not that it always works this way, it was the liberals that allowed 
government in, not the conservative members of the court. And it has nothing to do with 
the Bush administration. He, to date, has not appointed anybody on the Supreme Court. 
So this is -- you could look back to all the presidents who had the opportunity to make 
appointees and blame each and every one of them and that includes president Clinton, 
President Reagan and so on.”70 
 
Many of the stories involving Kelo used dialogue between on-air personalities to further 
illuminate its implications.  For instance, CNN aired a pre-recorded report on the ruling from 
correspondent Brian Todd before cutting to anchor Wolf Blitzer, who prods for further 
clarifications.  “How did this little community, Brian, in Connecticut get this big case?” he 
asks.71  Discussions like these – which employ non-technical language to provide context – are 
common in cable news coverage.  A number of reports also feature more animated arguments 
about the legal merits, political dimensions, and human-interest implications of judicial rulings. 
To be sure, then, there are important stylistic and substantive differences that distinguish 
print and cable news reporting on the U.S. Supreme Court.  And indeed, research suggests that 
broadcast journalism is more likely to emphasize drama and controversy (Slotnick and Segal 
1998), focus on human-interest perspectives (Graber 2001, Postman 1985), emphasize partisan 
considerations (Iyengar and Hahn 2009, Bennett and Iyengar 2008), and eschew context for 
episodic information (Iyengar 1991, 1987). 
But even though cable and newspaper organizations produce content that differs in style, 
their reporters face a similar set of constraints as they shape coverage of the Supreme Court.  For 
instance, one important distinction that sets apart newspapers and cable news channels – the use 
of unedited interviews with elites, which are broadcast quite frequently on television but not 
often published in print outlets – does not materialize when the Court is involved.  Because they 
lack direct access to the justices, print and broadcast reporters have the same legal information at 
their disposal – the written opinions of the Court.  And cable news stations have goals similar to 
                                                
70 Abrams, Dan and Martin Savidge. The Abrams Report. MSNBC. June 23, 2005. Carlson, Tucker. The Situation. 
MSNBC. June 23, 2005. Kagan, Daryn, Jamie McIntyre, and Kimberly Osias. Live Today. CNN. June 23, 2005. 
Harris, Tony, Ken Dolan, and Daria Dolan. Dolans Unscripted. CNN. June 25, 2005. 
71 Blitzer, Wolf, Jamie McIntyre, Jennifer Eccleston, Karl Penhaul, Christine Romans, and Brian Todd. Wolf Blitzer 
Reports. CNN. June 23, 2005.  
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those of print media: to emphasize drama and conflict, present accurate yet simple information, 
and report in a timely fashion (Forgette and Morris 2006, Bennett 2007). 
Given these priorities, we would expect cable news to closely adhere to the predictions of 
Dissensus Dynamics Theory, with judicial voting signals proving instrumental.  All else equal, 
coverage is more likely to be favorable and deferential to the Court in cases when a large 
majority coalition forms.  The ideological makeup of the Court majority provides a similarly 
consequential signal, which cable news programs may emphasize given their affinity for partisan 
conflict (Iyengar and Hahn 2009).  We would expect more supportive coverage to surround 
rulings reached by ideologically diverse coalitions of justices. 
Dissensus Dynamics Theory can also offer predictions about an important feature of the 
cable news environment: televised incivility (Forgette and Morris 2006, Mutz 2007, Brooks and 
Geer 2007, Sobieraj and Berry 2011).  Mutz and Reeves define this phenomenon as political 
conflict in the form of “particularly tense and heated exchanges” onscreen (Mutz and Reeves 
2005, 3).  Consider the following example from the MSNBC program The Situation, as on-air 
personalities debate the merits of Kelo: 
 
Guest 1: I think it [the ruling] benefits the liberal wing of the Court, simply because it 
was done on the basis of, the stores will generate more money for government to spend 
than your home will. 
 




 Host: Well, it’s not partisan.  It’s ideological. 
 
Guest 2: Well, to say this is a liberal problem … it’s not necessarily a left-right split.  On 
this case, the one, I think, silver lining here is that states can take action to protect 




Host: I think what makes it a liberal issue, in effect – and a lot of liberals I know are 
appalled by this – but in the case of the Court, is that it’s a victory over the group over 










These unstructured discussions, which allow guests to interrupt one another with 
regularity, add a singular dimension to how the media covers judicial politics.  They are so 
qualitatively distinct from the types of reports in print media that they deserve attention.  They 
tend to take shape based on a few simple pieces of information (i.e., ideology of a majority 
coalition on the Court), which enables guests who lack legal expertise to join the debate.  
Furthermore, they may have important implications for the Supreme Court: though the 
institution depends on diffuse support to function effectively, a growing body of research 
suggests that aggressive rhetoric diminishes citizens’ trust in the political process (Mutz and 
Reeves 2005, Forgette and Morris 2006, Brooks and Geer 2007). 
I suggest that, much as news organizations rely on judicial voting signals to guide the 
extent of favorable coverage they afford a ruling, they similarly use voting signals to determine 
when they feature incivility in their reports.  The reasons for this are twofold.  To begin with, 
cable news producers and program hosts are more likely to feature conflictual voices on-air when 
the justices signal internal discord with their votes.  So, in response to judicial dissensus, 
producers invite incivility through their selection of guests.  At the same time, on-air 
personalities have more material to animate their arguments when the justices disagree.  They 
may draw directly on the disputes that the majority and dissenting coalitions highlight in their 
analyses.  Or guests may disagree aggressively about the meaning and implications of a decision 
by making inferences based on the voting behavior of the justices.  In exchange recounted above, 
for instance, ideological conflict on the Supreme Court allows guests to tussle over whether the 
Kelo ruling represents a liberal expansion of government power. 
 
Televised Incivility Hypothesis – Large and ideologically diverse majority coalitions 
diminish televised incivility in cable news coverage. 
                                                
72 Carlson, Tucker. The Situation. MSNBC. June 23, 2005. 
 101 
 
Dissensus Dynamics Theory suggests that reportorial and editorial motivations interact 
with context to determine the nature of Court-related cable news coverage.  To impart 
knowledge and provide entertainment, cable news organizations rely on the information that 
elites convey.  With respect to the judicial branch, this information takes on a specific form: the 
voting outcomes that accompany their decisions. 
 
Study Design 
In order to examine Dissensus Dynamics Theory in the cable news environment, I utilize 
a simple random sample of all high salience decisions handed down by the Court between 1995 
and 2008 (see Chapter 5).  The sample consists of 48 cases, 11 of which receive no coverage 
from cable news stations (and are thus excluded from regression analyses).  For each case 
identified, I review CNN, Fox News, and MSNBC coverage of the decision by using Lexis-
Nexis keyword searches for the name of the plaintiff, the name of the defendant, and a term 
relevant to the case.  I read and coded all stories focusing on the Court’s decision in the relevant 
case that were broadcast within 30 days of the ruling (359 stories total).  I then take the 
indicators for each story-variable and average them across all broadcasts that dealt with a given 
decision.  The resulting score supplies a measure of the overall tenor of the coverage for each 
variable surrounding a single high salience Court ruling.  The independent and dependent 
variables, which I review here, are described in more detail in the previous chapter and in 




The measurement of decision support uses the same procedures and standards described 
in Chapter 5.  To capture frame dominance, I rate an article based upon how extensively it 
explains the decision, gives voice to justices in the majority coalition, and mentions supporters 
vis-a-vis critics of the decision.  An indicator for supportive tone is based upon the balance given 
in the broadcast to viewpoints that support and oppose the ruling.  For a random sample of cases 
(29% of stories), a blind coder analyzed cable news coverage.  Krippendorff’s alpha reliability 
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scores between the author and the blind coder for supportive tone and frame dominance were .74 
and .62, respectively.  
As before, I improve reliability by combing the two author-coded measures into a scale 
of decision support (Cronbach’s alpha of .87).  I also improve the efficiency of estimates by 
averaging story-level decision support over the entire spectrum of a ruling’s coverage, which 
allows me to provide a summary measure of content for any given case.  The decision support 
scale maintains convergent, predictive, and discriminate validity in the cable news sample.  For 
more information, see Appendix B. 
 
Televised incivility 
 To investigate the unique impact of the television medium, stories are scored as to 
whether they feature televised incivility (Mutz and Reeves 2005).  In these instances, two or 
more figures engage in contentious debates, interacting in a less-than-cordial manner.  In 
Appendix A, I provide a descriptive codebook that formalizes the coding standards for this 
variable based on the definition provided by Mutz and Reeves (2005).  Percent agreement 
between the author and the blind coder is .76 for this measure, with Krippendorff’s alpha of .49.  
To improve the efficiency of estimates, I again aggregate incivility scores across the entirety of a 
ruling’s coverage. 
 The televised incivility measure has desirable validity properties as well.  In particular, its 
discriminate validity allows us to effectively distinguish it from the measure of decision support. 
As we might expect, incivility on cable news programs is associated with decreases in decision 
support (r =-.406), but adding the incivility measure to the decision support scale weakens its 
reliability.  Later in the chapter, I provide more evidence about the relationship between the two 
distinct constructs of decision support and televised incivility. 
 
Independent Variables 
To account for alternative explanations, I employ the independent variables described in 
Chapter 5.  These allow me to test the alternative hypothesis that factors outside judicial voting 
outcomes influence cable news coverage.  In particular, I explore whether the preferences of 
non-judicial elites, the political context, the issues before the Court, or the specific characteristics 
of decisions affect the content of cable news reports. 
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A Summary Portrait of Supreme Court Coverage on Cable News 
 The content analysis provides novel insight into how cable news programs portray 
judicial decisions. To begin with, it suggests that cable news channels pay careful attention to the 
Supreme Court.  The typical high salience case in the sample receives nearly eight unique 
segments worth of coverage.  To be sure, some of these stories are brief, but many others use 
extensive legal analysis to explore a decision’s implications. Eleven of the 48 cases sampled 
receive no news coverage, while the Court’s affirmative action ruling in Grutter v. Bollinger 
draws the most notice (63 stories). 
 
Table 6.1 Selected Summary Statistics of Cable News Coverage, 1995-2008 
Variable Mean SD Min Max Obs 






.69 .30 0 1 37 






.07 .15 0 .67 37 
Televised incivility .14 .17 0 .6 37 
 
Stories per case 
 






The Spectrum of Coverage 
 A broad range of Supreme Court rulings meet with deferential press coverage, despite the 
fact that cable news outlets readily emphasize conflict (Forgette and Morris 2006).  For instance, 
coverage of Kimbrough v. U.S. (2007; decision support=1) portrays the ruling as one of common 
sense and judicial modesty.  According to one reporter, “As you know…there is a disparity 
between the sentences for crack and powder cocaine, and the justices basically said, look, judges 
can take that disparity into consideration when they are sentencing.”73  The informal language 
and simple analysis is emblematic of televised Court coverage, but stories on Kimbrough 
nonetheless give the viewer the impression that the justices exercised wise judgment.   
In another case, Burlington Industries v. Ellerth (1998; decision support=.83), the 
Supreme Court ruled that companies can be held liable if they do not exercise reasonable care to 
prevent sexual harassment in the workplace.  Cable news stations broadcast 23 stories on the 
decision, many of which speculate about its implications for sexual harassment suits against 
President Bill Clinton.  The ruling “drew immediate praise from women’s groups” and would 
create a “better workplace.”  One guest on a news program argues, “One of the advantages of 
having the Supreme Court make a pronouncement is its somewhat uniform throughout the 
country.”74  The vast majority of reports involving Burlington Industries follow this template: 
praising the decision and speculating about its implications. 
 At other times, cable channels highlight conflict and raise substantial criticism of rulings, 
questioning the legal findings and political motivations of the Court majority.  In so doing, the 
programs most commonly rely on information provided by the dissenting justices, the responses 
of political actors, perspectives from attentive interests groups, and the editorial judgments of on-
air personalities.  Consider coverage of a ruling concerning the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment.  Much as it did in Kelo, the media focuses on a compelling argument raised by the 
dissenters in the case.  Using language from a dissenting opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas, 
CNN reports that the ruling “bristle[d] with hostility” to any form of religion.  The network also 
                                                
73 Phillips, Kyra, Sean Callebs, Larry Smith, Kelli Arena, Jessica Yellin, Chad Myers, Miles O’Brien, Don Lemon, 
and Kathleen Koch. CNN Newsroom. CNN. December 10, 2007. 
74 Hume, Brit. Special Report with Brit Hume. Fox News. June 26, 1998. Waters, Lou and Charles Bierbauer. CNN 
Today. CNN June 19, 1998. 
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invites dialogue between proponents and opponents of religion in public life, which has the 
effect of portraying the Court as a party to an ongoing political dispute.75 
 Unfavorable depictions of a ruling take hold most often during the course of on-air 
arguments (televised incivility).  Decisions in U.S. v. Playboy (First Amendment law), Atkins v. 
Virginia (cruel and unusual punishment), and Grutter v. Bollinger (affirmative action) receive 
some of the most extensive uncivil coverage in the sample.  On Fox News, discussions of the 
Playboy case use the type of rhetoric that characterizes televised incivility, with guests 
denouncing one another in succession: 
 
 Guest 1: I say shame on the Supreme Court 
 
Host: You’re misrepresenting the case.  This case was about an attempt to protect 
constitutionally protected speech. 
 
Guest 1: Alan, that’s your opinion. 
 
Host: No, it’s not my opinion.  That’s the Court’s opinion. 
 
Guest 2: The Supreme Court’s opinion. 
 
Host: That’s not my opinion. 
 
Guest 1: Well, I’ll tell you, I agree.  The Supreme Court 200 – 100 years ago felt that 
African Americans weren’t persons. 
 
Guest 2: We’re not talking about the Supreme Court 200 years ago. 
 
Guest 1: 50 years ago – 50 years ago, all of the material… 
 
Host: That’s not the issue … 
 
Guest 1: … all of the material on these cable sex channels would have been considered 
obscene and unprotected by the First Amendment. 
 
Host: You’re misrepresenting – you’re misrepresenting the case, Bob. 
 




                                                
75 Chen, Joie and Charles Bierbauer. The World Today. CNN June 19, 2000. Waters, Lou and Charles Bierbauer. 
CNN Today. CNN. June 19, 2000. 
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Guest 2: You’re not even on the same page.  You’re not even in the same century.76  
 
 As is common in these types of exchanges, talking heads frequently stop one another 
mid-sentence, speak over one another, and direct insults at one another (Mutz and Reeves 2005).  
Many such debates reflect poorly on the work of the Supreme Court, not only by heightening 
popular distrust of the political process, but more directly by attacking the decision-making 
capabilities of the justices themselves.  At times, however, uncivil exchanges are limited in 
focus; while on-air personalities argue with one another, they may betray respect for the Court 
and its rulings.  CNN features similarly vigorous debate over the Playboy case, but while guests 
express different views about censorship, they defer to the findings of the Court about acceptable 
legal standards of judgment.77 
 
Partisanship and Ideology on Cable News Channels 
 To be sure, then, important differences in style distinguish coverage of the U.S Supreme 
Court across print and broadcast media.  In particular, the simple yet heated exchanges that 
appear prominently on CNN and other cable channels have no equivalent in the New York Times 
or the Washington Post.  But what about partisan rhetoric on cable news?  Existing evidence 
suggests that broadcast journalism involving the Court might be particularly likely to explore the 
political and ideological implications of its rulings (Iyengar and Hahn 2009, Bennett and Iyengar 
2008). 
 But there is no evidence to this effect.  Indeed, cable news networks do not cover rulings 
differently based on their apparent ideological content.  In Figure 6.2, I plot the estimated effect 
of majority median (a measure of a ruling’s ideological content; Carrubba et al. 2012) on decision 
support across the three cable news networks.  Though Fox News is widely presumed to be more 
politically conservative than MSNBC, there are no discernable differences in how the networks 




                                                
76 Hannity, Sean and Alan Colmes. Hannity and Colmes. Fox News. May 23, 2000. 




Graph shows estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for the effect of majority median on decision 
support by network, with positive coefficients indicating increased support for conservative rulings. 
 
These findings do not suggest that there are no important distinctions between the cable 
news networks in their coverage of the Court, but rather that they are unlikely to afford favorable 
coverage to rulings simply on the basis of ideological content.  As we will see later, the ideological 
cues that the Court offers have a consistently small influence on broadcast coverage when 
compared with print stories. 
 With this general picture of cable news’ depiction of judicial decisions in hand, we turn 
now to the central question of this analysis: to what extent do features of Supreme Court rulings 
determine the nature of cable news coverage given them? 
 
Results and Analysis 
 Does cable news coverage become more unfavorable when a judicial decision features 
multiple dissenters and narrow ideological coalitions?  There are reasons to expect some 
similarities between print and cable sources in their coverage. Most importantly, reporters for 
both receive identical signals on decision day: the case syllabus, majority, concurring, and 
dissenting opinions.  While journalists may seek comment from other sources, official 
 108 
communications from the justices play the most important role in informing news coverage 
because they emanate from precisely the type of legitimate elite voices that newsmen covet 
(Bennett 1990, Entman 2004). 
 Table 6.2 examines decision support and televised incivility on the cable news networks. 
I begin with simple models of favorable coverage (operationalized with the decision support 
indicator), controlling for the opinions of non-judicial elites, the political context, the issues 
under consideration, and characteristics of the decision itself (Models 1-4).  Given the appetite 
for controversy on cable news channels, the strongest alternative account to Dissensus Dynamics 
Theory suggests that broadcast journalism depicts judicial rulings in a more unfavorable light 
when they concern contentious issues (irrespective of how the Court rules).  There is a minimal 
amount of evidence for the issue controversy explanation (in Model 3 alone, one indicator of 
issue controversy – judicial disagreement at the lower court level in a case’s history – 
significantly decreases decision support).  But even then, large majority coalitions continue to 
increase the supportive coverage granted a decision on cable news outlets.  
 
Table 6.2 Dissensus Dynamics Theory on Cable News, 1995-2008 
 Decision Support Televised Incivility 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Majority    





















  Ideological   
























  Non-judicial    
  elites 
x    x x    x 
  Political  
  context 
 x   x  x   x 
  Issue  
  controversy 
  x  x   x  x 
  Decision  
  characteristic 
   x x    x x 
R-squared .174 .179 .244 .399 .617 .319 .305 .157 .594 .646 
N 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 
Results are OLS coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01. 
 
Indeed, across Models 1-4, there is strong evidence that majority coalition size influences 
coverage content.  On average, an additional justice joining the majority coalition generates 
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cable news reports that are approximately 10% more supportive of a ruling.  Model 5 presents a 
fully specified account of decision support that controls for all alternative explanations.  Once 
again, it shows evidence that broadcast journalists craft coverage in response to the voting 
outcome on the Supreme Court. 
 Dissensus Dynamics Theory is particularly effective at accounting for coverage of 
Kimbrough (seven justices in the majority coalition, decision support=1) and of Lorillard 
Tobacco Company v. Reilly (five votes in the majority coalition, decision support=.75).  Despite 
the fact that the former case dealt with a more newsworthy controversy (which allowed the 
media to seize on the racial implications of disparities in drug sentencing) it also garners more 
supportive coverage than the latter.  CNN’s coverage of Lorillard features objections to it from 
one of the parties to the case, Attorney General Tom Reilly of Massachusetts.  “Every day that 
goes by that they [tobacco companies] are able to target their advertising toward kids like this is 
a bad day,” he notes.78  Because cable channels do not view the Lorillard ruling as particularly 
noteworthy (they broadcast only three stories on it), they do not give detailed explanations about 
the Court’s written opinions.  But the presence of four dissenters signaled to CNN the need to 
broaden the range of debate about the ruling to include Reilly (even if the channel did not use the 
arguments raised by the dissenters).  These reports contrast with the deference shown by the 
network to the 7-2 ruling in Kimbrough.   
On the other hand, the cases that receive a minimal amount of coverage on cable news 
networks present the most problems for the full model (Model 5).  For instance, two of the cases 
with the worst fitted values – Bush v. Vera (1995) and Smiley v. Citibank (2000) – garner one 
story apiece.  In the case of the former, CNN frames the decision favorably in spite of a 5-4 vote 
on the Court.  Smiley meets with criticism in the single cable news report to cover it, despite the 
Court’s unanimous verdict.  The model’s shortcomings with respect to lower salience cases like 
Smiley are reasonable given the fact that the entirety of their coverage rests on more limited – 
and thus more volatile – editorial decisions. 
 Majority coalition size performs similarly well in accounting for the presence of televised 
incivility (Models 6-10). All else equal, the presence of an additional vote in the majority 
decreases cable news reliance on on-air confrontations by about six to eight percentage points.  
                                                
78 Woodruff, Judy, Kate Snow, Kelli Arena, Candy Crowley, Ron Brownstein, Robert Novak, Eileen O’Connor, Rea 
Blakely, Major Garrett, William Schneider, and Charles Bierbauer. Inside Politics. CNN. June 28, 2001. 
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To understand the significance of this effect, consider once again reporting on Kelo v. City of 
New London.  Cable news outlets broadcast 30 stories involving the decision, with one-third of 
them featuring the type of televised incivility that grabs the attention of viewers.  These reports 
use aggressive language (i.e., “ridiculous”) and feature guests interrupting one another 
frequently.  Had the Court reached an identical ruling in Kelo by unanimity, however, we would 
expect uncivil coverage to decline markedly.  Instead of broadcasting ten segments with 
incivility present, cable news channels would have substantially reduced this coverage to three or 
fewer reports, according to the models I present here. 
 
Televised Incivility and Decision Support 
 Statistical evidence demonstrates that large majority coalitions significantly increase the 
favorable coverage afforded a Supreme Court ruling and significantly decrease the use of 
intemperate rhetoric on cable news programming.  But we still have an incomplete sense of the 
relationship between these two coverage characteristics.  To what extent can we differentiate 
between incivility and decision support? 
 According to scholars, unfavorable messaging can be differentiated from incivility based 
on style and tone (Mutz and Reeves 2005, Mutz 2007).  “Some comments can, in fact, be quite 
critical of an opponent, and still not earn a classification as ‘uncivil.’  Incivility requires going an 
extra step; that is, adding inflammatory comments that add little in the way of substance to the 
discussion” (Brooks and Geer 2007, 4-5).  In cable news coverage of the Supreme Court, uncivil 
exchanges feature aggressive rhetoric used by on-air personalities while unfavorable coverage 
directs criticism at judicial rulings.  These characteristics are not indistinguishable.  For decisions 
that receive mostly unfavorable coverage (decision support<.5), incivility is present in about one 
in four news reports.  This figure drops to one in ten for rulings that generate mostly positive 
coverage. 
 One account of incivility and decision support, then, sees intemperate on-air discussions 
as contributing to unfavorable coverage.  The process takes place as follows.  After the Court 
rules, a cable news organization looks to the voting signals sent by the justices to shape 
coverage.  Dissent both directly and indirectly fosters unsympathetic portraits of a ruling.  It 
allows news reporters to emphasize arguments raised by the dissenting justices to the extent that 
they are compelling.  It also causes them to seek out other sources to criticize a ruling.  At the 
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same time, dissent has an effect on the production of news.  Cable channels view closely-divided 
rulings as worthy of debate since the justices themselves disagreed over the case.  To emphasize 
this conflict, networks become more likely to use a broadcast format where anchors and guests 
can express differences of opinion.  Programs like Hardball and Crossfire, in particular, might 
be more likely to cover dissensual rulings since these programs, by design, foster incivility.  As 
on-air debates transpire, critics of the Court are more likely to emerge.  Furthermore, they are 
empowered to attack rulings using the arguments the dissenting justices have published. 
 The above account suggests that televised incivility mediates the relationship between 
dissent and negative coverage of a ruling.  I use Baron and Kenny’s (1986) mediation analysis to 
explore this possibility.  Their test consists of estimating the effect of the independent variable on 
the mediator (should be significant), estimating the effect of the IV on the dependent variable 
(should be significant), and (3) estimating the effects of the IV and mediator on the DV 
(mediator’s effect should be significant and larger).  Co-linearity is a particular concern given the 
structure of the test and the variables employed here (MacKinnon, Fairchild, and Fritz 2007; 
Hayes 2009).  For this reason, I focus on three variables exclusively: decision support (the DV), 
televised incivility (the mediator), and majority votes (the IV).  I exclude other independent 
variables since majority votes has the only significant effect across all coverage models in Table 
9.  The results of the test, presented in Figure 6.3, suggest a strong relationship between majority 
votes and decision support that is mediated by the presence of incivility on cable news networks. 
 





To understand how uncivil debate mediates the relationship between majority coalition 
size and press coverage, recall the case of U.S. v. Playboy.  In response to the Court’s 5-4 ruling 
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that struck down regulations of explicit programming as a restriction on speech, the press took 
notice, broadcasting five reports on the decision within days of its announcement.  These reports 
mix criticism and implicit support for the majority’s holdings. 
 In news-oriented segments, reporters use a measured tone and intersperse background 
information, quotations from the majority and dissenters, and sound-bites from activists.  For 
instance, on CNN, reporter Charles Bierbauer reads from Anthony Kennedy’s opinion, quotes 
Stephen Breyer’s dissent, and includes taped reactions from the Family Research Council, 
National Cable Television Association, and Playboy Enterprises.  On programs like Fox News’s 
Hannity and Colmes, however, contentious debates drive the discussion.  The hosts and guests 
argue over First Amendment principles, the definition of obscenity, and the role of federal 
government.  Some of these arguments echo those made by the Court majority and dissenters.  
Other portions of the debate diverge from the justices’ analyses, as when one guest on the 
program levies a charge of activism: “The Supreme Court does not recognize any authority over 
itself.  The Supreme Court lives in the arrogance of power.”79 
 The case illustrates the process linking judicial dissensus to cable news coverage.  At 
times, the press draws directly on the arguments made by the justices themselves to support or 
critique a decision.  But dissensus also entices the media to feature televised incivility.  Networks 
broadcast three segments on U.S. v. Playboy featuring guests that they could, ahead of time, 
reasonably expect to have vehement disagreements with one another.  In the Hannity and Colmes 
segment, the guests include the president of Morality in Media and the vice-president of 
“Penthouse” magazine.  The debate between these guests shapes the coverage of the case, calling 
into question the Court’s ruling, referencing both original arguments and those espoused by the 
justices, and levying accusations of judicial recklessness. 
 Distinguishing between incivility and negativity in this manner provides one of the first 
pieces of evidence that helps to disentangle the responses of producers and reporters to judicial 
decisions.  It suggests why journalists, editors (for print publications), and producers (for cable 
news networks) may react similarly to judicial voting signals.  For instance, because reporters 
rely on sources to add texture to their coverage, they can raise criticisms of the Court most easily 
when they give voice to dissenting justices.  But editors and producers are more likely to 
prioritize reporting that will attract an audience with drama and conflict.  Though they intend to 
                                                
79 Hannity, Sean and Alan Colmes. Hannity and Colmes. Fox News. May 23, 2000. 
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highlight schisms on the bench whenever possible, they can most readily do so in closely-divided 
rulings. 
 The first support for this implication of Dissensus Dynamics Theory comes from cable 
news networks, where we can partially disentangle the work of producers (who invite guests on-
air to foster intemperate debates) and reporters (who describe a case outcome using sources).  As 
we see, both of these groups respond to dissent on the Supreme Court. 
 
Cable News and the Effect of Ideological Diversity in the Court Majority 
 Cable news channels pay almost no attention to the ideological makeup of the Court 
majority.  Contrary to the predictions of Dissensus Dynamics Theory, there is no evidence that 
more diverse majority coalitions attract more favorable coverage for rulings.  This can be seen in 
Table 6.2, where the estimated effect of ideological diversity on coverage is significant in only 
three of the ten models presented, and in the wrong direction.  In Model 4, for example, broad 
voting coalitions actually decrease positive coverage of rulings.  To consider the impact of 
ideological diversity more fully, I estimate its effect on coverage for only 5-4 rulings, where we 
would expect the press to pay the most careful attention to it.  Once again, diverse majorities 
have no impact on cable news reporting, even in the most closely-divided decisions. 
 How can we account for this null effect?  After all, Chapters 5 confirms that newspapers 
consider the makeup of judicial voting coalitions in their Supreme Court coverage.  Why would 
cable news networks behave differently?  One explanation is that the balance of reporting 
constraints differs for cable news networks, which are much more likely to feature guests who 
lack expertise about the law in their coverage.80  It is difficult for on-air personalities to make 
inferences based on the ideology of the justices if they do not follow the Court closely (Davis 
1994).  And in fact, the justices often behave in a manner that obscures their ideological beliefs: 
reaching unanimity, couching their opinions in the language of the law, deferring to precedent, 
distancing themselves from the party of the president who appointed them, and denying that 
personal values play a role in their decisions (Epstein, Segal, and Spaeth 2001; Davis 1994; 
Bailey and Maltzman 2008). 
 For these reasons, guests on cable news networks sometimes struggle to characterize 
rulings along an ideological spectrum.  Consider a debate broadcast on MSNBC about Kelo.  
                                                
80 Also, recall again the erroneous reporting of CNN and Fox News about the Obamacare ruling. 
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One guest depicts the decision as liberal because it would generate money for the government 
(though the guest does not reference the makeup of the majority coalition on the Court).  The 
news anchor clarifies this perspective, arguing the decision was ideological but “not partisan.”  
Finally, another guest asserts, without any justification, that the decision could not be portrayed 
along an ideological spectrum.81  Given the incomplete depictions of Kelo each figure offers, it is 
not surprising that they failed to reach agreement about its ideological content. 
 
Discussion 
 Cable news organizations offer a singular portrait of Supreme Court jurisprudence.  They 
confound our expectations in a number of ways.  Though research shows that cable programs 
tend to focus on the sensational and dramatic, they offer ample coverage of the law and the 
Court.  In fact, networks broadcast upwards of twenty distinct reports on the most newsworthy of 
cases.  Though research demonstrates that cable channels emphasize partisan conflict in their 
coverage, there are no clear differences in how various networks portray conservative (or liberal) 
Supreme Court rulings.  Despite the fact that newspapers exhibit deference to decisions reached 
by an ideologically varied assortment of justices, cable channels pay little attention to the 
makeup of voting coalitions.  And despite the fact that the Court follows procedures to raise 
respect for and compliance with its decisions, television networks regularly use colloquial 
language and aggressive rhetoric in their discussions of the law. 
 In fact, the stylistic content of cable news coverage merits more attention than it has 
received to this point.  The shortcomings of the experimental literature on policy legitimation 
become even more apparent when one contrasts the staid stimuli it employs with the type of 
coverage found on channels like CNN and Fox News.  Scholars know little about whether 
informal and entertainment-oriented discussions of the Court serve to increase interest in the law 
or whether, on the other hand, they have detrimental effects on public knowledge.  And most of 
the research involving televised incivility focuses on campaign contexts (Mutz and Reeves 2005, 
Brooks and Geer 2007), despite the fact that the Court depends on political trust to a greater 
extent than other actors.  Might intemperate arguments on cable news networks damage the 
legitimacy of the judicial institution? 
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 But despite the singular aspects of the cable news environment, broadcast journalists 
respond, as expected, to the size of the majority coalition on the Supreme Court when crafting 
their coverage of rulings.  Voting outcomes have a direct effect by supplying journalists with 
arguments from the justices’ written opinions and an indirect effect by motivating reporters to 
seek out outside sources for reactions to dissensual rulings.  But the effect of judicial votes is 
further mediated by uncivil debates on cable news, which producers invite more readily in 
response to divided decisions.  In the course of these debates, on-air personalities use belligerent 
language against one another and regularly denounce the Court’s decision-making capabilities.  
These findings provide more support for Dissensus Dynamics Theory, attesting to the important 
link between judicial votes and media coverage across time and medium. 
 
A Review of Dissensus Dynamics Theory 
 Taken altogether, the evidence provided in Chapters 3-6 provides a novel account of how 
coverage takes shape in response to judicial rulings.  It demonstrates significant cross-case 
variation in how the press depicts decisions.  It provides strong evidence that the content of press 
coverage responds directly to the size of voting coalitions on the Court (the Dissent Hypothesis).  
It also demonstrates the media coverage is influenced by the ideological makeup of the majority 
voting coalition, but this effect only occurs in print sources (the Ideological Diversity 
Hypothesis).  I summarize the most important findings from Chapters 3-6 below: 
 
• Given the constraints that face journalists on the Supreme Court beat, they look to 
judicial voting signals when crafting their coverage of rulings.  Reporters portray 
decisions unfavorably, including criticism and counter-frames to the ones offered by the 
majority, as the dissenting coalition increases in size.  This effect occurs similarly across 
mediums, news outlets, and time. 
 
• The size of a judicial voting coalition signals to journalists whether to accept the frames 
offered by the majority or to highlight conflict in coverage.  In dissensual decisions, 
written dissenting opinions receive coverage to the extent that they are newsworthy (the 
direct effect).  Dissenting votes also cause reporters to seek out other sources, including 
critics who may challenge a decision by using arguments not raised in the written 
opinions of the justices (the indirect effect). 
 
• Given the constraints that face journalists on the Supreme Court beat, they also use the 
ideological makeup of the voting coalitions to guide their coverage.  But they do so only 
under certain conditions.  There is evidence that the value of an ideological conflict frame 
depends on a ruling’s compatibility with existing ideological narratives (see Chapter 4). 
 116 
 
• There are important distinctions between cable news and print media.  Newspapers offer 
more favorable coverage to decisions reached by ideologically diverse majorities when 
this information has the most value to them – in the case of 5-4 decisions.  Cable news 
outlets, on the other hand, give little weight to the ideological makeup of majority 
coalitions.  Because these outlets more readily feature those with little legal expertise in 
their coverage of the Supreme Court, they are poorly equipped to discern with accuracy 
the ideological signals sent by the justices. 
 
• Ruling coverage produced by cable news also differs in style from that of newspapers, 
employing colloquy and speculation more readily.  More importantly, cable news 
produces content featuring aggressive rhetoric and debate in response to dissensual 
decisions.  
 
In the following chapter, I shift focus, drawing on the insights of Dissensus Dynamics 
Theory to offer an account of opinion responses to high profile decisions.  Though we now have 
strong evidence that the media covers decisions in more negative terms when the majority 
coalition is small, scholars have little sense of how such coverage may impact public opinion.  In 
particular, the literature has failed to examine the effects of countervailing pieces of information: 
the cue of a Supreme Court endorsement coupled with a negative frame about its ruling.  I assess 























In the Court of Public Opinion: 
Frames, Cues, and the Limits of Policy Legitimation 
 
The previous chapters make plain a disconnect between theory and reality in the study of 
the policy legitimation capabilities of the U.S. Supreme Court.  Though a wealth of experimental 
research suggests that the institution’s credibility allows it to persuade the public (Bartels and 
Mutz 2009, Hoekstra 1995, Mondak 1990), it rarely does so in actuality (Marshall 1989, Persily 
2008).  One of the most important explanations for this puzzle lies in the fact that the literature 
fails to consider the types of information the media conveys to the public about judicial 
decisions. 
Studies suggest that negative frames and counter-frames can diminish the impact of an 
initial positive frame, but scholars have little sense of the role source cues play in framing 
struggles (Druckman et al. 2010).  Can frames undo the impact of decisions reached by a high 
credibility source like the Supreme Court?  Can they diminish the standing of the source itself? 
 In this chapter, I conduct two experiments using descriptions of actual Supreme Court 
rulings to explore the limits of its persuasion powers.  I demonstrate that negative frames can 
mute the ability of even a high credibility source like the Court to garner approval for its rulings.  
I also explore the effects of framing on diffuse support for the institution.  I show that a negative 
frame limits the Court’s persuasive power by divorcing evaluations of the institution from 
evaluations of its specific output.  But diffuse support for the Court remains intact. 
 These findings suggest that public backlash to Supreme Court decisions may arise out of 





Press Reports and Public Responses 
 Frames matter.  In recent years, scholars have begun to take seriously the fact that 
framing contests are rarely one sided.  One important line of research suggests that elite 
competition and the framing struggles it fosters can attenuate framing effects under certain 
conditions (Druckman 2004, Druckman et al. 2010, Chong and Druckman 2007a, 2007b, 2012, 
Riker 1995).  While an initial frame regularly influences opinion in a positive direction (that is, 
in agreement with the direction of the frame), negative frames and subsequent counter-frames 
reverse these effects.  This may be due to the fact that framing struggles stimulate conscious 
deliberation and effortful processing amongst some individuals, leading them to focus on “the 
substantive merits of a frame in judging its persuasiveness” (Chong and Druckman 2007a, 109). 
 Is it worth considering whether framing effects diminish institutional persuasion?  After 
all, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the credibility of the Supreme Court might enable it to 
persuade even in the face of criticism (Woodson, Gibson, and Lodge 2011).  Perhaps the press 
cannot limit judicial policy legitimation, regardless of the type of coverage it offers? 
There are, in fact, two arguments as to why judicial endorsements may prove more 
powerful than the frames used to describe them.  One account suggests that Court draws on its 
legitimacy to ensure that criticism of its decisions does not receive media coverage.  As we have 
seen in the previous chapters, this explanation is demonstrably false.  Rather, the Court is quite 
vulnerable to negative portrayals of its work, particularly when a decision features multiple 
dissenters.  A second account suggests that, even in the face of criticism, the Court can persuade 
simply by signaling its position on a policy.  Given the trust Americans place in the Court, a cue 
(judicial endorsement) may lead them to support a policy even when it is framed in negative 
terms.  If this account is correct, then existing experimental research offers a compelling account 
of policy legitimation.  It would be unnecessary to control for framing effects if the Court is 
similarly persuasive across a variety of contexts.   
Put another way, the question of framing effects is a question that directly implicates the 
external validity of existing experimental research (McDermott 2002).  If the cue of a Court 
endorsement is powerful enough to persuade regardless of framing context, then experiments 
that present simple descriptions of rulings (i.e., Hoekstra 1995, Bartels and Mutz 2009) provide a 
reasonable depiction of how decisions may influence opinion in actuality.  But if the framing of a 
judicial decision has a systematic effect on opinion about it, then the literature has overlooked an 
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important factor in the study of policy legitimation.  The study of how cues and frames matter in 
context has broader implications as well, since scholars have little sense of how they interact to 
shape opinion more generally (Chong and Druckman 2007a; Druckman et al. 2010 offer one of 
the first studies of frames and cues in tandem). 
 In this chapter, I explore the relative effects of frames and cues surrounding the Supreme 
Court, with a focus on making connections between the theory of policy legitimation and the 
reality of how the media portrays the institution.  The cue in question is a Supreme Court 
endorsement of policy with a ruling.  Because people generally trust the Court, this cue allows 
them to make inferences without drawing on more detailed policy knowledge (Druckman 2001, 
Druckman 2007).  It has the effect of moving opinions in a positive direction – that is, in 
agreement with the policy advocated by the Court (Bartels and Mutz 2009, Mondak 1990).  
Framing effects, on the other hand, occur when people develop a particular conceptualization of 
an issue (Chong and Druckman 2007a, Druckman 2001).  I define positive frames as pieces of 
information that emphasize considerations that are likely to increase policy agreement with the 
Supreme Court, and negative frames as those likely to decrease agreement with it. 
 There are a number of reasons to expect that the Court’s credibility will afford it limited 
influence in framing struggles.  To begin with, the Court does not write its opinions with popular 
framing struggles in mind. 82  But critics of the Court can design potent arguments to convince 
the public.  Frames may effectively target certain segments of the public for persuasion (Clawson 
and Waltenburg 2003).  No evidence shows that the nature of Court legitimacy – in the form of 
public support for preserving the institution – similarly makes it a persuasive source in the face 
of criticism.  Second, frames may prove more influential than cues on opinion construction in 
general by having initial unconscious effects on the evaluation of an issue (Druckman et al. 
2010).  And finally, the prevalence of backlash suggests that the Court’s power to persuade may 
prove ineffective in real world framing struggles.  According to one study, “Backlash usually has 
roots that grow from sources other than a broad dislike of the institution issuing the decision … 
in the wake of a court decision, elites and interest groups mobilize its holding, discussion of the 
issue becomes more critical than when the issue was absent from the media radar screen, and a 
                                                
82 The decisions in Lingle v. Chevron and Kelo v. New London, CT (2005) illustrate this point.  Though they had 
many parallels, Lingle went unnoticed by the public while Kelo generated strong backlash (Barros 2006; Nadler, 
Diamond, and Patton 2008).  One study attributes the difference in these responses to the framing of the rulings: 
“The Court was far more effective in Lingle than in Kelo in engaging directly with public unease about the 
relationship between government and private property” (Baron 2007). 
 120 
section of the public then develops an opinion contrary to the Court’s resolution of the case” 
(Persily 2008, 12).  Therefore, I expect that even when the cue of a Court endorsement is present, 
frames will have a systematic effect on popular approval of policies.  I expect a ruling framed in 
negative terms to garner less support than an identical ruling framed in positive terms. 
 
Negative Frames – Negative framing of a Court ruling will mute the persuasive power of 
the institution. 
 
By what mechanism might negative frames limit the influence of the Court?   Two 
explanations exist.  On the one hand, negative frames may decrease support for a ruling by 
impacting how Americans view the Court.  In this scenario, people exposed to criticism of a 
judicial decision may lose confidence in the Court.  As trust in the Court declines, Americans 
become less likely to view its judgment as relevant and wise, stripping the endorsement cue of its 
potency.  On the other hand, the Court may suffer no reputational cost when critics attack a 
specific ruling.  Rather, targeted negative frames may lead people to essentially ignore the cue of 
a Court endorsement when formulating their attitudes. 
 This second explanation – endorsement irrelevance – is more plausible.  I expect that 
specific negative frames – aimed at a single ruling – have no effects on diffuse support for the 
institution; indeed, there is a large body of evidence that demonstrates the durable nature of 
support for the Supreme Court (Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2003; Gibson and Caldeira 2009a; 
Gibson and Caldeira 2009b).  But a targeted negative frame will impact support for a decision 
irrespective of people’s attitude towards the Court. 
 
Diffuse Support Stability – Specific criticism of a Court ruling will have no effect on 
diffuse support for the institution. 
 
Endorsement Irrelevance – Specific criticism of a Court ruling will limit the institution’s 
persuasive power by divorcing diffuse and specific support from one another. 
 
These hypotheses allow us to explore an important yet understudied part of the policy 
legitimation process – the relative effects of frames and source cues.  I expect the effect of 
negative frames to vary based on case-specific factors, individual level attributes, and their 
substance and strength.  But they should prove consequential even in the face of an endorsement 
from a high credibility source like the Supreme Court. 
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Study 1: Framing a Religious Expression Ruling 
 To explore the effects of a framing struggle, I administered an online experiment to a 
pool of 165 subjects in the Winter of 2012.  I focus on three important questions.  First and most 
basically, I investigate whether a simple negative framing of a Supreme Court ruling diminishes 
its support relative to a positive frame (the type that existing research commonly employs).  
Second, can such frames prove effective when they come from relatively unknown sources and 
fail to reference sophisticated arguments?  And finally, how do framing struggles mute the 
impact of Court endorsements? 
 
Study Design 
 I recruited subjects from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (mTurk) pool of workers to take 
part in a study about “political issues in the news.”83  They were advised that the researcher was 
interested in learning their opinions on a range of policy matters and directed to read a story 
about a current event from the Washington Post.  In actuality, subjects had been randomly 
assigned to one of three conditions - to read a story about a Supreme Court decision ensuring 
public funding of some types of religious expression (treatment conditions) or an unrelated 
article (control group).  Subjects in the treatment groups were presented a news article that 
included a Court cue (the ruling) coupled with a positive or negative decision frame.84  This 
design allows me to explore the relative power of frames as they relate to a High Court ruling. 
 I took care to ensure external validity with respect to the treatments; in fact, I suggest that 
a lack of external validity in existing experimental research has systematically biased results in 
favor of legitimation.  In this research, subjects typically receive either a cue (Court 
endorsement) or a frame (majority reasoning) that is likely to increase their support for a 
decision.  But the media regularly frames rulings in more negative terms. 
                                                
83 When the researcher takes the proper measures, the data quality in online experiments is typically high and 
Internet studies generate substantially similar results to laboratory experiments (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2011, 
Joinson 1999, Krantz and Dalal 2000, Reips 2000, Stanton 1998).  For the study presented here, I required subjects 
to verify their age and location in the United States to participate.  Subjects were experienced mTurk workers who 
had earned approval in over 95% of the studies in which they have participated and demonstrated their attentiveness 
to the survey as they responded.  They received a nominal sum for their participation, which lasted about eight 
minutes on average. 
84 An additional group of subjects was randomly assigned to a different framing treatment during the course of the 
study.  This final condition was used for exploratory purposes and was not germane to the study presented here. 
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I adapt articles from actual newspaper coverage of Rosenberger v. Virginia (1995), where 
the Court ruled that the University of Virginia was constitutionally bound by the First 
Amendment to fund a publication by a Christian student group as it did other secular 
publications.  Treatment articles describe the decision identically across conditions, including the 
cue of a Court endorsement.  They differ only as to whether they frame the decision in positive 
(“praise”) or negative (“criticism”) terms.  In the positive frame condition, subjects read 
arguments that the Court protected the Constitution and put an end to the double standards in the 
funding of religious student groups; in the negative frame condition, they read that the Court 
dishonored the Constitution and created a new double standard (see Appendix E). 
The design of these treatments is very conservative, by intention.  Subjects receive 
identical descriptions of the ruling across conditions.  The positive and negative frames use 
substantively similar arguments to praise and criticize the Court (i.e., that it either protected or 
dishonored the Constitution).  This ensures that differences in the strength of frames do not 
contribute to the results presented here.  The design allows me to explore most basic framing 
critique of the Court necessary to undo policy legitimation.  By describing a decision concerning 
religious expression, an issue on which most people hold strong opinions, I further expect that 
frames will have a smaller effect on mass opinion than they would on a less salient topic 
(Brickman and Peterson 2006, Hoekstra 1995).  After reading the article, subjects responded to a 
brief survey intended to measure demographic characteristics, political knowledge, trust in the 
Court, opinions about religion, and attitudes towards the decision. 
 
Subject Population and Variables 
 Seventy-five males and ninety females took part in the study and a majority of subjects 
were white (83 percent) and over the age of forty  (55 percent).  They were, in general, well 
educated, knowledgeable about politics, and secular.  Ninety-nine subjects (60 percent) had 
received a bachelor’s degree or higher, approximately half expressed a preference for the 
Democratic Party, and the median subject categorized himself as “moderate.”  Thirty-two 
percent of subjects expressed no religious preference; of those that did express a preference, a 
plurality identified themselves as Mainline Protestants.  And nearly half of all subjects indicated 
that they never attend religious services apart from occasional weddings, baptisms, and funerals. 
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 In the analysis to follow, I pay careful attention to the meaning and measurement of 
support for a Court decision.  Too often, research fails to consider fully the nature of policy 
legitimation, a complex phenomenon that must be measured with care.  Legitimation may 
indicate an increase in public support for the political issue-position that the Court endorses.  
With respect to the case here, subjects respond as to whether to allow public funding for 
religious publications.  Legitimation may also result in an increase in support for the 
Constitutional interpretation offered by the Court, which here privileges free speech 
considerations over the separation of church and state.  It may involve support for a ruling of the 
Court, regardless of the substance of the ruling.  I also explore whether subjects differentiate 
between their “personal opinions” and their views about the Constitution when considering a 
ruling of the Supreme Court.  All told, I utilize a four-item decision approval scale that taps the 
complex nature of reactions to the Court’s religious expression ruling.85 
 I also measure diffuse support for the Supreme Court.  The six-item institutional 
legitimacy scale (scored 0-1) remains a staple of the literature, tapping durable support for the 
judiciary.  It measures willingness to abolish the Court and limit its jurisdiction, trust in Court 
decision-making, beliefs that the Court favors some groups over others and is too politicized, and 
views about the Court’s role as arbiter of the Constitution (see Chapter 2 and Gibson, Caldeira, 
and Spence 2003). 
 
Results 
 We begin by looking at the effects of framing struggles on support for the religious 
expression decision.  As expected, the frames used to describe the decision influence opinion 
about it.  Subjects who read about a positively-framed Court ruling express significantly more 
support for allowing the government to fund religious publications than those in the control 
condition (Mdiff=.16, p=.007, two-tailed).  But subjects confronted a negative decision frame 
opposite a Court endorsement are not persuaded by the ruling (Mdiff=-.05, p=.42, two-tailed). 
                                                
85 The scale reliability coefficient is .873.  The scale generates a single significant underlying factor.  The items used 
to construct the decision approval scale: (1) Do you favor or oppose allowing public schools and universities to fund 
religious publications in equal measure as secular (non-religious) publications?  (2) In your personal opinion, do you 
believe that it is more important to ensure the separation of church and state by prohibiting government funding for 
all types of religious expression or to protect the freedom of speech by allowing the government to fund religious 
expression? (3) The Supreme Court recently ruled that the Constitution permits government funding of religious 
expression.  In your personal opinion, do you agree with this Supreme Court decision?  (4) Regardless of your 
personal opinion, do you agree that the Constitution permits government funding of religious expression? 
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Figure 7.1  
 
Bars are OLS coefficient estimates of the effect of framing condition on decision approval (relative to the control 
group).  Lines represent 95% confidence intervals.  Results robust to the inclusion of other variables. 
 
Figure 7.1 shows the estimated effects of framing on support for the Court’s decision.  
The significant effect of a positive frame on decision support is not surprising, as the treatment in 
this condition adheres closely to those employed in existing research on legitimation.  It is 
relatively uncontroversial that, on some issues, a positively framed judicial endorsement can 
legitimate policies.  But the impact of a specific negative frame has not yet been explored, and 
under these conditions, the Court’s ability to legitimate policies diminishes.  This result provides 
some robust support for the Negative Frames Hypothesis given the conservatism of the 
treatments applied.  Recall, again, that all information presented to subjects in the two conditions 
is equivalent, with the exception of whether it is used to praise or criticize the ruling.  It does not 
appear it is necessary for negative frames to employ strong arguments to lessen the Court’s 
persuasive capacity (in spite of its institutional reputation).   
 But what of this reputation?  In general, subjects rate the Court somewhat favorably on 
the institutional legitimacy scale (Mcontrol=.562), a result in line with other findings about judicial 
legitimacy (Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2003).  But there is evidence that people credit the 
institution when presented with a positively-framed ruling; subjects in this condition view that 
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Court as significantly more legitimate (Mdiff=.073, p=.018, two-tailed).  This result follows other 
research that suggests a positivity bias – people credit the institution for decisions of which they 
approve but do not penalize it when they disapprove of a ruling (Gibson and Caldeira 2009a, 
Gibson and Caldeira 2009b; but see Grosskopf and Mondak 1998).  And as expected, the Court’s 
standing does not suffer, relative to the control group, when respondents read about a ruling 
framed negatively (Mdiff=.038, p=.253, two-tailed). 
Because the Court’s legitimacy does not suffer when its decision is attacked (Diffuse 
Support Stability), it begs the question of how specific and diffuse attitudes involving the 
judiciary relate during framing struggles.  If we assume that there are no differences in the 
diffuse and specific support expressed by respondents in the control and negative treatment 
groups, two competing explanations exist.  People may defer to the Court more when its rulings 
come under criticism (to the extent that they view it favorably), or they may defer to it less.  In 
the former scenario, there should be a strong correlation between diffuse and specific support in 
the negative framing condition alone: those who view the Court most positively should applaud 
the ruling while those who like it least should oppose the ruling when it is criticized.  In the latter 
scenario, the pattern would change, with no correlation between diffuse and specific support 
when a negative frame is present.  This is indeed the case. 
Table 7.1 and Figure 7.2 offer support for the Endorsement Irrelevance Hypothesis.  
Diffuse and specific support are closely related in the positive framing condition but unrelated in 
the negative framing scenario.  This is shown across the three models of decision approval 
presented in Table 7.1.  While church attendance has a significant effect on support for the 
religious expression ruling regardless of condition, attitudes towards the Court are significant 
only in the positive framing condition.  In this case, positive views about the institution increase 
support for its ruling.  But when the ruling is framed in negative terms, perceptions of 
institutional legitimacy no longer affect support for its output.  
As can be seen in Figure 7.2, this effect is driven by those who view the Court most 
favorably: they defer to it much more when its ruling is praised, but then quickly eschew 
deference when a negative decision frame is before them.  On the other hand, there is little 
correlation between framing condition and decision approval for those respondents who rate the 
Court least favorably. 
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 These tests provide some of the first evidence about the importance of framing struggles 
surrounding High Court decisions.  They suggest that policy legitimation may prove harder for 
the justices to achieve when the press frames their rulings negatively.  They also suggest that 
powerful source cues do little to lessen framing effects.  Though the Court’s diffuse support 
remains intact across conditions, its ability to persuade changes markedly.  Whereas one might 
assume that judicial credibility proves most persuasive when the Court is under attack, the 
evidence here shows the opposite pattern – people essentially ignore their attitudes about the 
Court when formulating opinions about a negatively framed ruling.  The theory of policy 
legitimation depends on the link between support for the institution and support for its output, 
but diffuse and specific support seem to have little relationship once a judicial ruling receives 
criticism. 
Study 1 raises important questions about the potency of judicial influence.  It also offers 
an explanation as to why policy legitimation appears prevalent in the laboratory but not in the 
real world.  Nonetheless, questions remain as to whether frames can similarly diminish Court 
influence across a range of legal controversies. 
 
Table 7.1 Framing Effects, Institutional Legitimacy, and the Basis of Decision Approval 
 Decision Approval 















































R-sq .409 .451 .339 
N 58 54 48 
Results are standardized regression coefficients. *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01.  The effect of institutional legitimacy is 






Symbols represent the intra-group mean of decision approval relative to the control group.  Among those expressing 
the most support for the Court, decision approval is significantly higher in the positive frame condition than in the 
control condition (p=.0007, two-tailed).  No other intra-group relationships are significant. 
 
Study 2: Framing Four Legal Controversies 
 In Study 1, I demonstrated how negative frames attenuate policy legitimation, even when 
they oppose the potent cue offered by a Supreme Court decision.  I explore these results further 
in Study 2.  My purpose here is twofold.  First, I look at the relative effects of frames and cues 
with a design that allows me to vary both.  (In Study 1, variations in frames constituted the 
treatments, while the cue of a Court endorsement was present across both treatment conditions).  
This approach allows me to better disentangle the interactive effects of frames and cues when 
they are consistent (i.e., a positive frame and cue present) and inconsistent (i.e., a positive frame 
and no cue present).  And second, I explore whether the results of Study 1 are issue-dependent.  
Is the Court’s ability to persuade circumscribed by strong pre-existing attitudes people may have 
held about religious expression?  Does the salience of the issue influence the power of a judicial 
endorsement (see Hoekstra 1995)?  To better answer these questions, I explore a variety of legal 





 Subjects were recruited, again through mTurk, to participate in a survey about their 
opinions on a variety of political issues during the Winter of 2012-2013.  I focus on four 
controversies that have come before the Supreme Court: gun rights, religious expression (the 
separation of church and state), government takings of private property, and term limits for 
members of Congress.86  These controversies were selected because they vary across a number 
of potentially important dimensions.87  To the extent that the salience matters in how people react 
to judicial decisions (Hoekstra 1995), these issues may prove instructive, varying from relatively 
high profile (gun rights) to relatively low profile (term limits).  The issues also implicate 
different dimensions of opinion.  For instance, subjects may be more likely to defer to the Court 
regarding the constitutionality of term limits than they would about a matter involving church-
state separation, about which they may hold strong a priori opinions.  And finally, the decisions 
vary in their ideological implications, which may impact how subjects view them (Egan and 
Citrin 2009).  One ruling was more consistent with political conservatism (where the Court 
struck down gun control legislation), one was more consistent with liberalism (where the Court 
banned the display of the Ten Commandments in public places), and two had ambiguous 
ideological characteristics. 
I randomly assigned subjects to either a control group, where they answered a variety of 
questions about these and other issues, or a treatment group, where they were first tasked with 
reading a newspaper article about one of the rulings.  These articles varied as to whether they 
included the cue of a Supreme Court endorsement and whether they used a positive or negative 
issue frame.88  The four distinct articles per issue included: positive frame + endorsement cue, 
positive frame only (no cue), negative frame + endorsement cue, and negative frame only (no 
cue).  All told, the experiment was a 4 issue (gun rights, religious expression, takings, term 
limits) x 2 frame (positive, negative) x 2 cue (present, absent) design, with a control group. 
                                                
86 In the gun rights condition, the Court was described as striking down the Gun Free School Zones Act (based on 
the decision in U.S. v. Lopez).  In the religious expression case, the Court was portrayed as banning the display of 
the Ten Commandments in public places.  The eminent domain case was based on the ruling in Lingle v. Chevron.  
Finally, the Court was described as striking down term limits for congressmen, based on its decision in U.S. Term 
Limits v. Thornton. 
87 During the time frame the study was administered, a school shooting in New Jersey led to a national debate about 
gun control.  Approximately two-thirds of subjects took part in the survey prior to this event.  Their response 
patterns are substantively similar to the responses patterns of all subjects, which I present here. 
88 In contrast to Study 1, positive and negative frames do not raise identical considerations. 
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 The issue of gun rights provides a more full illustration of the experimental design.  The 
positive frame was defined as a position consistent with a Supreme Court ruling on the topic.  
The positive frame article highlighted arguments in favor of gun rights: that the federal firearms 
regulations infringed on local authority and Second Amendment protections.  The negative frame 
article took an anti-gun position, emphasizing the safety of school children and the authority of 
Congress to regulate guns under the Commerce Clause.  Frames were drawn from actual media 
coverage of a relevant Court ruling.  Articles that included a cue mentioned that the Supreme 
Court had ruled in favor of gun rights recently.  So subjects in the treatment groups were 
randomly assigned to read one of four articles: 
 
• Positive frame + cue: arguments in favor of gun rights with information about a pro-gun 
rights Supreme Court decision 
 
• Positive frame: arguments in favor of gun rights 
 
• Negative frame + cue: arguments against gun rights with information about a pro-gun 
rights Supreme Court decision 
 
• Negative frame: arguments against gun rights 
 
This design allows for a more careful examination of the relative effects of cues and 
frames, which often occur in concert with one another in coverage of the Supreme Court.  Full 
versions of stimuli are available in Appendix F. 
  
Subject Population and Variables 
After reading these articles, subjects responded to a series of questions regarding their 
attitudes on gun rights, religious expression, eminent domain, term limits, and the Supreme 
Court.  For each issue, I create a four-item decision approval scale (0-1) that taps various 
dimensions of approval for policies.  These items mimic the design of questions used to construct 
the decision approval scale in Study 1.  They tap into various attitudes surrounding the issue in 
question.89  Scales used to create the key dependent variables had sound properties.  Reliability 
                                                
89 For the gun rights issue, the items used to construct the decision approval index are as follows: (1) In your 
personal opinion, should the federal government have the power to ban guns near schools, or should this be a matter 
left to state and local governments? (2) In your personal opinion, what is more important, ensuring safety from 
violence with strict gun control policies, or ensuring that the government does not infringe on the right to bear arms? 
(3) Do you support or oppose the law known as the Gun Free School Zones Act, which gives the national 
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coefficients for the decision approval scales were .81 for gun rights, .71 for religious expression, 
.67 for takings law, and .65 for term limits.  For institutional legitimacy, reliability was .78.  All 
scales generated a single significant underlying factor. 
595 subjects took part in the study – 346 males and 249 females.  About three quarters of 
the subjects were white, with Asians (9%) and blacks (7%) as the next largest groups.  Subjects 
were also fairly well informed about politics.  About 58% of subjects expressed a preference for 
the Democratic Party and characterized themselves as liberal.  The average subject spent about 
seven minutes participating in the study, for which he was compensated $0.50. 
  
Results 
 How might Americans respond to a complex informational environment as they learn 
about legal controversies?  In this study, I focus on two features of the environment that are most 
relevant to the study of policy legitimation: framing context and cueing information.  I expect 
both factors to influence opinion. 
 To test these expectations, I look at approval across experimental conditions for policies 
involving gun rights, religious expression, eminent domain, and congressional term limits.  In 
each case, I compare the opinions of subjects in a treatment group with those in the control 
group.  Figure 7.3 presents mean differences in decision approval across these groups. 
Unsurprisingly, frames and cues have the most powerful effects on opinion when they 
align with one another in a positive direction.  For instance, subjects who read a story that frames 
limits on religious expression in positive terms (i.e., “the government must protect the rights of 
all Americans, no matter their religion”) and mentions a Supreme Court ruling on the matter 
express significantly more support for church-state separation than those in the control group 
(Mdiff=.139, p=.062, two-tailed).  Similarly, a positive frame coupled with a Court endorsement 
of gun rights leads to a significant increase in approval (Mdiff=.185, p=.030, two-tailed).  These 
effects are as expected because, in both scenarios, the considerations that subjects bring to mind 
when expressing their attitudes have a consistent effect on their opinions (Zaller 1992, Druckman 
et al. 2010). 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
government the power to ban guns near schools? (4) Regardless of your personal opinion, what do you believe the 
Constitution permits?  Items for other issues followed a similar structure by framing the political controversy in 





 More interesting, however, is what transpires when frames and cues are at odds with one 
another.  In particular, coverage of the U.S. Supreme Court regularly approximates that 
presented to subjects in the negative frame + SC cue condition, especially when dissent on the 
Court is high.  In these instances, as we have seen in the case of Kelo, the media regularly 
portrays a ruling (the cue) in unfavorable terms (the frame). 
According to existing research, the Court’s credibility may allow it to persuade despite 
the negative framing context.  Indeed, “the Court is more influential than Congress in using its 
institutional credibility to move opinion, and it can do so fairly unconditionally, regardless of 
people’s sophistication levels, levels of issue-relevant thinking, or the presence of issue-relevant 
arguments” (Bartels and Mutz 2009, 259, emphasis added).  But accounts such as these seem to 
offer an inflated assessment of the ability of the Supreme Court to persuade. 
 Study 2 provides additional evidence that opinion change is minimal when frames and 
cues are at odds.  Across the eight contrast conditions (cue + negative frame, no cue + positive 
frame), opinion changes in a positive direction only in the case of takings law.  In all other 
conditions, the differences between policy support in the control and treatment groups is 
statistically indistinguishable.  In fact, the pattern of responses remains relatively issue-
independent. There is no evidence that positive frames absent a Court endorsement are more 
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powerful for some controversies more than others.  There is no evidence that the Court is more 
influential on low salience issues like term limits for congressmen.  These results, particularly in 
the negative frame + SC cue conditions, demonstrate limits on the Court’s ability to persuade.  
They echo the findings from Study 1. 
 According to the Endorsement Irrelevance Hypothesis, negative frames divorce diffuse 
support for the institution from specific support for its output.  Trust in the Court remains stable 
after criticism of a ruling, but cues lose their potency.  This limiting effect may be due in part to 
relevance since issue-specific frames provide information that directly relates to a policy issue, 
whereas cues speak only indirectly to policy considerations.  When an endorsement cue is the 
most relevant information present, it has the most powerful effect on opinion (policy 
legitimation).  But the cue loses influence when a frame raises more pertinent considerations.  





 Figure 7.4 provides evidence that diffuse support has little effect on policy legitimation 
when framing struggles take place.  For all four issues, subjects express significantly more 
support for a policy when presented with a positive frame + cue compared with a negative frame 
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+ cue.  But across all four issues, frames have no effect on support for the Court.  Consider the 
matter of eminent domain.  Subjects who read arguments in favor of takings and learned about a 
Supreme Court ruling with the same substantive effect (the positive frame + cue group) are more 
supportive of them than those who read about the same ruling coupled with counterarguments 
(the negative frame + cue group).  But subjects in both conditions express similar levels of trust 
in the Court.  In fact, both groups of subjects respond similarly even when asked to assess 
whether the justices “can usually be trusted to make decisions that are right for the country as a 
whole.”  Nonetheless, this trust does not lead to policy legitimation.90  Taken together, the results 




 The literature on the Supreme Court and policy legitimation does little to situate rulings 
in the type of news context through which most Americans learn about them.  Though numerous 
studies demonstrate how a Court endorsement legitimates policies in even controversial cases, 
the actual persuasive power of the Court is more circumscribed.  I provide and test a new 
explanation that accounts for the failure to persuade: framing struggles.  In fact, I suggest that the 
power of framing effects is similarly important as the effect of a Court endorsement, with 
support for a ruling dependent on the presence of positive frames.  Using two experiments that 
provide varying depictions of judicial rulings, I find evidence for this account.  Critics need not 
introduce any novel considerations nor reference sophisticated arguments to effectively 
neutralize the Court.  Reports that simply “criticize” a decision using the same generic arguments 
that can be employed to praise it can successfully limit Court influence.  
 As negative frames of its decisions emerge, the Court loses the ability to convince.  The 
institution’s diminished persuasion powers stem not from a loss of legitimacy – as subjects are 
reticent about formal censures of the Court – but rather from an unwillingness to defer to it.  As 
the framing environment becomes more unfavorable towards the judiciary, it can face, if not a 
dramatic erosion of support, the prospect of decision-specific disapproval.  Theses findings hold 
                                                
90 Because the cell sizes in Study 2 are small (the average size of a cell in a treatment group is 29), there is not 
enough evidence to suggest that diffuse support has a significant influence on decision approval across framing 
conditions (as we saw in Study 1). 
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across a range of controversies with which the Supreme Court has involved itself in recent 
decades. 
 Still, this account does little to suggest what drives backlash to a ruling (where people 
express significantly less support for a policy after the Court endorses it), which future research 
would do well to explore.  It may be the case that backlash arises only when strong negative 
frames dominate the media environment (Chong and Druckman 2007b).  It is also possible that a 
single news article offers only a limited impetus for backlash; for many other issues, it may take 
a sustained media campaign for people to reject strongly a Supreme Court decision.  For 
instance, the public’s overwhelmingly negative reaction to Kelo v. New London occurred while 
the press lavished attention (much of it unfavorable) on the ruling. 
 This chapter also suggests that more work is needed to explore the relative effects of 
frames and cues.  I demonstrate that both matter to an extent: particularly when frames and cues 
align with one another, they powerfully affect opinion.  But the cue examined here – a ruling by 
the Supreme Court of the United States – is a relatively powerful one, given the credibility of the 
institution.  Do cues remain as potent when the source is unknown?  When it is viewed in 
negatively?  One might imagine a more comprehensive study of how endorsements impact 
political campaigns depending on the identity of the endorser.  But I would also suggest that the 
study of frames and cues should move beyond the campaign context to consider other 
communication environments. 
 For now, we can say with confidence that the Supreme Court’s ability to persuade is 
more limited than previously believed.  It is circumscribed by the types of framing struggles that 
regularly characterize coverage of the judiciary, which cause Americans to eschew the 






















 How will Americans make sense of one of the most important judicial decisions in 
modern history?  What effects will the Supreme Court ruling ultimately have on attitudes 
towards the healthcare law known as the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act? 
 Though an expanding body of research continues to explore reactions to judicial rulings, 
it offers conflicting answers to these questions.  According to the policy legitimation hypothesis, 
the ruling should create consensus in favor of the PPACA.  As Americans paid close attention to 
the case, they learned that an essentially fair and trustworthy institution had endorsed the once-
controversial policy, which should increase their approval of it.  The conditional response 
hypothesis offers qualifications: since American attitudes towards the law had crystallized long 
before the decision, it should have no persuasive impact.  Not so, according to evidence showing 
that structural responses characterize reactions to judicial rulings.  To the extent that Americans 
discussed the decision across disparate social contexts, they may diverge in their reactions to it. 
 These distinctions make plain the shortcomings of the literature on Supreme Court 
persuasion.  Each account suggests that an additional variable – a source cue, a voting cue, a 
measure of salience – improves our understanding of policy legitimation (Zink, Spriggs, and 
Scott 2009; Bartels and Mutz 2009; Baird and Gangl 2006; Hoekstra 1995).  But while this 
approach has some value, it has lead to a confused portrait of Court influence.  We can observe 
distinct reactions to decisions not only because of the small details associated with each, but 
more notably because each decision does not exist in a vacuum.  The Court depends on the 
media to characterize its rulings for public consumption.  But no existing research explores the 
differences in press coverage across a range of decisions, or how these differences come about.  
Given the disjointed state of the literature – the various models of Court influence, the troubling 
divide in conclusions between experimental and survey research – it is not a stretch to say 
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meaningful research on policy legitimation cannot proceed absent attention to the role played by 
the media after the Court rules. 
 How will Americans respond to the ruling on the PPACA?  The answer to this question 
depends not only on popular views about the Court and pre-existing attitudes towards the law.  It 
also depends on the information conveyed by the press about them. 
 
Review of Dissensus Dynamics Theory 
 I argue that leading national news organizations shape their coverage of Supreme Court 
rulings systematically in response to judicial voting coalitions.  Dissensus Dynamics Theory 
suggests that rulings meet with the most favorable reports when the majority coalition is large 
and ideologically diverse.  In these cases, reporters will defer to elites on the Court, who possess 
expertise about legal controversies.  Small and ideologically narrow coalitions on the bench have 
the opposite effect, as the press more willingly portrays their rulings in unflattering terms.  
Dissent has the direct effect of supplying critical arguments for use by the press; it also has an 
indirect effect, by giving reporters an incentive to seek out competing voices. 
 To evaluate the theory, I marshal a diverse range of evidence, with each piece designed to 
address the shortcomings of another.  In theoretical terms, I demonstrate how constraints faced 
by reporters on the Supreme Court beat – the need to emphasize drama and conflict, the dual 
goals of simplicity and accuracy, the demand for timely reporting – lead them to shape coverage 
around judicial voting outcomes at the expense of more complex pieces of information.  In fact, a 
number of experienced Supreme Court journalists attest that, for many decisions, they skim 
written opinions for such simple cues and craft coverage according to formula.  I demonstrate 
that this account – where the press looks to elites to shape its coverage – fits with findings from 
other research on political communication (i.e., Entman 2004).  I also suggest that the theory 
may allow us to fill in gaps in the literature on policy legitimation. 
 A case study provides the first empirical evidence in favor of Dissensus Dynamics 
Theory.  It demonstrates how press coverage of two analogous rulings differs markedly, in large 
part because the cases featured distinct voting outcomes.  The case study adds texture to 
Dissensus Dynamics Theory.  Examining media coverage of property rights law, I show that 
dissent has both a direct and an indirect impact.  The written opinions of the justices may be 
most influential when they allow the press to emphasize internal disagreements on the Court and 
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when they use compelling and evocative language that makes them newsworthy.  Technical legal 
analysis from the dissenters has a less potent effect on media coverage.  Nonetheless, the signal 
sent by dissenters with their votes encourages reporters to broaden their use of sources.  Outside 
actors more willingly criticize what they perceive to be a divided bench. 
 The case study also allows us to examine alternative explanations to Dissensus Dynamics 
Theory.  For instance, one of the most potent critiques of the model suggests that certain issues 
the Court chooses to hear are much more likely to receive unfavorable coverage, no matter the 
substance of a ruling.  By controlling for issue area in the case study, we can rule out this 
alternative account quite effectively.  Indeed, Lingle and Kelo not only involve the same issue, 
they have further substantive similarities: their legal implications, significance, and ultimate 
outcome.  The case study also allows us to trace media coverage over time.  It helps demonstrate 
that not only did the press cover Kelo in negative terms, it did so in a manner that changed 
popular discussions of property rights from the pre-ruling phase. 
 In later chapters, I find evidence in favor of Dissensus Dynamics Theory across a range 
of years (1981-2008), cases (a random sample of high salience decisions), mediums (newspaper 
and cable news), and news outlets.  These findings suggest that we can draw a broad conclusion: 
that the effect of judicial votes on press coverage is not restricted to a few exceptional cases or a 
few news organizations.  Americans who learned about high profile Supreme Court rulings in the 
last thirty years – whether they read the New York Times or watched Fox News – saw much more 
positive portrayals of consensual decisions than dissensual ones, even if the cases were otherwise 
similar.  For some of the most widely covered decisions, a unanimous bench (in place of a 
closely-divided one) would generate 10-15 more positive stories in place of negative ones, all 
else equal.  On cable news channels, the voting result has the added effect of significantly 
decreasing incivility of the type frequently seen on programs like Hannity and Colmes and 
Crossfire. 
 To the extent that this evidence paints a clear, consistent, and convincing portrait of how 
the press covers the Court, it adds a new dimension to our understanding of how policy 
legitimation may come about.  And yet, even the most recent experimental work fails to consider 
whether the framing context alters the impact of Court rulings.  Do negative portrayals of rulings 
– the kind that prevail most frequently when the Court majority is small and narrow – diminish 
their persuasive appeals?  This question is not a rhetorical one: a number of studies suggest that 
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the simple cue of a judicial endorsement is enough to persuade, regardless of the contextual 
information that comes with it.  I design two related experiments to explore why Dissensus 
Dynamics Theory matters.  Using stimuli that have a greater degree of external validity than that 
typically found in the literature, I suggest that negative frames limit the Court’s ability to 
persuade, even after people are made aware of a relevant ruling.  This loss of influence stems 
not from diminished standing for the Court – subjects continue to rate it as trustworthy and 
unbiased – but rather from the ability of negative frames to divorce support for the institution 
from approval of its output. 
 With these findings, I advance the study of Supreme Court influence along multiple lines. 
I point to an important shortcoming of existing research that is responsible for its divergent 
conclusions.  I suggest that future studies of policy legitimation must consider that role played by 
the press.  One can think about judicial persuasion not as something that operates solely on the 
public, but also as constituted by the ability of courts to earn favorable press notices. I offer new 
insight about journalism at the Supreme Court.  To this point, little research gives a systematic 
account of how decision-centered coverage takes shape.  And I link experimental stimuli with 
real world context more closely than the literature has.  I explore some of the implications of my 
research more fully in the following pages. 
 
Implications for Studies of Political Communication 
 A significant portion of the literature on political communication explores the quality and 
content of the news (for an overview, see Graber and Smith 2005).  This research regularly finds 
important links between mainstream government debate and media coverage (Bennett 1990).  
According to Althaus and colleagues, “We should distinguish three ways of segmenting U.S. 
elites: governing elites as a whole; the executive branch or administration, which typically 
initiates foreign policy; and oppositional officials, whom the media generally identify among 
members of the opposition party in Congress.  Together the administration and its critics in 
Congress compose the governing elite” (Alhaus et al. 1996, 408).  Judges and judicial branch 
sources are conspicuously absent from this formulation. 
 In fact, the vast majority of research involving media-government relations focuses on 
executive branch actors (Entman 2004, Bennett 1990, Bennett and Manheim 1993, Owen and 
Davis 2008, Campbell and Jamieson 2008, Hart 2002).  The volume of research on 
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communication strategies employed by the George W. Bush administration alone is impressive 
(Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston 2006; Winkler 2007; Winkler 2008; Benoit and Henson 
2009; John, Domke, and Coe 2007).  A large portion of this work considers foreign policy crisis 
in particular.  Other areas of active research include new media institutions (Livingston and 
Bennett 2003, Sobieraj and Berry 2011, Xenos and Bennett 2007) and political communication 
in campaigns (Gibson et al. 2010; Benoit and Arne 2009; Falk, Grizard, and McDonald 2006; 
Spillotes and Vavreck 2002). 
 The imbalance in political communication research is troubling.  In fact, in studies of the 
relationship between elite influence and news coverage, researchers often pitch their findings too 
broadly since the elites in question are almost always executive branch actors.  To what extent 
can we generalize these findings to other areas of the government?  Does their reliance on 
executive branch elites affect the conclusions they draw? 
 In this dissertation, I have suggested that models of elite influence capture an important 
portion of the court-press dynamic.  I demonstrate that the media’s reliance on elite expertise, 
and its willingness to index coverage to elite voices, allows Supreme Court justices to use their 
votes to shape how their rulings will be framed.  Consensus among these elites causes reporters 
to offer a unified and deferential perspective in coverage.  But division among the justices opens 
the Court to framing challenges both internal and external.  In this respect, elite disagreement is 
similarly influential whether occurs on the bench or inside the White House. 
 But Dissensus Dynamics Theory also demonstrates how focusing on presidential 
administrations obscures other aspects of news production.  One missing piece of existing 
research concerns elite source credibility, which captures the extent to which various high levels 
sources have an incentive to offer counter-framing perspectives.  Given the durable nature of its 
legitimacy, the Court may have a higher level of inherent credibility than other branches of the 
federal government.  Because Americans penalize aggressive attacks on the Court (Shesol 2010), 
political actors have limited incentives to express disagreements with it.91  Wielding this 
credibility, the justices have more power to frame than other actors.  Attacks on the Court are 
unlikely except when it is internally divided.  Indeed, evidence shows that elite disagreement 
                                                
91 In this respect, we might see parallels to foreign policy conflicts where political actors become reluctant to 
criticize the president. 
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with the Court does not affect its coverage once we control for the size of its majority voting 
coalition. 
 Dissensus Dynamics Theory also shows the importance of strategic communication.  
According to Entman, framing challenges occur readily in response to culturally incongruent 
frames.  Presidents are unlikely to define issues successfully when they employ frames that are 
incongruent with “schemas that dominate the political culture.”  But, “a good match between a 
news item and habitual schemas pulls a frame into people’s thoughts with virtually no cognitive 
cost” (Entman 2004, 14-15).  The examples of Lingle and Kelo, however, refine this perspective.  
In both cases, the Court offered a decision that challenged prevailing cultural norms: that private 
property rights were not sacrosanct, but rather subject to government interference.  But the media 
rejected the Court’s frame only in the latter case, where the majority failed to communicate its 
decision effectively (Baron 2007).  Rather, it was the dissenters who offered successful strategic 
arguments that were designed to inflame public sentiment over the ruling. 
 An important contribution of this study, then, is to demonstrate how research on political 
communication has drawn broad conclusions while focusing on a narrow range of elites.  I hope 
to suggest ways to refine and improve existing models of elite influence in the future, paying 
more systematic attention to press coverage of other actors like the justices of the Supreme 
Court. 
 
Implications for Studies of Judicial Decision Making 
 The attitudinal model of judicial decision-making, which has played a key role in the 
study of Supreme Court rulings, suggests that justices base their votes on personal policy 
preferences alone (Segal and Spaeth 2002).  Scholars continue to refine this perspective, 
demonstrating that the justices also take into consideration legal principles (Clark and Carrubba 
2012, Knight and Epstein 1996), the preferences of other political actors (Segal 1997, Sala and 
Spriggs 2004, Harvey and Friedman 2006, Clark 2009), the state of public opinion (Marshall 
1989, Mishler and Sheehan 1993), and the identities of claimants (Carrubba et al. 2012).  Many 
of these approaches recognize a role for strategic behavior on the bench (see also Maltzman, 
Spriggs, and Wahlbeck 2000).  So, for instance, justices have at times preferred unanimous 
decisions to guard the legitimacy of the institution (Epstein, Segal, and Spaeth 2001). 
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 How might strategic considerations come into play when we consider media coverage of 
the Supreme Court?  Imagine the choice facing a justice as he or she prepares to vote in a case.  
Existing research shows that concerns about the Court’s image and a desire to shape the outcome 
create incentives to join the majority coalition.  But, as this dissertation demonstrates, voting 
decisions also have consequences for how the media will portray a ruling.  A justice may more 
effectively circumscribe the Court’s persuasive power by dissenting. 
 To be sure, media coverage likely plays a small role in judicial voting decisions, since it 
is unclear as to whether judges concern themselves with how the press depicts their work (see 
Davis 1994 and Baum 2006 for discussions).  It is even less clear as to whether the Court cares 
about decision-specific coverage; rather, it may focus on maintaining its diffuse support alone.  
But there are some indications that the justices may, at times, behave strategically through their 
votes and written opinions to influence the public.  Most importantly, the Court lacks the ability 
to enforce its rulings; it depends on the other branches to do so and on the public to comply 
(Johnson 1967).  With a dissenting vote, a justice may make public outcry – like the type that 
followed the Kelo decision – more likely. 
 There are, indeed, a few instances where a dissenting justice attempted to undermine 
popular support for a ruling.  In Arizona et al. v. U.S. (2012), the Court ruled that federal 
immigration law pre-empted an Arizona statute.  In a stinging dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia 
took aim at the ruling.  “Are the sovereign States at the mercy of the Federal Executive’s refusal 
to enforce the Nation’s immigration laws,” he asked.  In Ledbetter v. Tire & Rubber Co. (2007), 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg read an impassioned dissent from the bench, where she asserted, 
“the ball is in Congress’s court … the Legislature may act to correct this [decision].”  And in 
Kelo, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor issued a warning about the case’s implications for ordinary 
Americans.  All of these dissents strayed from formal legal analysis, using language to that 
betrayed concern with public opinion. 
 Going forward, I suggest that the study of judicial behavior should begin to incorporate 
how justices might use dissent to diminish public support for rulings.  This motivation, of course, 
is but a single ingredient of the many that shape judicial voting behavior.  But there are reasons 
to expect that each justice holds distinct preferences about the tradeoffs between shaping a case 
outcome, buttressing Court legitimacy, and ensuring public compliance with decisions. 
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Implications for Studies of Public Opinion 
 Finally, my findings have a number of implications for the study of public opinion.  I 
have taken care to explore a process that links elite action and public response more fully than 
other research on policy legitimation.  Scholars have long suggested that elites influence public 
opinion through messaging in the media (Zaller 1992, Zaller 1996), but studies of political 
communication and public opinion often exist separate from one another.  With respect to the 
Supreme Court, this separation has generated disputes rooted in methodological differences, 
since experimental studies offer an incomplete look at the information conveyed to the public.  I 
suggest that future research on public opinion would do well to explore media effects in a more 
realistic context. 
 Already, recent studies have taken steps in this direction.  Chong, Druckman, and 
colleagues explore the impact of multiple, competing frames on public opinion (Chong and 
Druckman 2007b, 2012, Druckman 2004, Druckman et al. 2010).  Their work demonstrates 
some important limits on framing effects in competitive contexts.  I hope to advance this 
discussion by demonstrating when and why credible sources fail to frame problems effectively in 
the media, which may in turn sharply constrain their ability to persuade.  But the study of 
contradictory cues and frames is in its early stages.  Much more remains to be explained about 
how public opinion takes shape in a complex media environment.   
But at this point evidence shows that the link between the Court and public is much less 
direct than commonly assumed.  Because the institution depends on the media to translate its 
decisions to ordinary Americans, its influence is circumscribed.  As this dissertation 
demonstrates, to important effect, the press does not defer to the wisdom of the justices in all 



















Coding Standards for Media Coverage Variables 
 
Frame dominance 
0 (Frame parity): If frame parity is present, critics of the Court / decision will receive extensive 
voice in the article.  Their arguments, either summarized or directly quoted, will contest the 
ruling on substantive (and possibly legal) grounds, often offering differing interpretations of the 
Court decision and its impact.  While the majority and/or its supporters may receive voice in the 
article, they will clearly fail to dominate the discussion and establish the superiority of their 
preferred frame.  Content of article focusing on Court majority’s frame at the expense of 
opposition frames: ~0-50%. 
 
.5: The article presents the viewpoints of both supporters and critics of the Court’s decision.  
The Court’s opinion might be quoted and/or explained in detail, but in this case dissenters and/or 
opponents will also offer their viewpoints. Alternatively, some articles may fail to mention the 
positions of the Court and its critics in great detail.  Articles that briefly mention a decision 
outcome but then discuss other matters related to it (that do not implicate support for or rejection 
of the majority’s frame) should be coded here. Content of article focusing on Court majority’s 
frame at the expense of opposition frames: ~50-75%. 
 
1 (Frame dominance): If the Court’s issue frame is accepted, the article will describe extensively 
what the Court ruled and why, frequently choosing to quote from the majority opinion itself.  
Opposing viewpoints (like those of dissenters on the Court, or activists upset with the decision) 
might also be present in the article, but these will be given very little space relative to the 
majority’s opinion and the reasoning behind it. Content of article focusing on Court majority’s 




0 (Opposition/unsupportive): Articles unsupportive of the Court’s decision may reject the 
Court’s framing of the issue (by giving extensive voice to critics of the ruling) and additionally 
express either explicit or implicit disapproval of the ruling.  Implicit approval is associated with 
the absence of challenges to the critics’ positions.  Alternatively, the article may be neutral with 
respect to the Court’s issue frame, but highlight explicitly a position that is unfavorable towards 
the ruling. 
 
.5 (Neutral/balanced): The article may be neutral as to whether it accepts the Court’s issue frame 
and, in doing so also fail to indicate support or opposition to the ruling through its language or 
tone.  It may also give equal voice to both critics and supporters of the decision – similar in their 
level of vehemence – in equal measure.  Alternatively, the article may either accept or reject the 
Court’s frame, but explicitly convey ambivalence about the decision overall. 
 
1 (Supportive): Articles supportive of the Court’s decision may accept the Court’s issue frame 
(by giving extensive voice to the majority and/or supporters of the ruling) and additionally 
express either explicit or implicit approval of these supporters.  Implicit approval is associated 
with the absence of challenges to the Court’s positions.  Alternatively, the article may be neutral 
with respect to the Court’s issue frame, but highlight explicitly a position that is favorable 
towards the ruling. 
 
Uncivil debate (cable news sample only) 
0 (No):  The program does not include two or more figures engaged in a back-and-forth 
discussion.  Alternatively, a program may include the presence of multiple figures engaged in a 
discussion in a “civilized” manner.  They may discuss the meaning and impact of a decision, 
with one of them acting as devil’s advocate for the purposes of better understanding a ruling (and 
not to actually generate a contentious substantive debate).  Similarly, two speakers can actually 
debate the merits of a ruling, but if they do so in the most civilized manner (no charged language, 
no long / contentious exchanges, no interruptions of one another) it should be coded here. 
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1 (Yes):  The program includes two or more figures that debate the merits of an issue/decision in 
anything less than a cordial manner.  Such debate is often characterized by charged language, 
lengthy back-and-forth discussions that take the form of an argument, and/or speakers 
interrupting one another during the course of a discussion.92 
 
Activism 
0 (No): No mentions of the term “activism” and its derivatives to characterize the decision.  Brief 
or no mention of overturning a lower court and/or legal precedent.  The article may say things 
like “groundbreaking,” “clarifies old law,” “answers new questions,” “overturns lower court,” 
though, and still be coded as 0. 
 
1 (Yes): The article clearly portrays the decision as activist.  This is most typically done with a 
mention of the phrase “activist” or “activism,” but might instead include a description of the 
Court’s overturning of a legal precedent.  However, mentions of overruling a precedent should 
be explicit and obvious.  Passing phrases about the establishment, clarification, and/or alteration 
of precedent do not indicate activism, but clear charges of an activist judiciary do.  These charges 
might emphasize an unelected body making policy judgments or a deliberate refusal to honor 













                                                








The Measurement of Decision Support 
 
Construction of the Measure 
 Dissensus Dynamics Theory explores the links between judicial voting outcomes and 
favorable media coverage of rulings.  Decision support serves as the main measure of news 
content, intended to tap the degree of favorable coverage afforded to any one Court decision. 
 To construct the measure, I begin by taking a random sample of all high salience 
Supreme Court rulings handed down between 1981 and 2008.  For each ruling in the sample, I 
limit the window of coverage from the day of its announcement to 30 days afterwards.  This time 
frame allows me to survey the vast majority of coverage that will ever be published on most 
decisions.  I conduct a Lexis-Nexis keyword search for “supreme court” and the name of one of 
the parties to the case in the New York Times (1981-2008), Washington Post (1981-2008), 
Washington Times (1989-2008), CNN (1995-2008), Fox News (1996-2008), and MSNBC (1996-
2008).  In most cases this party is the plaintiff, but when the search retrieves a small set of results 
or a large number of irrelevant results, I refine by searching for the name of the defendant.  Since 
cable news channels are less likely to mention the names of the parties before the Court, I also 
search for a substantive term related to the case on cable outlets (i.e., “abortion” in the case of 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services).  For each article in the sample, I focus on only the 
relevant portions of the text.  For instance, when an article summarizes a series of decisions in 
separate sections, I evaluate only the portion of the story that focuses on the ruling in question.  
This helps to ensure that coverage is decision-specific. 
 I expect that the news media can convey support for a decision by making positive 
evaluative judgments of it and/or by employing frames used by the Court majority.  Therefore, I 
code stories using two separate ordinal measures. The supportive tone of a report captures 
whether it directly or indirectly expresses support for a decision.  The frame dominance captures 
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how extensively a report explains a decision, gives voice to justices in the majority coalition, and 
mentions decision supporters vis-à-vis critics. 
 I combine the article level measures supportive tone and frame dominance – which tap 
different portions of the favorable coverage construct – into a decision support scale (also at the 
article level).  But Dissensus Dynamics Theory requires a decision-centered measure.  So I 
average article scores across all coverage of a case.  The ruling centered measure of decision 
support (0-1) captures the degree of favorable coverage (in tonal and framing terms) afforded 
any single ruling across the entirety of its coverage. 
 
Performance of the Measure 
Reliability 
 The reliability of a measure is the extent to which it is free from random error (Hoyle, 
Harris, and Judd 2002).  To improve reliability, I formalize a set of coding standards for both the 
supportive tone and frame dominance measures.  These coding standards are included in 
Appendix A.  Using these standards, a research assistant who was blind to the study’s hypotheses 
read and coded news coverage of a random sample of cases (10.3% of the newspaper articles, 
29% of the cable news stories). 
 I use a number of tools to assess and improve reliability.  Table B.1 presents two 
measures of intercoder reliability: percent agreement between coders (the author and the research 
assistant) and Krippendorff’s alpha.  With three coding categories for each variable, the baseline 
is 33.3% agreement by chance; in actuality, percent agreement ranges between 55.4% and 
70.2%.  Krippendorff’s alpha is among the most conservative standards for intercoder reliability, 
guarding against agreement by chance (Lombard, Snyder-Duch, and Bracken 2002; Lombard, 
Snyder-Duch, and Bracken 2004; Krippendorff 1987; Freelon 2010).  Krippendorff’s alpha 
scores range from .425 (the frame dominance category in the newspaper sample) to .735 (the 
supportive tone category in the cable news sample).  The print news reliability scores fall short 
of accepted standards, which is to be expected given the complex nature of the coding task.  To 
the extent that measurement error is non-systematic (i.e., the difficulty of the coding task leads to 
random error in article level coding), this will decrease the efficiency of estimated effects 
without biasing them (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). 
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Table B.1 Reliability of the Dependent Variable 
 Frame dominance Supportive tone 
 % agree Krippendorff’s ! % agree Krippendorf’s ! 
Newspaper sample .554 
 
.425 .643 .542 
Cable news sample .635 
 
.623 .702 .735 
 
 
 I address remaining reliability concerns in two ways.  First, I use a decision-centered 
dependent variable to alleviate inefficiencies that arise in the coding of individual articles.  
Though we cannot use intercoder reliability scores to assess the summary measure of decision-
centered coverage, we would expect the effect of article level coding error to diminish as the 
media publishes more stories on a given ruling.  To test this possibility, I run an OLS regression 
of Dissensus Dynamics Theory for print outlets only.  Since we expect more coverage to 
generate a more reliable decision support measure, the error term should be smaller for the most 
high salience decisions.  This is indeed the case – high coverage volume decreases the size of the 
residual term (though this relationship is not significant and other diagnostics indicate that 
heterogeneity is not a problem for the models presented in Chapters 5 and 6).  This suggests that 
combining multiple articles into a decision-centered measure, as I do here, may increase the 
efficiency of estimates and reliability of the dependent variable. 
 Additionally, combining the supportive tone and frame dominance measures improves 
reliability (the decision support scale).  The measures are highly correlated with one another; the 
scale reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s alpha) is .898 for the newspaper sample and .873 for the 
cable news sample. 
 
Validity 
 The validity of a measure is the extent to which it reflects only the desired construct 
without contamination from other systematically varying constructs (Hoyle, Harris, and Judd 
2002).  We can assess the validity of the decision support measure in a variety of ways. 
 Convergent validity represents the overlap between measures of a single construct that 
have different sources of systematic error.  The measures of favorable decision coverage that I 
employ are supportive tone and frame dominance.  The former taps the portion of the construct 
associated with direct praise for a ruling, which is most often found in editorials and Op-Eds.  
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This measure fails to account for the ways in which a ruling can receive favorable coverage 
absent direct praise.  Most importantly, it does not allow us to distinguish between framing 
contexts depending on whether they adhere to or depart from the Court’s analysis.  The frame 
dominance measure, on the other hand, allows us to tap framing contexts that are favorable to the 
Court, but it overlooks whether the frames are employed to praise or criticize a ruling.  For 
instance, coverage of Roe v. Wade may employ the “zone of privacy” frame to denounce the 
ruling as misguided (even though the majority coalition developed the frame).  The shortcomings 
of the supportive tone and frame dominance measures are a result of the different sources of 
systematic error in each; I therefore combine these distinct measures of the favorable coverage 
construct into a scale of decision support. 
 A measure with discriminate validity serves to distinguish between the construct it taps 
and other constructs.  Two of the concepts that are associated with but ultimately distinct from 
favorable coverage include incivility and judicial activism charges.  As we might expect, 
incivility on cable news programs is associated with decreases in decision support (r =-.406), but 
adding the incivility measure to the decision support scale weakens its reliability.  Similarly, 
accusations of judicial activism correlate negatively with decision support (r =-.337) but 
decrease the reliability of the index.  The decision support scale, then, appears to tap the desired 
construct while discriminating between the related yet distinct constructs of incivility and 
judicial activism in the news. 
 Finally, the decision support measure has strong predictive validity.  To test this, I use Ho 
and Quinn’s analysis of newspaper editorials on Supreme Court decisions from 1994 to 2004 
(Ho and Quinn 2008).  In a sample of 25 papers, the authors rank the New York Times and 
Washington Post as the most liberal and seventh most liberal sources.  They rank the Washington 
Times as the third most conservative.  Thus, we would expect a valid measure of decision 
support to show that favorable coverage varies depending on the relationship between source and 
decision ideology, all else equal.  I measure decision ideology with the Bailey ideal point 
estimate of the median justice in a majority coalition (see Carrubba et al. 2012) and offer 
separate models of decision support for liberal (the New York Times and Washington Post) and 
conservative (the Washington Times) newspapers.  Figure B.1 presents the estimated effect of 
majority median on decision support by source. As expected, liberal newspapers project less 
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support for rulings reached by conservative majority coalitions on the Court, further attesting to 




Graph shows estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for the effect of majority median on decision 
support by newspaper source, with positive coefficients indicating increased support for conservative rulings. 
 
Decision Support in Kelo v. New London 
 We can observe the decision support measure in action in the case of Kelo v. New 
London.  The realized value of the variable is .098 in the newspaper sample, meaning that the 
measure characterizes coverage of the ruling as highly unfavorable towards it in both tone and 
framing content.  In fact, Kelo has the lowest realized value for decision support in the sample. 
 Data from Chapter 4 provides evidence that the decision support measure characterizes 
coverage accurately.  The media’s displeasure with the decision is both strong and widespread.  
Editorials call it “uninformed expropriation” and “fascist.”  One source, speaking about the 
Supreme Court, says, “Do they have any idea what they’ve done?” The tone employed in the 
press with respect to the ruling is almost exclusively negative; so too are the frames used to 
characterize the decision.  As detailed in Chapter 4, five of the major frames in the news describe 
the decision in an unflattering light. 
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 To be sure, the decision support measure is one that captures central tendency alone.  It 
does little to suggest that a few articles praise Kelo.  It offers no information about the variety of 
negative perspectives that concern the decision.  It does not catalogue the specific frames used by 
the Court and its opponents.  But it is not intended to do so.  The decision support measure taps a 
construct that applies across a wide range of rulings: the degree of favorable coverage afforded 
any Court decision.  Though Kelo represents an extreme case along this spectrum, the measure 
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Stimuli from Study 1, Framing a Religious Expression Ruling 
 
Condition: Cue + Positive Frame___________________________________________________ 
Praise for Supreme Court Ruling in Favor of Religious Groups 
WASHINGTON (AP) - The Supreme Court recently enhanced the ability of religious groups to 
promote their messages in the public arena.  In a 5 to 4 vote, the Court held that the University of 
Virginia was constitutionally obligated to subsidize a student religious publication, as it did other 
non-religious publications. 
The decision marked the first time that the Court approved government funding for a 
religious activity. 
Many groups hailed the ruling as a major victory for Constitutional principles. 
"We have crossed a critical threshold in the fight over the First Amendment," said Jeffrey 
Fort, chief litigator for the American Center for Law and Justice. "The message is clear: The 
Supreme Court has protected the United States Constitution." 
In the case, a former university student had sought $ 5,800 from a student activities fund to 
publish "Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective at the University of Virginia."  The Supreme 
Court ruled that once a state-supported university decides to underwrite the private speech of any 
group of students, it "may not silence the expression of selected viewpoints" on the grounds that 
the expression is religious in content. 
Martin Renault, executive director of Americans United, was one of the many to praise the 
decision and said the Court provided a level playing field for all students. “The Court has, for the 
first time, balanced the freedom of speech and the freedom of religion,” Mr. Renault said. “This 





Condition: Cue + Negative Frame__________________________________________________ 
Criticism for Supreme Court Ruling in Favor of Religious Groups 
WASHINGTON (AP) - The Supreme Court recently enhanced the ability of religious groups to 
promote their messages in the public arena.  In a 5 to 4 vote, the Court held that the University of 
Virginia was constitutionally obligated to subsidize a student religious publication, as it did other 
non-religious publications. 
The decision marked the first time that the Court approved government funding for a 
religious activity. 
Many groups denounced the ruling as a major defeat for Constitutional principles. 
"We have crossed a critical threshold in the fight over the First Amendment," said Jeffrey 
Fort, chief litigator for the American Center for Law and Justice. "The message is clear: The 
Supreme Court has dishonored the United States Constitution. 
In the case, a former university student had sought $ 5,800 from a student activities fund to 
publish "Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective at the University of Virginia."  The Supreme 
Court ruled that once a state-supported university decides to underwrite the private speech of any 
group of students, it "may not silence the expression of selected viewpoints" on the grounds that 
the expression is religious in content. 
But Martin Renault, executive director of Americans United, was one of the many to 
criticize the decision and said that the Court failed to provide a level playing field for all 
students. “The Court has, for the first time, failed to balance the freedom of speech and the 
freedom of religion,” he said. “This decision creates a double standard that will be used in 
















Selected Stimuli from Study 2, Framing Four Legal Controversies 
 
Gun Rights Issue: Cue + Positive Frame 
Controversy Over Gun Ban Grows As Supreme Court Declares it Unconstitutional 
 Washington (AP) – In a landmark decision, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the Gun Free 
School Zones Act, declaring it an unconstitutional exercise of federal power.  The Court ruled 
that only state and local governments have the ability to shape gun control policies in school 
zones. 
  Nonetheless, the longstanding debate over gun control in the United States continues to 
inflame passions, as both supporters and opponents of gun restrictions have turned their attention 
to firearms near schools.  Many activists oppose the law known as the Gun Free School Zones 
Act because it grants broad power to the federal government to restrict gun rights.  They argue, 
instead, that because education is primarily a local matter, that state and local government must 
have the exclusive ability to enact gun laws near schools in accordance with the Constitution. 
  According to James A. Michael, a gun rights advocate, “There is no doubt that Congress 
lacks the authority to regulate matters that deal with local schools.  It is not up to federal officials 
to ban the gun rights enshrined in the Second Amendment while local governments retain 
authority over the educational institutions near which they are banned.”  He pointed to the fact 
that the federal ban was overly broad, including a 1000-foot radius around all schools, which he 
argued Congress was using to chip away at gun rights. 
  “If we accept the argument that the national government can ban guns near schools, we 
are hard-pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to 
regulate,” said Martin O’Brien, a Washington D.C.-based attorney and Constitutional expert. By 
the same logic, he added, school curricula and state laws governing divorce and child custody 
would also come under federal control. 
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  The Gun Free School Zones Act has been controversial since its adoption.  At issue are 
two major principles.  With respect to the matter of federal power, opponents of the Act argue 
that it drastically expands the authority of the national government beyond what the Constitution 
permits.  Congress is not permitted, they say, to regulate matters dealing with education.  
Second, the Act has angered gun rights advocates, who view it as an unconstitutional 
infringement on the right to bear arms. 
  The Supreme Court has settled this debate for the time being, striking down the gun ban 


























Gun Rights Issue: No Cue + Positive Frame 
Controversy Over Gun Ban Grows 
Washington (AP) – The longstanding debate over gun control in the United States continues to 
inflame passions, as both supporters and opponents of gun restrictions have turned their attention 
to firearms near schools.  Many activists oppose the law known as the Gun Free School Zones 
Act because it grants broad power to the federal government to restrict gun rights.  They argue, 
instead, that because education is primarily a local matter, that state and local government must 
have the exclusive ability to enact gun laws near schools in accordance with the Constitution. 
  According to James A. Michael, a gun rights advocate, “There is no doubt that Congress 
lacks the authority to regulate matters that deal with local schools.  It is not up to federal officials 
to ban the gun rights enshrined in the Second Amendment while local governments retain 
authority over the educational institutions near which they are banned.”  He pointed to the fact 
that the federal ban was overly broad, including a 1000-foot radius around all schools, which he 
argued Congress was using to chip away at gun rights. 
  “If we accept the argument that the national government can ban guns near schools, we 
are hard-pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to 
regulate,” said Martin O’Brien, a Washington D.C.-based attorney and Constitutional expert. By 
the same logic, he added, school curricula and state laws governing divorce and child custody 
would also come under federal control. 
  The Gun Free School Zones Act has been controversial since its adoption.  At issue are 
two major principles.  With respect to the matter of federal power, opponents of the Act argue 
that it drastically expands the authority of the national government beyond what the Constitution 
permits.  Congress is not permitted, they say, to regulate matters dealing with education.  
Second, the Act has angered gun rights advocates, who view it as an unconstitutional 








Government Takings Issue: Cue + Negative Frame 
Controversy Over Gun Ban Grows As Supreme Court Declares it Unconstitutional 
Washington (AP) – In a landmark decision, the U.S. Supreme Court broadened the “takings” 
power, which allows the government to extract revenue from private companies.  The Court 
found it constitutional for the government to regulate the property of private entities for the 
public good, so long as it provides compensation for the taking. 
 Nonetheless, the longstanding debate over property rights in the United States continues 
to inflame passions.  Both supporters and opponents struggle over the proper scope of the takings 
power, which allows the government to extract revenue from private companies.  Many activists 
argue that the government does not have the power to trample on private property rights.  They 
argue that government takings do little to ensure economic fairness. 
  According to James A. Michael, a lawyer who opposes most government takings, “The 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment allows the government to seize private property in only 
the rarest of cases.” He pointed to the fact that most takings do not further the public good, even 
though governments have used this rationale to expand their control over the private market.  In 
Hawaii, for instance, the government has limited the rent that companies can charge to use their 
property. 
  “Private property is a bedrock of our society and we must protect it from bureaucratic 
interference,” said Martin O’Brien, a Washington D.C.-based attorney and Constitutional expert.  
He argued that city governments have traditionally used the eminent domain power to clear land 
that belongs to homeowners, even if they do not wish to give up their property.  According to 
O’Brien, “Though governments must provide some compensation when they take land, this is 
little solace to the people whose property is seized.” 
  Controversy over regulatory takings has increased in recent years.  At issue are two major 
principles.  With respect to the Fifth Amendment, opponents of takings argue that the 
Constitution guards against abuse by a powerful government. Second, many activists argue that 
the government must protect the property rights of all Americans, since such rights are a 
fundamental part of society and ensure a prosperous economy. 
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The Supreme Court, however, has settled this debate for the time being, upholding the 
right of the government to extract revenue from private companies as a constitutional exercise of 































Government Takings Issue: No Cue + Negative Frame 
Controversy Over Property Rights Grows 
Washington (AP) – The longstanding debate over property rights in the United States continues 
to inflame passions.  Both supporters and opponents struggle over the proper scope of the takings 
power, which allows the government to extract revenue from private companies.  Many activists 
argue that the government does not have the power to trample on private property rights.  They 
argue that government takings do little to ensure economic fairness. 
  According to James A. Michael, a lawyer who opposes most government takings, “The 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment allows the government to seize private property in only 
the rarest of cases.” He pointed to the fact that most takings do not further the public good, even 
though governments have used this rationale to expand their control over the private market.  In 
Hawaii, for instance, the government has limited the rent that companies can charge to use their 
property. 
  “Private property is a bedrock of our society and we must protect it from bureaucratic 
interference,” said Martin O’Brien, a Washington D.C.-based attorney and Constitutional expert.  
He argued that city governments have traditionally used the eminent domain power to clear land 
that belongs to homeowners, even if they do not wish to give up their property.  According to 
O’Brien, “Though governments must provide some compensation when they take land, this is 
little solace to the people whose property is seized.” 
  Controversy over regulatory takings has increased in recent years.  At issue are two major 
principles.  With respect to the Fifth Amendment, opponents of takings argue that the 
Constitution guards against abuse by a powerful government. Second, many activists argue that 
the government must protect the property rights of all Americans, since such rights are a 
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